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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Strategies for South Africa’s development are often analysed from a predominantly 
economic perspective, overlooking the key role that political and sociocultural 
elements play in the developmental process. This study will assess possible 
development strategies by making use of the modern world-systems (MWS) 
theoretical perspective, due to the theory’s holistic approach to development. The 
question is posed whether South Africa – in accordance with the MWS perspective – 
will be able to ascend from its current semi-peripheral position in the hierarchy of the 
modern world-system to the core group of states by 2025. The components for 
national development are all-encompassing and require an increase in state strength, 
long-term economic development, and domestic and international sociocultural 
influence.  
 
Prospects for South Africa’s ascent to the core have been explored within a 15-20 
year time period because the capitalist world-economy is currently still in a phase of 
contraction, or B-phase of growth (1973-2025). The modern world-systems 
theoretical approach asserts that country mobility is more likely during this phase and 
that ascent in the hierarchy will be increasingly difficult when the world-economy 
begins its expansionary phase around 2025.  
 
The study concludes that South Africa faces numerous external and internal 
constraints to its development, despite the noteworthy economic, political and 
sociocultural incentives that it could potentially capitalise on over the next fifteen 
years.  It is anticipated that these constraints will place the country in a position 
whereby it will be unable to reap the benefits of the most optimal developmental 
strategies put forward by the modern world-systems approach; hence it will be 
severely challenged to attain core status by 2025.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
 
Strategieë vir die ontwikkeling van Suid-Afrika word meerendeels geanaliseer vanuit 
‘n hoofsaaklike ekonomiese invalshoek en dit het tot gevolg dat die rol wat politieke 
en sosio-kulturele aspekte in die ontwikkelingsproses speel nie op ag geslaan word 
nie. Die studie evalueer moontlike ontwikkelings-strategieë vir Suid-Afrika deur 
gebruik te maak van die moderne wêreld-sisteem teoretiese benadering (MWS) wat ‘n 
meer holistiese perspektief op ontwikkeling bied. Die vraag word gevra of Suid-
Afrika – in ooreenstemming met die uitganspunte van MWS - teen 2025 sal kan 
vorder tot die kategorie van “kern-staat”, vanaf sy huidige status as “semi-periferale 
staat”. Die allesomvattende komponente vir ontwikkeling wat MWS identifiseer 
vereis die groei van staatskapasiteit, langtermyn ekonomiese ontwikkeling, en die 
uitbreiding van regionale en internasionale sosio-kulturele invloed. 
 
Die vooruitsigte vir Suid-Afrika se opgang is nagevors oor die verloop van ‘n 15-20 
jaar tydperk, aangesien die kapitalistiese wêreld-ekonomie tans in ‘n fase van 
kontraksie verkeer (B-fase van groei) tussen 1973-2025. Die MWS benadering 
argumenteer dat opwaartse mobiliteit van state meer waarskynlik is tydens ‘n B-fase 
van groei en dat opgang moeiliker sal word wanneer die wêreld-ekonomie weer ‘n 
ekspansionistiese fase van groei betree in 2025. 
 
Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat Suid-Afrika se ontwikkelings-uitdagings 
deur beide eksterne en interne faktore bemoeilik word, nieteenstaande moontlike 
sterkpunte op ekonomiese, politieke en sosio-kulturele gebied waarop dit sou kon 
kapitaliseer oor die volgende 15 jaar. Hierdie faktore, word geargumenteer, sal 
veroorsaak dat die optimale ontwikkelingstrategieë wat deur ander state gevolg is, nie 
deur Suid-Afrika nagevolg sal kan word nie, en dat gevolglik, sonder innoverende 
strategieë, die kanse dat die land kern-status teen 2025 sal bereik, gering is. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Background to the Study 
Post-Apartheid South Africa has emerged out of the cloud of uncertainty that seemed 
to obscure its future prospects in the early nineties. It has successfully carried out four 
relatively peaceful democratic elections since then and possesses one of the most 
liberal constitutions in the world.  South Africa is also the dominant economic player 
on the African continent and has an economy that is highly sophisticated in many 
sectors. The country is beginning to recover after experiencing its first recession in 17 
years due to the global economic crisis. According to World Bank (2011a, 2011b, 
2011c) statistics, before the global financial crisis hit South Africa it maintained a 
favourable real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of five percent between 
2004 and 2007. With a gross national income (GNI) per capita of US$6,090 in 2010, 
it is classified as an upper middle-income developing country by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2011d). Furthermore, Africa’s southern-most state is held in high 
regard in international security circles after it voluntarily disbanded its nuclear 
weapons programme. Its human rights based foreign policy has allowed it to take part 
in several high-level diplomatic activities, such as the conflicts in Sudan and Northern 
Ireland and the peace process in Israel and Palestine (Van der Westhuizen, 1998:435-
437). 
 
Strategies for South Africa’s development are predominantly examined from a purely 
economic standpoint, whilst overlooking the impact of political and social elements. 
There is considerable contestation among scholars about the degree of importance that 
the performance of a country’s economy has on its overall development and whether 
it can be looked at in isolation. The integrative approach in the social sciences, 
although not specifically focused on development, is a relatively new one and 
theorists (Gilpin, 2001; Keohane and Nye, 1977) with an understanding of the 
international political economy (IPE) are sensitive to the dynamics of interdependence 
within a world that is increasingly subjected to the forces of globalisation. Keohane 
(2009) recalls: 
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“When Susan Strange, Joseph Nye, Peter Katzenstein, Stephen Krasner, John Ruggie, and I 
started to explore IPE – Susan in the 1960s, Joe and Steve and I around 1970, Peter and John a few 
years later – there was no field. Very little research was being done. Most economists were ignoring 
politics, and international relations specialists saw political economy as ‘low politics’, minor, boring, 
and incomprehensible. So our task – and opportunity – was first one of identification, then of broad 
interpretation” (Keohane, 2009:34) 
 
This study is based on the premise held by Modern World-Systems (MWS) theorists 
that equating a country’s position and development in the international system solely 
to its economic performance does not paint the entire picture. For this reason, the 
approach will be to examine the social, economic and political dynamics of 
development in South Africa. The MWS theoretical perspective will be used for this 
endeavour as it delves deeply into the theme from a systemic point of view. World-
systems theorists aspire to incorporate various social scientific disciplines in gaining 
an understanding of our complex world, especially in the fields of politics and 
economics. They aim to do this by claiming that the modern world-system consists of 
an interstate system and a world-economy. This integrated approach of social 
scientific disciplines returns to what Strange (1984) described as: 
 
“… a vast, wide open range where anyone interested in the behavior of men and women in 
society could roam just as freely as the deer and the antelope. There were no fences or boundary-posts 
to confine the historians to history, the economists to economics. Political scientists had no exclusive 
rights to write about politics, nor sociologists to write about social relations” (Strange, 1984:ix). 
 
Wallerstein (1974b) is the ‘father’ of MWS theory, which emerged in the early 1970s. 
He believes that the modern world-system - in the form of the capitalist world-
economy - has its roots in 16th century Europe (Wallerstein, 1974b:229). It is driven 
by the enduring need of capital accumulation and has enlarged to the extent that it has 
incorporated the entire planet (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2005:206). The interstate 
system is the political equivalent of the capitalist world-economy; the two combine to 
form the current world-system (Sanderson, 2005:182). It is anticipated that by 
locating its current position in the modern world-system, coupled with the knowledge 
of the system’s future trajectory, this perspective will help us to understand the 
internal and external policy alternatives that will direct South Africa’s future 
development. 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 3 
1.2. Problem and Research Question 
McGowan (1993) stresses the need for a shift toward an integrated understanding of 
development by emphasising that ascent or descent within the current world-system 
can only be understood by means of a holistic approach. He argues that although long-
term economic development forms the base for upward mobility in the world-system; 
cultural strength and impact, as well as political stability and legitimacy (combined 
with sound public and foreign policies by the state), are necessary for leadership in 
international and regional affairs (McGowan, 1993:37). 
 
According to MWS theorists, the world is organised as a political-economic hierarchy 
of core, semi-peripheral and peripheral states. A state’s position in this hierarchy is 
determined by its role in the division of labour within the capitalist world-economy 
(Shannon, 1989). Core states are economically, politically, and technologically 
advanced and essentially comprise the members of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD); other than possibly South Korea. Semi-
peripheral states and zones share core-like and peripheral-like traits and include much 
of Eastern Europe, the major oil-exporting countries, and the range of newly 
industrialised countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Mexico 
(Haggard, 1990:9). Peripheral countries are economically underdeveloped and are 
politically unstable; they occupy large regions in the world, which include Africa, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and Asia. According to 
McGowan (1993), national development in the current era has involved ascent in this 
hierarchy, as experienced by the United States and Germany in the 19th century and 
the Republic of Korea since 1960. Decline has also been a reality for many states such 
as the semi-peripheralisation that occurred in Bourbon Spain (McGowan, 1993:37). 
 
World-systems theorists (Wallerstein, 1979; Arrighi and Drangel, 1986; Andreasson, 
2001; Martin and Wallerstein, 1990; Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998b) appear 
to be in agreement that South Africa currently possesses an advanced semi-peripheral 
status in the modern world-system. This argument is supported when analysing the 
country’s contemporary economic and political situation. Gross National Product 
(GNP) per capita is the primary economic-level indicator that these theorists use for 
assessing a country’s position in the MWS. South Africa’s proposed semi-peripheral 
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position corresponds with the World Bank’s (2011e) GNP per capita country 
classification criteria for upper middle-income developing countries.  
 
Cox (1992) explains the power, or political, structure behind the economic base of the 
modern world-system as follows: 
 
“Core economies are dominant over peripheral economies; they determine the conditions in 
which peripheral economies produce and they extract surplus from peripheral production for the 
enhancement of the core. Thus, the core produces underdevelopment in the periphery through the 
economic relations linking the two. Semi-periphery economies are strong enough to protect themselves 
from this kind of exploitation, and they struggle to attain core status” (Cox, 1992:510). 
 
The semi-periphery benefits from this exploitative relationship by dominating the 
periphery through a trade surplus. Trade patterns are usually skewed heavily in favour 
of the semi-periphery as peripheral countries serve as a market for their exports. This 
exploitation by the semi-periphery has an important role to play on the systemic level, 
as it brings stability to the world-system (Wallerstein, 2000:88-90). This stabilising 
role serves as a useful political indicator of a country’s semi-peripheral status; this is 
also reflected in its diplomatic activities. Van der Westhuizen (1998) and Jordaan 
(2003) observed that South Africa conducts its foreign policy in accordance with 
other middle powers; which is a predominantly stabilising and peacemaking role. The 
country’s diplomatic activities have extended beyond the southern Africa region; it 
has for example engaged in the peace process in Israel and Palestine, and the conflict 
in Northern Ireland (Jordaan, 2003:167-169; Van der Westhuizen, 1998:435-437). 
The contention is not that a middle power and a semi-peripheral state share the same 
characteristics; a useful comparison can be drawn between the world-systems and 
middle power theory however when one looks at the extensive use of multilateral 
activities that these sets of countries are involved in. South Africa’s multilateral 
activities can be seen in its increasing involvement in institutions and alliances such as 
the World Bank, the G-20, BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) and 
IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) (World Bank, 2011e). 
 
McGowan (1993) focused on whether South Africa was likely to ascend from the 
semi-periphery into the core, and as a result be comparable to minor core states such 
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as Ireland and Portugal; or whether it would descend into the African zone of the 
world’s periphery. He contended that the answer to this question lay in the careful 
analysis of the recent past, the present, and the near-term situation in the world and in 
South Africa (McGowan, 1993:37). The outlook at the time was somewhat gloomy 
considering that the country was experiencing significant political instability as well 
as negative economic growth during that period. McGowan’s analysis, as well as that 
of Andreasson (2001), will be discussed in the literature overview in the following 
chapter. The chapter will also contain a theoretical component based on Wallerstein’s 
work that, amongst other things, will discuss the possible strategies for ascent in the 
modern world-system.  
 
A comparative study will be made between recent ascents in the MWS using the 
different development strategies proposed by the theoretical perspective, in order to 
assess whether the growth trajectories are completely independent or whether there is 
a degree of compatibility. This study supports the argument that all ascents in the 
MWS need to adopt a level of protectionism at different stages of their development. 
Sally (Sally, 2000:403) points out that between 1985 and 1995 almost half of all 
developing countries with protectionist policies adopted relatively open trading 
regimes. 
 
The impact that the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has had on the movement 
within the hierarchy of core, semi-peripheral and peripheral states needs to be looked 
at closely as a result. Theorists such as Robert Wade argue that the WTO’s 
commitment to liberalisation and privatisation is shrinking both the development and 
‘self-determination’ space of developing countries (Wade, 2003:622). Chang (2003) 
refers to this shrinkage as ‘kicking away the ladder’ as the developed nations – who 
he argues adopted interventionist policies such as infant industry protection and 
export subsidies during their developmental phases – are hiding the ‘secrets of their 
success’ (Chang, 2003:1-3). The impact that the WTO has had on developmental 
policy alternatives will be looked at in a separate chapter, considering that it may have 
a significant impact on South Africa’s policy space. It could make it more difficult for 
South Africa to emulate successful ascents in the modern world-system if this is the 
case. The need for comparison is important because South Africa can learn a lot from 
the successes and failures of countries that followed different developmental paths.  
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The aim of this study is to present an updated version of South Africa’s current 
position and prospects in the modern world-system, by revisiting and building upon 
the work conducted by McGowan (1993) and Andreasson (2001). This will also be 
undertaken by combining a historical, contemporary, and forward-looking analysis of 
South Africa and the world-system. The study will identify strategies that can assist 
South Africa with its endeavour to acquire core status, once its current position has 
been located in the modern world-system and a comparison has been made to 
previous studies regarding whether it has been ascending or descending in this system. 
South Africa’s internal and external strategies for ascent should be evaluated in 
conjunction with its anticipated domestic and international constraints and incentives.  
 
The research question for this study is the following: What strategies can South 
Africa employ in order to ascend in the contemporary modern world-system? 
 
1.3. Research Objectives  
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate what contribution modern world-
systems theory can make to better understand South Africa’s developmental strategy 
alternatives. From this perspective, the measurement of the country’s development 
will entail a shift from the semi-periphery to the core group of countries. In addition 
to furthering research already undertaken regarding this topic by authors such as 
McGowan (1993) and Andreasson (2001), the remaining chapters will be guided by 
the following questions: 
 
1. What is the Modern World-Systems theory and what strategies have led to ascent 
in the MWS? 
 
2. What has South Africa’s historical trajectory in the MWS been?  
 
3. What impact has the advent of the WTO had on strategies implemented by 
countries aspiring to move up this division of labour? How does it affect the 
comparisons that South Africa should draw upon when analysing recent ascents in 
the MWS?  
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4. What should South Africa’s internal and external strategies for ascent be and how 
can they be tailored to anticipated changes in the world-system over the next 15-
20 years?  
 
1.4. Motivation for the Selection of this Case 
Limited research has been undertaken using a holistic approach when looking for 
ways in which South Africa can secure its future growth and development. Fewer 
researchers have tried to do so using the MWS theoretical perspective as the 
foundation for their analysis. Building on the existing literature, this thesis will 
provide a contemporary understanding of South Africa’s current position and future 
prospects within the world-system. South Africa’s political, economic, and cultural 
influence is being increasingly felt internationally, and particularly within Africa. 
Coming out of nearly fifty years of authoritarian rule under the Apartheid regime, the 
country’s gradual democratic consolidation greatly influences its ability for upward 
mobility within the modern world-system. South Africa’s new democracy has gained 
international accreditation, often allowing it to punch above its weight in the global 
arena (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:15).  
 
Being a middle-income, emerging country, South Africa plays an important role in the 
global economy. Its influence is amplified on the African continent, wherein it is often 
viewed as the dominant player. McGowan (1993) notes that the cultural influence of 
countries is often overlooked, and this is something which South Africa possesses in 
abundance. Its highly respected academic institutions, sporting achievements, and the 
fact that it is a member of the English-speaking world, combine to give South Africa a 
decided advantage over other upper-middle income countries (McGowan, 1993:342-
43).  
 
Although not being investigated in this study, the country’s ascent in the modern 
world-system towards the core group of states could have a major impact on the 
growth of the rest of the continent. There is significant potential for the spill-over of 
the country’s economic, political, and social/cultural success. South Africa is seen as 
the gateway to the rest of Africa. All of these elements combine to make this a 
necessary area of enquiry. 
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1.5. Research Design 
The research design will follow a historical-comparative approach (Mouton, 
2001:154,170). This approach supports the aim of this study by tracing the 
development of countries over time and comparing their developmental strategies. 
The historical nature of this study will draw on comparisons at different times in the 
modern world-system, since the inception of capitalism around the sixteenth century. 
It needs to be comparative in nature because it allows for a cross-national focus on the 
similarities and differences between groups of units of analysis. This is especially 
effective when assessing the movement of countries within the division of labour. A 
comparison will made between country classifications i.e. core, semi-peripheral and 
peripheral countries; as well as between individual countries that have adopted 
specific developmental strategies, such as Mexico and Brazil, Russia and China, and 
Taiwan and South Korea.  
 
Mouton (2001) believes that the advantage of the comparative approach is that it 
provides the opportunity to test a theory across different settings. A major limitation 
of the approach, however, lies in the degree of comparability of the cases. The 
researcher needs to look beyond merely selecting the appropriate cases for the 
purpose of selection, by taking constraints such as differences in language and culture, 
and various other endogenous forces, into account (Mouton, 2001:154-155).  
 
1.6. Methodology 
According to Wallerstein (1974b), the world-system itself is the primary unit of 
analysis in modern world-systems theory. South Africa and the various other states 
that will be selected for this study exist within the world-system. The methodology of 
this study will follow a hybrid of the quantitative-statistical and the qualitative-
interpretative approaches (Marais and Mouton, 1988:153). Statistical indicators such 
as national income per capita and gross domestic product are paramount when 
undertaking the task of tracking a country’s performance within the world-system. 
These statistics have no meaning in isolation however, and gain their real value when 
utilised within the historical-comparative approach of this thesis. The research will 
also be descriptive and explanatory in nature (Marais and Mouton, 1988:42-46). It is 
descriptive in its assessment of the modern world-system and the movement of states 
within the system itself. The study is explanatory in its attempt to predict the most 
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suitable strategy, or mix of strategies, that will lead to South Africa’s upward mobility 
in the division of labour. The predictive element of the explanatory research takes 
place within a 15-20 year time scope, and is presented within the MWS theoretical 
framework. This time scope is being used because the capitalist world-economy is 
currently still in a phase of contraction, or B-phase of growth. The modern world-
systems theoretical approach states that semi-peripheral mobility is much more likely 
during this phase. It is anticipated that the world-economy will begin its expansionary 
phase around 2025 (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1996). 
 
No primary data collection will be carried out for the purpose of this study; it will thus 
be completely reliant on secondary data and desktop analysis. This will suit the 
historical-comparative, descriptive and explanatory nature of the study. The data will 
be collected from secondary sources such as academic books and journals, the 
Internet, and newspaper articles.  
 
1.7. Key Variables 
1.7.1. Dependent and Independent Variables 
The dependent variable focuses on why a state, South Africa in this case, ascends in 
the hierarchy of the modern world-system. The independent variables comprise the 
economic, political and cultural indicators that have either a positive or negative 
influence on the possibility of ascent. According to McGowan (1993), economic, state 
and cultural strength serve as the components required for national development in the 
political-economic hierarchy of core, semi-peripheral and peripheral states. MWS 
theorists utilise diverse indicators for determining a country’s location in this 
hierarchy; hence this study will be combining the most prominent economic, political 
and cultural indicators. The economic requirement for upward mobility is based on 
the development of South Africa’s role in the international division of labour. Good 
indicators of this development include the nature of its imports and exports, the 
percentage of GDP growth and the composition of GDP per sector (Wallerstein, 
1979). The World Bank’s comparative statistics, based on national income per capita, 
serve as another important indicator that will be used to assess whether South Africa 
has moved from its current upper middle-income developing country status to one 
where it joins the group of high-income core countries (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986).  
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An indication of South Africa’s development on the political level will be measured 
by whether it experiences an increasingly influential role in regional and global 
affairs, whilst furthering its domestic political strength. Both the nature of the 
country’s diplomatic activities and the furthering of its hegemonic attributes on the 
African continent are good indicators of the former (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 
1998b; Shannon, 1989). Domestic state strength will be measured by looking at the 
legitimacy of the ANC government, whether democratic consolidation is being 
furthered, the quality of its public policies, and whether it can ensure regional 
security. The extension of South Africa’s cultural strength is paramount on the social 
level. Reputable institutions, as well as influence in the world of entertainment and 
sport, are indicators of positive cultural traits that a country should try to advance. 
Socioeconomic characteristics will also be assessed due to the potentially divisive role 
that they can play during the formation of state unity (McGowan, 1993).  
 
1.7.2. Intervening Variables 
The intervening variables – strategies for ascent – could potentially influence how 
ascent in the hierarchy can be brought about using the economic, political and cultural 
indicators. The adoption of each strategy, or mix of strategies, will either hinder or 
facilitate ascent. Wallerstein (1974a) proposes that there are three possible strategies 
for ascent in the modern world-system. These include development through self-
reliance, by invitation, or by seizing the chance. Wallerstein also proposed a fourth 
strategy which is solely aimed at semi-peripheral ascent. This strategy involves 
attaining a favourable strategic mix of policies which allow semi-peripheral countries 
to attain optimal cost levels whilst acquiring a certain absolute size of the market for 
their products in order to ascend in the world-economy. 
 
Strategy A 
Ascent through self-reliance 
This closed national strategy of structural change was prevalent in Communist 
countries such as China and Russia. Of all the strategies this one has enjoyed the least 
success, with one of the most successful interestingly being Tanzania (Wallerstein, 
1974a:14-15). 
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Strategy B 
Ascent by invitation 
Promotion by invitation usually occurs during moments of economic expansion. Both 
Japan and South Korea are contemporary examples of countries that have benefited 
from this collaborative development, with the US in this case. On the African 
continent, the Ivory Coast underwent this path of development (Wallerstein, 
1974a:13-14). 
  
Strategy C 
Ascent by seizing the chance 
This approach, which is also known as import substitution, is adopted by countries 
during moments of world-market contraction. It has traditionally resulted in an 
increase in industrial activity in these countries, such as that experienced by South 
Africa, Brazil, and Mexico in the wake of the Great Depression of 1929 (Wallerstein, 
1974a:9-10). 
 
Strategy D 
Combining optimal cost levels with an enlarged market 
It is of paramount importance for semi-peripheral countries attempting to make this 
shift that they have a large enough market (internal or external) at their disposal to 
justify a sophisticated technology that is produced at a lower cost than existing 
producers. Successful countries have adopted various techniques to enlarge their 
markets for national products. Both Germany and the United States made this 
transition in the nineteenth century; whereas England had already gained membership 
by the time the seventeenth-century recession came about (Wallerstein, 1974a:16-18). 
 
After careful consideration the most appropriate strategy, or mix of strategies, will be 
proposed for South Africa in its attempt to attain core status. South Africa’s proposed 
policy options need to be expanded thereafter, by placing them within the context of 
the internal and external constraints and incentives that should be addressed and 
exploited respectively. These constraints and incentives will be put forward 
holistically by evaluating their political, economic, and social elements. Economic 
incentives include South-South trade in the current B-phase, outperforming the upper 
middle income group, and capitalising on Africa as South Africa’s external market. 
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The economic constraints that need to be addressed revolve around the mineral-
energy complex, the state of technology and infrastructure, wage levels, and the brain 
drain. The political incentives that will be looked at are consolidation of South 
Africa’s relatively new democracy and the utilisation of foreign policy as a 
partnership-building tool; constraints include corruption, crime and xenophobia. The 
growth of South Africa’s cultural strength through high quality institutions and 
through achievements in the sporting arena will help to extend the country’s soft 
power; whereas significant constraints are experienced as a result of unemployment, 
poverty, and inequality, as well as health and education levels (Ahwireng-Obeng and 
McGowan, 1998b; Alden and Soko, 2005; Arrighi and Zhang, 2010; McGowan, 
1993; World Bank, 2011e).  
 
1.8. Research Limitations  
The consultation of secondary sources and desktop research will serve as the primary 
mode of gathering information for this thesis. The researcher is restricted to the books 
and journals that can be accessed via public libraries and the Internet. The historical 
nature of the research means that reliability and validity cannot be guaranteed. The 
data will be analysed objectively as a result, taking into account the possibility of 
ethnocentrism. The next limitation concerns the theoretical framework that this study 
bases its arguments on. Critics of the modern world-systems theory argue that it 
overlooks endogenous characteristics of societies, and overemphasises economic 
relationships; they also refute the theory’s notion of the exploitation of the periphery, 
as well as the development of underdevelopment.  
 
MWS theorists defend the importance that they give to economic relationships by 
emphasising that the complexity of the social world cannot be understood by breaking 
it up into different areas of enquiry. They hold the materialist conception of history 
which states that the economic development of society is a catalyst for historical 
change (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2005:200-205). Wallerstein maintains that a 
society’s position in the world-economy is the sole determinant of where it is located 
politically and militarily in the world-system. This is seen in his explanation of the 
exploitation of the periphery by the core, serving as the fundamental relationship 
among parts of the system (Shannon, 1996:138). 
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It is evident that endogenous characteristics of societies are neglected but an over 
analysis of this would rob the theory of its greatest attribute, namely that it 
incorporates a holistic approach on a systemic level. This framework allows the 
analysis of the topic to be far more integrative than it would otherwise have been. The 
increasing speed of globalisation has illuminated the interconnectedness of what was 
traditionally viewed as separate spheres of society, both within, and between 
countries. This thesis, operating within the MWS framework, will be subject to the 
same strengths and weaknesses that the theory is said to possess. The following 
chapter will contain a detailed description of the arguments for, and against, the MWS 
theory.  
 
1.9. Structure of Study 
This study comprises six chapters. The outline of these chapters is as follows: 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
The opening chapter will introduce and provide the background to the study. It will 
contain the problem statement, objectives, research design and methodology, as well 
as the important conceptual definitions.  
 
Chapter Two: Literature Overview and Theoretical Perspective 
The second chapter will provide a detailed overview of the literature and theoretical 
knowledge required to gain an understanding of the dynamics of the topic. The works 
of McGowan, Wallerstein and Andreasson will be used for this endeavour. The 
chapter will conclude with a description of the three possible strategies for ascent in 
the modern world-system. They are ascent by means of seizing the chance or import 
substitution (Mexico and Brazil), self-reliance (these include Communist countries 
such as China and Russia) and by invitation or export-led growth (Taiwan and South 
Korea). Wallerstein added a fourth strategy to the mix, which was exclusively for 
semi-peripheral ascent. 
 
Chapter Three: South Africa’s Incorporation into the Modern World-System  
South Africa is currently an advanced semi-peripheral country. This chapter will 
explain how it reached this point by tracking its development in two phases, namely 
the 1840s – 1920s and 1920s – present. It is believed that South Africa was 
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incorporated into the modern world-system around the 1840s through the production 
of wool and sugar, which was followed by the boom in diamond and gold mining 
activity a couple of decades later. Its peripheral status came to an end around the 
1920s as the country adopted an import substitution strategy. The last ninety years or 
so has seen South Africa not only solidify its semi-peripheral status but develop into 
an advanced entity within this phase.  
 
Chapter Four: Recent Ascents in the Modern World-System  
The nature of the world-system has changed considerably since the inception of the 
WTO. These new dynamics have resulted in a shift in strategy for countries wishing 
to ascend in the modern world-system. The chapter will firstly assess the development 
strategies of the established core powers. This will be followed by a comparative 
analysis of recent ascents (post-World War II) in the modern world-system that have 
implemented different strategies. The purpose of the comparison between China and 
Russia (self-reliance), Mexico and Brazil (import substitution), and South Korea and 
Taiwan (export-led growth), is to assess whether their strategies are completely 
distinct or whether there is a degree of compatibility. The chapter conclude with an 
analysis of how contemporary strategies for development have been moulded by 
restrictive WTO policies, with the intention of applying these findings to South 
Africa’s future strategy.  
 
Chapter Five: How South Africa can get into the Core 
This chapter forms the crux of the thesis and will delve into the most optimal internal 
and external strategies proposed for South Africa’s development making use of the 
MWS theoretical perspective. The time scope for assessing South Africa’s prospects 
for ascent will be approximately 15-20 years, as it is anticipated that the world-
economy will still be in a negative phase of growth up until then. The following 
chapter will explain that semi-peripheral ascent occurs more easily during this phase; 
it is therefore vital to have an understanding of the expected changes that will take 
place within the nature of the world-system by 2025 as this will determine the most 
optimal development strategies that South Africa has at its disposal.   
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Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks 
The final chapter will assess whether South Africa is able to adopt the proposed 
developmental strategies by placing them within the context of the internal and 
external constraints and incentives that need to be addressed and exploited 
respectively. The impact of these constraints and incentives will be assessed by 
placing them within their political, economic and sociocultural spheres of influence. 
The chapter will end off with a discussion of the main findings of the study and will 
be followed by recommendations for future research.   
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Chapter Two 
 Literature Overview and Theoretical Perspective 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The first chapter introduced the topic and set the tone for the remainder of the study. 
This chapter will provide a detailed overview of the literature and theoretical 
knowledge required to gain an understanding of the dynamics of the MWS theoretical 
approach. The literature review will look at previous assessments of South Africa’s 
location in the modern world-system and will include the works of McGowan, 
Wallerstein, Andreasson and others. The theoretical component of the chapter will 
begin with an analysis of the origin and structure of the MWS, followed by the 
definition of key theoretical concepts and major criticisms of the theory. The 
theoretical section will conclude with a description of the three possible strategies for 
ascent in the modern world-system, namely by means of seizing the chance or import 
substitution, self-reliance, and by invitation or export-led growth. The second chapter 
will conclude by identifying the indicators that will be used in the analysis of South 
Africa’s current location in the modern world-system, as well as with a summary of 
the proposed strategies for a state’s progression in this system. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
McGowan (1993) conducted research into South Africa’s incorporation into the 
modern world-system and tracked its gradual ascent from the periphery to its current 
semi-peripheral status. In 1993, he wrote a paper assessing the new South Africa’s 
chances for ascent or descent within the world-system. He concluded that during that 
period it was unlikely to maintain its position in the medium-term. McGowan utilised 
a holistic approach in his analysis of South Africa’s current location, and its potential 
for upward mobility, in the modern world-system. According to McGowan, the key 
components for national development are state strength and politics; cultural strength 
and influence; and the performance of the economy. He emphasised that even though 
upward mobility in the world-system is based on long-term economic development, it 
needs to be supported by a strong state that is able to exert a high degree of cultural 
strength. Key political indicators include the legitimacy of the government, the state’s 
hegemonic attributes, its public policies and finances, the level of democratic 
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consolidation and its domestic and regional security.  Economic indicators comprise a 
comparison of GDP per capita between semi-peripheral states, the nature of the state’s 
imports and exports, the degree of growth in GNP per capita, and whether its 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies favour savings, investment and low inflation. 
Important cultural indicators consist of the state’s linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural, 
educational and sporting achievements and characteristics (McGowan, 1993:37, 41-
46).  
 
On the political level, South Africa’s bleak outlook was attributed to its tumultuous 
political situation that it experienced at the time, when political instability was rife 
despite the unbanning of the liberation movements and other anti-apartheid 
organisations in 1990. Added to this, the interim government was not able to change 
the fact that since 1910 the majority of South Africa’s people had not viewed any of 
its successive governments as legitimate (McGowan, 1993:41-46). Economically, 
South Africa was categorised as an upper middle-income developing country by the 
World Bank in 1990, based on national income per capita. It must be noted, however, 
that this indicator does not provide an all encompassing view of a state’s level of 
development due to the fact that its level of inequality is not specified; despite this, 
the real advantage lies in the opportunity to compare this indicator across different 
states. South Africa shared this position with 14 other countries at the time, such as 
Brazil, Korea and Greece. In his analysis McGowan noticed that between 1965 and 
1990 the country’s GNP per capita underwent less than half of the annual rate of 
growth that was experienced by the group as a whole; in fact its position at the 
forefront of developing societies had been gradually diminishing since 1965 
(McGowan, 1993:35).  
 
This development could not be attributed to a sudden boom in semi-peripheral growth 
that left South Africa behind, but rather a result of the fact that it had become poorer 
in per capita terms since 1980. South Africa moved from a period between 1919 and 
1975 where it enjoyed an average annual GDP growth rate of above five percent, to 
one between 1975 and 1990 where its annual rate of growth collapsed to only 1, 8 
percent. This decline was exacerbated at the time of writing during the early 1990s 
when the country endured three consecutive years of negative GDP growth 
(McGowan, 1993:39). It is not surprising that this led, in conjunction with the 
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increasing marginalisation of the disenfranchised black population in particular, to a 
somewhat negative projection for the future maintenance of South Africa’s position 
within the world system, let alone its ascent.  
 
The final factor that McGowan analysed was that of cultural strength. He pointed out 
how heavily the current hegemon, the United States, has relied on the 
interconnections of cultural, political/military and economic strength.  The cultural 
sphere comprises what is termed “Coca Cola” culture, world-renowned institutions 
such as Harvard and MIT, and “high” cultural organisations like the Metropolitan 
Opera in New York (McGowan, 1993:41). McGowan argues that people often 
mistakenly attribute South Africa’s linguistic, cultural, ethnic and racial diversity to 
an inherent cultural weakness that results in political instability and violence, which 
also limits its economic ambitions. This viewpoint overlooks a number of features that 
provide South Africa with significant cultural strength thereby increasing its sphere of 
influence internationally. The country’s primary cultural strength lies in the fact that it 
is a member of the English-speaking world; it shares this advantage with only a 
handful of upper-middle income countries. Other strengths include its artistic and 
sporting achievements as well as the quality of its universities and technikons 
(McGowan, 1993:342-43).  
 
Andreasson (2001) conducted an interesting study where he examined whether the 
MWS perspective could shed some light on the processes of democratisation in 
Africa. After comparing semi-peripheral South Africa with peripheral Zambia, he 
claimed that South Africa’s more advantageous position in the world-system meant 
that it was better equipped to safeguard democracy. This mirrors McGowan’s 
argument that a key characteristic of core states is that they share strong democratic 
principles. The main value of Andreasson’s work in relation to this thesis lies in 
locating the two African countries in the modern world-system, and like McGowan he 
contends that South Africa is located in the semi-periphery. He does this by 
measuring South Africa’s economic characteristics, giving special attention to the 
nature of its exports and imports. Andreasson preceded this by providing the 
necessary historical understanding of how South Africa was incorporated into the 
modern world-system and how it reached its current semi-peripheral status after 
World War II.  
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Several other MWS theorists (Wallerstein, 1979; Arrighi and Drangel, 1986; Martin 
and Wallerstein, 1990; Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998b) have also located 
South Africa in the semi-periphery of the modern world-system. Wallerstein (1979) 
based his locating of South Africa in this group on his assessment that it formed part 
of the middle ground in a system of unequal exchange in terms of the nature of its 
exports, its wage levels and profit margins. Politically he based his assessment on the 
high level of the state’s control of the internal and international market, which he 
argues is a characteristic of semi-peripheral states, far outweighing the level of control 
that is experienced in the periphery and the core. This comparison is illustrated in 
figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Comparison between State intervention in the Market and State 
strength 
 
 
Source: McGowan, 2007 
 
Arrighi and Drangel (1986) agreed with South Africa’s semi-peripheral status despite 
contesting the validity of Wallerstein’s methodology. They argued that Wallerstein’s 
extensive list of the semi-periphery contained states with dissimilar wage levels and 
profit margins that exported a diverse range of products. They also emphasised that 
his proposed semi-peripheral group of states implemented inconsistent policies toward 
the internal and global markets. Arrighi and Drangel purported that GNP per capita 
should be used when attempting to locate states in the global division of labour. They 
Periphery Semi-Periphery Core 
State intervention 
in the market 
 
State strength 
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placed South Africa in the semi-periphery using this indicator during the period 
between 1938 and 1970.  Martin and Wallerstein (1990) as well as Ahwireng-Obeng 
and McGowan (1998b) made use of trade statistics and patterns in order to locate 
South Africa in the semi-periphery. The former used these patterns to identify the 
economic relationships that it holds with core and peripheral states; whereas the latter 
used them to observe the country’s perceived hegemonic role in a region comprised of 
peripheral economies. Both sets of theorists argue that long-distance commodity trade 
patterns determine a state’s role in the modern world-system.  
 
Mingst (1988) emphasises the importance of using economic complexity when 
locating a country in the semi-periphery. Economic complexity can include the 
movement from an economy that is based on agriculture to one that experiences 
growth in the manufacturing and service sectors. It can also include the shift from a 
dominant trading partner to multiple trading partners. An indicator of economic 
complexity should involve an analysis of the composition of GDP per sector by 
comparing the percentage share of agriculture, manufacturing and services. The 
nature and composition of imports and exports is also important; agriculture forms a 
high percentage of exports in peripheral countries, whereas they import a high 
percentage of manufactures due to the low levels of industrialisation (Mingst, 
1988:261-265). 
 
Mingst emphasises the significance that the strength of state machinery and cultural 
integrity play in locating a state in the modern world-system; they also comprise 
important components for national development. Some of the aforementioned 
theorists argue that core states possess strong state machineries; this refers to the core 
government’s ability to control the actions of the population within its boundaries, a 
characteristic that peripheral countries do not possess whilst lying somewhere in 
between in the semi-periphery. This goes against Wallerstein’s notion that semi-
peripheral states require stronger political machinery than core and peripheral states in 
order to control the domestic and international market. Studies – such as Arrighi, 1985 
– appear to support Wallerstein’s formulation of state primacy in political and 
economic activity. An analysis of the strength of state machinery is a complex task in 
view of the fact that there is little consensus pertaining to the measurement of state 
strength. A good indicator is whether the authority of the president has been 
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challenged. Even though stability of rulers does not necessarily equate to state 
primacy, other elements of stability include an institutionalised state structure, a 
growing political, economic, and social elite in the political realm, and having a single 
party that absorbs rather than mobilises politics (Arrighi, 1985; Mingst, 1988:261-
265; Wallerstein, 1979; Zartman and Delgado, 1984:3) 
 
Even though the term ‘cultural integrity’ is not widely used by MWS theorists 
anymore, Wallerstein (1984) defines the cultural component as “the degree of fit 
between the values of the state and society” (Wallerstein, 1984:1). The cultural 
integrity enjoyed by semi-peripheral states resembles that which is found in the core 
and which is generally absent in the periphery. Mingst agrees with McGowan’s 
contention that the prevalence of a number of ethnic groups within a state leads to the 
formation of a stronger national identity; she also emphasises the importance that a 
common language plays in promoting a degree of cultural integrity, or homogeneity. 
Societal congruity is also promoted through the government’s promotion of education, 
healthcare, and employment, thus reinforcing the notion of an integrated society 
(Mingst, 1988:261-265).  
 
2.3. Theoretical Overview 
2.3.1. The Origin and Structure of the Modern World-System 
Wallerstein believes that the modern world-system developed out of the remnants of 
feudalism during what became known as the “long sixteenth century” (1450-1640) in 
Europe. It operates with capitalism as its mode of production and possesses a 
hierarchical international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1974b:229; Wallerstein, 
1974c:406-407). The capitalist world-economy is driven by the enduring need of 
capital accumulation and has enlarged to the extent that it has incorporated the entire 
planet. It is based on the market through which monetary exchange takes place in the 
public arena (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2005:206; Wallerstein, 2004). The interstate 
system is the political equivalent of the capitalist world-economy which combines to 
form the current world-system; one of its primary traits is that it prevents a single state 
from controlling the investment activities of all the capitalists (Sanderson, 2005:182). 
It “is the political side of capitalism, not an analytically autonomous system, and its 
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survival is dependent on the operation of the institutions which are associated with the 
capital-accumulation process” (Chase-Dunn, 1981:19).  
 
  Capitalist World-Economy          Interstate System 
 
Source: McGowan, 2007 
 
Moreover, the capitalist mode of production requires the continuation of interstate 
competition. The competitive nature of the relationship between capitalists of 
different countries ensures that success is never maintained for long periods, thus 
preventing the emergence of a world-empire through military power (Chase-Dunn, 
1981:26). Wallerstein (1974b:16) captures the complexity of this relationship by 
stating that  
 
“[i]n a capitalist world-economy, political energy is used to secure monopoly rights (or as near 
to it as can be achieved). The state becomes less the central economic enterprise than the means of 
assuring certain terms of trade in other economic transactions”. 
 
2.3.2. Conceptualisation 
2.3.2.1. World-Systems, World-Economies and World-Empires 
According to Wallerstein, ‘world-systems’ are the primary form of social 
organisation; they either take the form of world-empires or world-economies. The 
main difference between the two lies in how the decisions about resource allocation 
are made. Resources are redistributed from the periphery to the core through a central 
political system in a world-empire. This is done through the market in the world-
economy, in the absence of a centralised world authority. The end result is the same, 
however, as resources flow to the core from peripheral areas (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 
2005:206). Wallerstein identified Holland, Britain and the United States as the only 
hegemons of the capitalist world-economy to date (Sanderson, 2005:182). 
 
2.3.2.2. Division of Labour in the World-System 
The division of labour within the world-system consists of the core, semi-peripheral, 
and peripheral zones. The core benefits the most from the capitalist world-economy 
whereas peripheral nations experience the other extreme. Semi-peripheral states are 
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located in between the core and periphery, and stabilise the capitalist world-economy 
due to their ability to protect themselves to a degree from core exploitation whilst 
being able to dominate the periphery through favourable trade patterns; this stability is 
attributed to the fact that the core is not faced with a unified resistance. It is unlikely 
that a unified periphery will be able to cause the downfall of the world-system 
because the semi-periphery depolarises the relationship between them and the core, 
and actually profits from the exploitation of the periphery (Wallerstein, 2000:88-90). 
The core, semi-periphery, and periphery make up the spatial dimension of the world-
economy, which refers to its vertical dimension that is characterised by a hierarchical 
structure. The historical trajectory of the system can only be explained accurately by 
analysing it in conjunction with the temporal dimensions of the world-economy, 
which will be looked at in the next section (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2005:208).  
 
The core nations direct global production through their economic strength and are 
characterised by their significant global influence, substantial wealth and 
technological development. Peripheral states, in contrast, have weak economies and 
rely on the exports of primary products. They also experience widespread poverty, 
high population growth, environmental degradation, and possess a low level of 
technology. These conditions are not favourable for upward mobility in the world-
system. Semi-peripheral states share aspects of the core and the periphery. They 
dominate the periphery through the exchange of finished goods for raw material 
products and are in turn dominated by the core through their need for investment. 
These countries undergo a process of rapid industrialisation and possess a relatively 
high level of technology (Burns et al, 2000). 
 
CORE ZONE 
(Info rich) 
 
SEMI-PERIPHERY 
(Mixed) 
 
PERIPHERAL ZONE 
(Info poor) 
 
Source: McGowan, 2007 
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2.3.2.3. Cyclical Trends 
On top of being expansionary and evolutionary the capitalist world-economy also 
experiences cyclical trends. The first of Wallerstein’s temporal dimensions takes the 
form of Kondratieff and hegemony cycles. The second dimension refers to secular 
trends, which assesses the long-term impact of each cycle; whereas the third aspect of 
the temporal dimension describes the contradictory elements found within the system 
itself, whereby short and long term benefits work against each other until the world-
system experiences a crisis that will lead to its ultimate demise, replacing it with a 
new system. Kondratieff cycles occur over a 40-60 year period and are characterised 
by a phase of expansion which is then followed by a phase of contraction, also known 
as A and B phases. Peripheral economies suffer the most during the period of 
contraction, or B-phase, due to the drop in global commodity prices. These countries 
depend heavily on commodity prices for their economic growth in light of the fact 
that they serve as a major source of their foreign earnings (Figure 2 illustrates the drop 
in global commodity prices since the late 1970s). Hegemony cycles refer to the 
moderately short periods when the world-economy is controlled by a single core 
power; this takes place in between periods that are characterised by a multipolar 
power structure (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2005:208-209; Sanderson, 2005:182). 
 
Figure 2: Commodity Prices, 1970 to 2000 
 
It is important to note the impact that the expansion and contraction of the world-
economy has on the global division of labour. New markets for new products are 
created more easily during periods of economic expansion, as there is little need to 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 25 
compete for old ones. According to Wallerstein (1974a), the tables are turned during 
periods of contraction when core states frantically compete to reclaim old markets; 
this period is characterised by the potential slippage of core states. He adds that the 
prospects for peripheral states moving towards a semi-peripheral status are limited 
during this period, whereas semi-peripheral states are provided with an opportunity to 
attain core status. The bargaining power of the weakest portion of the world-economy 
is restricted first during world economic downturns. The reason for this is that the 
decline of world output diminishes the market for the exports of peripheral states; this 
occurs before the prices of their imports are reduced (Wallerstein, 1974a:20). 
 
“Peripheral countries may even discover new protectionist barriers against their exports as 
other countries seek to "take back" areas of production once thought to be of such low profitability as 
to be worthy only of peripheral countries. To be sure, a few peripheral countries who have the 
relatively strongest technological base may use the impetus of the crisis to push forward with import 
substitution. But the bulk of the periphery simply stagnates” (Wallerstein, 1974a:21). 
 
Wallerstein notes that semi-peripheral states undergo a different experience during 
these economic cycles. They are highly dependent on the core during an expanding 
world-economy as they rely on these states to acquire a share of the world market 
against other semi-peripheral states. It is for this reason that semi-peripheral states are 
the strongest advocates of the status quo, whilst they fiercely condemn the actions 
undertaken by other semi-peripheral states that are opposed to this. The development 
of these countries during periods of economic expansion is reliant on the 
reinforcement of dependency patterns vis-à-vis core states. During periods of world 
economic contraction the development of new industries is limited in the core 
resulting in these states having to compete with each other in order to prevent 
slippage. Interestingly, the bargaining relationship between core and semi-peripheral 
states changes to one whereby the former courts the latter in an attempt to channel its 
products (Wallerstein, 1974a:21; Wallerstein, 1976:464-466). 
 
Semi-peripheral states, according to Wallerstein, have the ability to expand control of 
their home market and their neighbouring peripheral markets at the expense of core 
producers, which enables the group to benefit from the new exchange by pushing for 
structural and institutional change. Terlouw (2003) agrees that semi-peripheral 
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countries are provided with an opportunity to expand during periods of system wide 
economic stagnation, but points out that the nature of the system is such that only a 
few of them are able to capitalise on the situation completely by being promoted to 
the core. Wallerstein adds that the few semi-peripheral states that are able to progress 
to the core during a downturn, do so at the expense of other semi-peripheral countries 
by acquiring a significant portion of the group’s collective advantage (Terlouw, 
2003:75; Wallerstein, 1974a:21; Wallerstein, 1976:464-466).  
 
2.3.3. Critique 
There are four major criticisms of Wallerstein’s world-systems theory. It is argued 
that too much attention is placed on peripheral exploitation that was brought about by 
Wallerstein’s alleged overemphasis on the interdependence between states in the 
world-system (Sanderson, 2005:183-186). He attributes the exploitation of the 
periphery by the core to unequal exchange but has been criticised for not providing a 
detailed explanation for this point of view (Shannon, 1996:148). The theory has also 
been criticised for only using external factors in its analyses. Sanderson (2005), for 
example, argues that the endogenous characteristics of societies are overlooked when 
the world-system is used as the unit of analysis. Cultural, political and geographical 
factors all play a part in a society’s development and the argument is that the MWS 
theory undermines the role that a society’s history played in its development, which 
acts against the historical approach that the world-systems theory claims to undertake 
(Sanderson, 2005:187-188). 
 
Another criticism laid toward world-system and dependency theorists’ is their 
depiction of North-South relations as one of the ‘development of underdevelopment’. 
Ultimately, accurate data is needed to distinguish which side is correct regarding this 
issue (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2005:218). The final criticism of Wallerstein’s attempt 
to explain the fundamental nature of the world-system involves him placing too much 
emphasis on economic relationships. Skocpol (1977) points out these limitations in 
Wallerstein’s definitions of the core and periphery. According to Wallerstein, 
technological development and world-market opportunities are the primary factors for 
determining a society’s position in the world-system and for shaping its position in the 
world division of labour. She also disagrees with the degree of importance Wallerstein 
gives to a society’s position in the world-economy as the sole determinant of where it 
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is located politically and militarily in the world-system. This is seen in his explanation 
of the exploitation of the periphery by the core, serving as the fundamental 
relationship among parts of the system (Shannon, 1996:138).  
 
2.4. The MWS Approach for Ascent in the Modern World-System 
Arguably, Wallerstein’s most important piece of work was published in the African 
Studies Review in 1974. The paper entitled ‘Dependence in an Interdependent World: 
The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy’ 
expressed the strategies needed for upward mobility in the international division of 
labour from the MWS perspective.  The final section of this chapter will focus on the 
features of each strategy with the intention of finding those that complement South 
Africa’s growth aspirations. 
 
2.4.1. Overview 
Capitalism is not a system of free competition for all sellers, instead it is one in which 
the relative freedom of competition requires an economic advantage of upper strata - 
or owners of the means of production - that is so comprehensive that the operation of 
the market needs no interference in order to maintain the existing system of 
stratification. This does not translate into a static hierarchy within the division of 
labour. Instead, there is constant jostling between countries as to who occupies the 
range of positions in the hierarchy of production, profit, and consumption 
(Wallerstein, 1974a:1). The primary motivating force behind the operation of the 
capitalist world-system is the disparity of reward. It is for this reason that the 
simultaneous development of states is not possible within the system, resulting in the 
inevitable widening gap between the core and the periphery. The countries that are 
able to develop do so at the expense of others (Wallerstein, 1974a:7). 
 
Strategies for ascent in the modern world-system constantly change and are inherently 
different at varying stages of development. Wallerstein (1974a) notes that 
development strategies are often mistakenly only described as being from the 
periphery to the core; development is a gradual process however and differs 
considerably for states progressing from the periphery to the semi-periphery and from 
the semi-periphery to the core.  A state cannot for example move from being 
predominantly an exporter of low-wage products to being a substantial exporter of 
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high-wage products whilst also being the major customer for these products. Every 
core power has had to undergo this process of moving from its peripheral status to the 
semi-periphery, and from its semi-peripheral status to the core. Hout (1996) argues 
that both export-led growth and import substitution have been used in combination by 
states giving greater weight to one or the other in varying sectors of the economy and 
at different stages of development. Wade (2004) supports this argument by stating that 
the neoliberal development agenda, which promotes open markets, does not reflect the 
history of development experienced in developed European and North American 
countries. Chang (2003) agrees with this sentiment and purports that infant industry 
protectionism and export subsidies formed an integral part of development for the 
majority of these countries.   
 
Furthermore, there are also differences between states within each category. 
Peripheral states, for example, do not all find themselves in an equal position to 
undertake a shift in status. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that some peripheral 
states have managed to change their status, whereas others have not; the same can be 
said for semi-peripheral states. Ultimately, only a limited number of peripheral states 
are able to fit into an expanding world market or conquer a portion of a contracting 
one during a specific time period (Wallerstein, 1974a:7-8). 
 
2.4.2. The Three Strategies for Ascent in the Modern World-System 
Wallerstein (1974a:9) proposes three strategies for development in the modern world-
system, namely the strategy of seizing the chance, of promotion by invitation, and the 
strategy of self-reliance. These strategies are more similar than they seem to be at first 
glance and there also appears to be a high degree of compatibility between the former 
two approaches The finer details and the importance of this relationship will be 
clearly illustrated in the remaining chapters. Wallerstein added a fourth approach 
which is only centred on semi-peripheral ascent. This approach however is not meant 
to be viewed in isolation but rather in combination with the previous three strategies. 
 
Seizing the Chance (Import Substitution) 
Seizing the chance, also referred to as import substitution industrialisation (ISI), is an 
opportunity that presents itself during moments of world-market contraction. During 
this period, peripheral states are generally faced with a rise in unemployment, 
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balance-of-payments problems, and a decline in state income. This situation is caused 
by a higher drop in the price level of primary exports from peripheral states than the 
reduction that occurs in the price level of technologically advanced industrial exports 
from core states (Wallerstein, 1974a:9-10). The primary objective of the ISI approach 
is to displace imported manufacturing goods through the strengthening of domestic 
industries; key instruments include the financial and fiscal support of the domestic 
industry, hefty tariffs and the promotion of state-owned companies (Haggard, 
1990:161-188). 
 
Import substitution as a developmental strategy can help peripheral states alleviate 
some of the difficulties that they experience during world-economic contraction. It is 
referred to as seizing the chance because aggressive state action is utilised so that it 
can benefit from the diminished political position of core states and the reduced 
economic influence of domestic opponents of these policies. This approach has 
traditionally resulted in an increase in industrial activity in these countries, such as 
that experienced by South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico in the wake of the Great 
Depression of 1929. The latter two countries and several other Latin American 
countries continued to use the strategy and experienced substantial economic growth 
until the 1980s when the United States pressurised them to adopt import liberalisation 
and privatisation as opposed to state protectionism (Kennedy, 1993:202-207). The 
peripheral states that benefit from this situation need to be reasonably strong, with an 
existing industrial base so that it can be enlarged at the opportune moment 
(Wallerstein, 1974a:10). The importance of this requirement is captured by Dos 
Santos (1971): 
 
“The capacity to react in the face of these [economic] crises depends in large part on the 
internal composition of the dependent countries. If they possess a very important complementary 
industrial sector, the latter can profit from the crisis in the following manner: In the course of the crisis, 
the export sector is weakened, imports diminish and their cost tends to rise because of the financial 
crisis which devalues national currencies....The consequence is thus an encouragement of national 
industry which has a relatively important market, a high sales price, and weak international 
competition; if this sector has some unused capacity, it can utilize it immediately, and with a favorable 
state policy, it can use the small existing foreign exchange to import machines cheaply, for the surplus 
production in dominant countries causes their prices to go down relatively” (Dos Santos, 1971:737). 
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The problem with this strategy is that it leads to technological dependence because the 
prospective semi-peripheral states become reliant on the importation of manufactured 
primary materials and on machines from core states. This dilemma is exacerbated 
today due to the global level of technology (Wallerstein, 1974a:10-11). National 
monopolies are created as a result of this technological dependence, due to the fact 
that the level of output far outweighs the scale of the initial market. A substantial 
amount of investment through imports is required in order to increase the initial 
market. This monopolistic structure causes a reduction in the volume of investments 
that would otherwise have occurred with existing resources (Merhav, 1969:59-60). 
 
This developmental alliance creates significant internal contradictions in countries. 
The needs of the industrial bourgeoisie and the urban workers converge initially as 
they support certain kinds of state action. However, their interests diverge after this as 
they oppose each other in terms of wage scales; this alliance can only survive at the 
expense of the agricultural and traditional sectors, by creating monetary and tariff 
policies that encourage a gradual incorporation of individuals into the industrial 
system (Wallerstein, 1974a:11). Countries that have used this approach to move into 
the semi-periphery have experienced tremendous political pressure from the 
agricultural sector; events in Latin America and Eastern Europe demonstrate this. 
Marini (1969:85-86) provides a solution for the technological dependence and the 
internal political pressures from the agricultural sector that these countries endure. He 
proposes that these countries adopt an outward approach whereby an external market 
for their manufactured products is secured. This alleviates the inability of the internal 
market to absorb the increase in production, thus the country has the opportunity to 
continue on its road toward technological modernisation whilst reinforcing its alliance 
with the large landowners. The South African government incorporated the same 
process during its transition into the semi-periphery. The country’s endorsement of a 
common market in southern Africa is a reflection of its outward policy (Lombard et 
al, 1968). 
 
Wallerstein (1974a) summarises this strategy for ascent as follows: 
 
“The image thus far projected is of an attempt by an indigenous "developmentalist" sector in a 
peripheral country to "seize its chance" and strengthen its "industrial sector," thus becoming a "semi-
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peripheral" country. Then, we have suggested, over time the combination of internal pressure (the 
"agricultural sector") and external force majeure ("technological dependence") leads to the recuperation 
of the rebel and the stabilization of the new economic structures such that the development of an 
"internal market" originally projected is abandoned and an "external market" is substituted, but one in 
which the semi-peripheral country largely serves as a purveyor of products it is no longer worth the 
while of the core country to manufacture” (Wallerstein, 1974a:12-13). 
 
Promotion by Invitation (Export-led growth) 
Wallerstein (1974a) explains that the path of promotion by invitation differs from the 
path of seizing the chance in two instances. Firstly, this approach – which works more 
closely with external capitalists – is more likely to occur in moments of global 
economic expansion than in moments of contraction; the US for example supported 
the development of Korea and Taiwan during the world-economy’s A-phase after 
World War II. Core states are prone to do away with this collaborative development 
when they undergo economic difficulties themselves. Secondly, it tends to be adopted 
by countries with less prior industrial development than the first approach. 
Furthermore, countries that use this strategy tend to be involved in light industries that 
are consumer-oriented, as opposed to business-oriented and less capital intensive than 
the heavier industries that countries such as Brazil, Mexico and South Africa engaged 
in using the ISI approach (Haggard, 1990:51-99; Wallerstein, 1974a:14). Korea and 
Taiwan adopted the export-led growth strategy in the early 1960s after having initially 
implemented the ISI approach after World War II. They shared key elements of 
economic growth that were adopted by the East Asian ‘tigers’, such as a commitment 
to exports as opposed to imports, the maintenance of a low currency value, the 
protection of local industries from foreign competition and the capitalisation of the 
open international trading regime (Kennedy, 1993:196-200). 
 
According to Wallerstein (1974a), this approach came about due to increasingly 
sophisticated multinational corporations that became aware of the benefits of 
operating in collaboration with state bureaucracies. The expansion of direct 
investment across borders developed due to political impediments to the growth of 
enterprises in the core as well as the prevalence of infant industry protectionism. 
Governments of underdeveloped nations are weak and pose little threat to the overall 
financial position of the outside investor. Hymer (1972) compares this relationship to 
that of a US state and a national corporation. Any share of the MNC’s profit that the 
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country may have gained through taxes is negated by the competition among 
peripheral states to attract corporate investment (Hymer, 1972:128; Wallerstein, 
1974a:13). Nevertheless, these underdeveloped countries compete for this investment 
due to the distinctive advantages that it offers. Amin (1971) illustrates this in his 
analysis of the Ivory Coast’s path of development. He pointed out that in some twenty 
years the Ivory Coast progressed from being a primitive country in 1950 to one that 
had been well integrated into the capitalist world-economy. Traditional chiefs and 
immigrant workers are some of those that prospered from foreign capitalist enterprise, 
whilst unemployment in Ivory Coast’s urban areas was considerably lower than what 
had been experienced in those located in older African countries (Amin, 1971:92; 
Wallerstein, 1974a:14).  
 
Self-reliance (Closed-national strategy) 
Wallerstein’s (1974a) third road of development for a peripheral state – which had 
been attempted by eastern European countries and others such as Tanzania – is that of 
“self reliance”. Chief components of the self-reliance strategy include the intolerance 
of the private sector and the endorsement of collectivised agriculture, state trading 
monopolies, state owned enterprises, and price, wage, interest and exchange rate 
control. Several states rejected the market in favour of this strategy during the post-
war period, which had been encapsulated by the Soviet model of central planning. 
China and the Soviet Union adopted the approach and experienced significant GNP 
growth rates during the 1950s and 1960s; the approach lost its popularity during the 
1970s and 1980s due to persistent economic stagnation that resulted in the movement 
from planned to market economies. This shift occurred due to several shortcomings in 
the self-reliance approach such as a lack of incentives and sizeable sectoral 
distortions; key successes however included relatively equal income distribution, 
progress in achieving industrialisation, the establishment of a welfare system, and the 
sufficient provision of education, job creation, housing and healthcare (Harvie, 
1999:1091-1092; Wallerstein, 1974a:14-15).  
 
Green (1970) emphasises that the implementation of the closed-national strategy of 
structural change is fraught with difficulties for peripheral states, particularly in 
Africa. This is due to the slow pace at which economic decolonisation and 
development will take place. There have been modest success stories nonetheless, 
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such as Tanzania’s carefully pursued strategy of development. Wallerstein stresses, 
however, that the country’s success is a rarity among peripheral states pursuing this 
strategy. Tanzania’s model of self-reliance was uncommon in Africa which is the 
reason that there was little external pressure against her policies (Green, 1970:284-
285; Wallerstein, 1974a:14-15).  
 
2.4.3. Strategies for Semi-Peripheral Ascent 
The discussion thus far has been on peripheral ascent into the semi-periphery, the 
focus now shifts to how semi-peripheral states have historically made it into the core 
group of countries. Both Germany and the United States made this transition in the 
nineteenth century, whereas England had already gained membership by the time of 
the seventeenth-century recession; countries lower in the hierarchy of core states that 
made this shift include Sweden, Belgium and Canada (Wallerstein, 1974a:16). 
 
According to Wallerstein (1974a), a review of what the classic mechanism for 
advancement in the world-economy entailed needs to be undertaken in conjunction 
with the impact that wage differentials have had on the structure of the world-
economy. The general wage level differs considerably from country to country, the 
trend however is that it remains comparatively high in core states and low for those in 
the periphery. Looking at elements in a national society that determine its wage level, 
it is clear that it is the employer’s aim is to pay its employees as little as possible 
whereas employees in turn seek to receive the highest possible wages for their 
services. Wage levels are also important as they affect the sale of products both 
internally – serving as a motive to push for higher wages – and externally, a motive 
for lower wages. Added to this is the requirement to adhere to legislation for 
minimum wage levels that is brought about by the collective organisation of workers, 
regardless of market conditions. The inflexibility of national wage levels, coupled 
with its propensity to equivalence in international profit margins, leads to what MWS 
theorists’ term unequal exchange within the world-economy. Wallerstein argues that 
the inflexibility of national wage levels is what has historically allowed semi-
peripheral states, with their medium wage levels, to shift to core status (Wallerstein, 
1974a:17). 
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It is of paramount importance for semi-peripheral states attempting to make this shift 
that they possess a large enough market for the national products that they produce in 
a cost-effective manner. Successful countries have adopted various techniques to 
enlarge their markets for national products. One method to achieve this aim involves 
the use of quotas and tariffs to manage the entrance of other producers into the state-
controlled market. Another option that states have at their disposal is to expand their 
political boundaries by conquering their neighbours through the use of force, or by 
means of unification through political and economic unions. A third way to affect 
both the home and external markets is to lower the costs of production instead of 
increasing the costs of imported goods. This can be achieved by allocating subsidies 
for production which will effectively increase the cost of other goods relative to the 
product that has been subsidised; another option for lowering the costs of production 
is to reduce wage levels, the key however is to ensure that the opposing resultant 
trends of increasing external sales and jeopardising internal sales produces a positive 
financial outcome. The fourth method that can be used to enlarge a semi-peripheral 
state’s market is to increase the internal level of purchasing power; coupled with the 
fact that transportation costs are basically nullified, it will almost certainly bring about 
an increase in internal sales. If purchasing power is boosted through higher wage 
levels, it produces a reversal of the previous method, as internal sales are increased at 
the risk of lowering external sales. The final method that can be adopted is to expand 
the market for a country’s products through ideology or propaganda, by affecting the 
tastes of predominantly its internal consumers (Wallerstein, 1974a:17-18). 
 
It is clear that semi-peripheral states require optimal cost levels and need to possess a 
certain absolute size of the market in order to ascend in the world-economy. In 
addition, this threshold is constantly elevated due to the continuous advancement of 
technology involving machinery with ever increasing components of fixed capital. 
Wallerstein emphasises the important role that government plays during this stage by 
stating that “the possibility of a state passing from semi-peripheral to core status has 
always been a matter of juggling elements that move in varied directions to achieve a 
nearly perfect mix” (Wallerstein, 1974a:18). England created a favourable mix in the 
“long” sixteenth century when it combined a rural textile industry with a process of 
agricultural development of arable land in medium-sized units. It also formed a new 
market of low-cost textiles to be sold to less affluent citizens, wealthier peasants and 
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the new middle stratum of artisans. Germany benefited from a medium wage level in 
the nineteenth century as it created a significant internal market during the historic 
legacy of a shrinking artisan class. Germany’s cost of production was competitive 
with Britain due to transportation advantages (Wallerstein, 1974a:18). 
 
Wallerstein (1974a) brings up an interesting mix that also worked, known as the 
‘white settler phenomenon’, which is characterised by high wage levels that precede 
industrialisation. These areas were located a considerable distance away from world 
centres of production, providing protection against imports due to high transportation 
costs. At the time of writing, Emmanuel (1972) noted that four of the five British 
colonies of settlement, namely the United States, New Zealand, Canada and Australia, 
had the highest per capita incomes in the world. South Africa, however, had only been 
at the level of Greece or Argentina, despite having the same colonists and links to 
Britain. Emmanuel explains that: 
 
“One factor alone was different, namely, what happened to the indigenous population. 
Whereas in the other four colonies the total extermination of the natives was undertaken, in South 
Africa the colonists confined themselves to relegating them to the ghettos of apartheid. The result is 
that in the first four countries wages have reached very high levels, while in South Africa, despite the 
selective wages enjoyed by the white workers, the average wage level has remained relatively very low, 
hardly any higher than that in the underdeveloped countries, and below that of the Balkans, Portugal, 
and Spain” (Emmanuel, 1972:125). 
 
It is doubtful whether the high-wage route, in relation to the wages of core powers, 
can be repeated again in modern times. The current high degree of technological 
dependence and the fact that technology has advanced to the point that world 
distances do not matter anymore makes it difficult to recreate the situation that led to a 
settler population being drawn toward such a high standard of living again 
(Wallerstein, 1974a:18). Even though high wages are beneficial in terms of unequal 
exchange, states cannot simply raise their wage levels because it is also a function of 
low absolute competition. Capital flows to high profit areas at all times despite there 
being a lag. What happens in actuality is that whenever a producer is undercut in the 
cost of production, over time a new specialisation will be unearthed that requires a 
temporary rare skill, which is free from competition on the part of low-wage countries 
in the international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1974a:20; Emmanuel, 1972:145).  
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Although seemingly counterproductive, Brewer (1990) explains that mechanisation 
caused by an increase in wage levels can actually be beneficial to capitalist 
development in the country where these wage levels are raised. He states that even 
though mechanisation essentially signifies development one needs to investigate 
whether this will lead to sustained development. Emmanuel (1972) argues that the 
social character of work and production is altered by mechanisation, laying the 
groundwork for additional wage increases. High wages thus result in a high organic 
composition of labour, which denotes that a substantial proportion of the total labour 
force is comprised of skilled workers and professionals. He adds that even if wage 
levels and scales were the same all over the world, areas that possess a high 
proportion of skilled workers would experience significantly higher per capita income 
levels and larger markets as a result. The fact that South Africa possessed a substantial 
amount of cheap and unskilled labour is a precise indication of why the country 
developed to a lesser extent when compared to other British colonies. It must be noted 
that Emmanuel’s views are by no means universally accepted, he does however 
provide a compelling argument for the connection between unequal exchange and 
capitalist development (Brewer, 1990:200-222). 
 
2.5. Key Indicators used in this Study 
This study will expand on the work covered by McGowan (1993), Andreasson (2001) 
and others by providing a contemporary analysis of South Africa’s current location in 
the world-system and its prospects for growth. A good understanding of the 
interdependent factors coupled with an insight into the future trajectory of the world-
system will provide the platform necessary to suggest appropriate strategies that put 
South Africa in good stead for achieving core status. 
 
2.5.1. Locating South Africa in the Modern World-System 
Wallerstein uses three dimensions to locate the semi-periphery between the core and 
the periphery in the modern world-system, namely the strength of state machinery; the 
complexity of economic activities; and cultural integrity (Wallerstein, 1974b:349). 
The following indicators (figure 3) will be used in the analysis of South Africa’s 
current location in the modern world-system; they represent a combination of the 
indicators that were used by key authors (McGowan, 1993; Andreasson, 2001; 
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Wallerstein, 1979; Arrighi and Drangel, 1986; Martin and Wallerstein, 1990; 
Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998b) in this chapter. These indicators have been 
combined in order to make the assessment as all encompassing as possible.  
 
 
Figure 3: Indicators representing South Africa’s position in the Modern World-
System 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion and Summary of Proposed Strategies for South Africa’s 
Development 
McGowan, Andreasson, Wallerstein and several others, purport that South Africa is 
located in the semi-periphery of the modern world-system. These assessments made 
use of differing indicators but fall within the broader political, economic and 
sociocultural categories. This chapter has provided a detailed description of the 
proposed strategies for a state’s progression in the modern-world system according to 
the MWS theoretical approach. The proposed economic strategies included seizing the 
chance, promotion by invitation, self-reliance and the semi-peripheral growth 
strategy. Seizing the chance refers to the import substitution approach that is 
characterised by the creation of strong domestic industries and is carried out more 
easily during the phase of economic contraction. Promotion by invitation is an 
approach to economic growth that prioritises exports and attempts to reduce the 
reliance on imports as much as possible; this occurs more easily during the world-
economy’s A-phase of growth. The self-reliance approach is a state-dominated 
closed-national strategy that prevents the creation of an active private sector. The 
strategy is not associated with a specific phase of growth in the world-economy but is 
implemented more easily during a phase of economic expansion. States that adopt this 
approach are also affected when there is a downturn in the global economy.  The 
semi-peripheral growth strategy is not meant to be viewed in isolation but does 
emphasise the need for these states to have a large enough market for their products 
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that are produced as cost-effectively as possible. The B-phase of the world-economy 
does provide an opportunity for a small amount of semi-peripheral states to make the 
shift to the core group of states.   
 
Political and cultural strength and influence are also important components of national 
development. State strength requires political legitimacy and stability, domestic and 
regional security, and the use of foreign policy as a partnership-building tool; 
furthermore the state needs to be actively involved in its developmental process and 
should also exert a degree of political and economic influence over its neighbours, 
perhaps possessing the attributes of a regional hegemon. Cultural drivers of 
development include a state’s active participation in international organisations and 
global forums, the creation of a strong national identity, artistic and sporting 
achievements, reputable academic institutions, and a common language for 
communication locally and internationally. Socioeconomic conditions are also 
important components of the cultural dimension as they play a key role in the 
reduction of divisive elements in society and foster of a unified culture, particularly in 
a multicultural society. 
 
These strategies form the base for the remainder of the study that aims to apply them 
in its assessment of South Africa’s prospects for growth. Figure 4 contains the 
characteristics of these economic, political and cultural developmental strategies. The 
next chapter will investigate how South Africa was incorporated into the periphery of 
the modern world-system and tracks the country’s development to its current semi-
peripheral status.  
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Figure 4: Summary of strategies for development according to MWS theory 
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 Chapter Three 
South Africa’s Incorporation into the Modern World-System 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The third chapter will investigate South Africa’s entry into and development within 
the modern world-system. It will explain how the country reached its current semi-
peripheral status by tracking its development in two phases, namely the 1840s – 1920s 
and 1920s – present. The second half of the chapter will evaluate South Africa’s 
current location in the MWS in order to ascertain whether it still possesses the 
characteristics of an advanced semi-peripheral country. This analysis will be carried 
out by adopting a combination of the indicators that were employed by the MWS 
theorists discussed in the second chapter. Utilising a broader spectrum of indicators 
provides a more thorough understanding of the country’s current position in the 
modern world-system. These indicators include: assessing South Africa’s gross 
national income per capita, the composition and growth of its GDP, the nature of its 
imports and exports, the level of technology and infrastructure, and its hegemonic 
attributes. Political and sociocultural elements will also be uncovered, looking beyond 
purely economic characteristics, in order to assess whether South Africa displays 
these semi-peripheral attributes on other levels too. Political indicators include foreign 
policy, military and democratic characteristics; sociocultural indicators comprise 
literacy rates, HIV/AIDS rates and university rankings.  
 
3.2. South Africa’s Entry into and Development within the World-System 
3.2.1. 1840s – 1920s: Incorporation into the Periphery of the World-System 
This section will begin by shedding some light on how South Africa was incorporated 
into the periphery of the modern world-system. It will track its first phase of 
development within this group up until its transition to the semi-periphery. Before any 
region can be incorporated into the capitalist world-system it needs to integrate its 
production processes into the interdependent production processes that make up the 
world-economy (Wallerstein, 1986:139).  Despite the Portuguese discovery of the 
Cape of Good Hope in the 15th century, the first Europeans only settled in South 
Africa after Jan van Riebeeck’s arrival in the Cape in 1652. As governor for the Dutch 
East India Company (DEIC), he ensured that meat, grain, and vegetables were 
produced for the crews of the company’s ships. Efforts to export surpluses of wheat 
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and wine at the end of the 17th century were unsuccessful due to the large distances to 
European and Indonesian markets. During the 18th century, the sale of foodstuffs to 
warships passing the Cape served as the only significant export market; other than the 
small, but long-established, east coast trade in gold, ivory and copper with Arabs 
(Andreasson, 2001:189-190; Chase, 1967:5-6; Fourie and Mohr, 2004:84). 
 
According to Wallerstein (1986), It was not until the first half of the 19th century that 
South Africa was incorporated into the periphery of the world-system. This event was 
preceded by an ineffective attempt by the British, the Cape’s new occupier at the start 
of the century, to create a clearing house for the East by declaring the Cape as a free 
port. This setback was short-lived though, as the country gained entry through the 
creation of successful production processes that involved the Cape and Natal 
producing wool and sugar for Britain respectively. By 1842 wool had become the 
Cape Colony’s most important export product after the roughly 4000 British 
immigrants, who had arrived during the 1820s, turned to animal husbandry (Fourie 
and Mohr, 2004:84; Wallerstein, 1986:139). 
 
According to Wallerstein, political resistance and access to a large enough labour 
force for the new production processes, represent the two major impediments that 
need to be dealt with before a region can be successfully incorporated into the world-
system. Political resistance in South Africa at the time was quelled through the 
colonisation by the British. Labour supply was a far more difficult challenge to 
overcome, however, as the participation of Africans in the colonial labour and 
commodity markets could not be assured due to the rigidity of long-standing internal 
social and production relations. It is for this reason that the labour requirements of 
settler agriculture ended up being met coercively, during the first half of the 19th 
century, through the provision of slave labour for the Cape and Natal (Wallerstein, 
1986:140-142). 
 
The South African economy had predominantly been based on agriculture since its 
incorporation. This changed dramatically during the 1860s and 1870s when the 
discovery of diamonds in Kimberley led to a boom in mining activity. Foreign capital 
flowed into the country as a result; other developments included the extension of 
railways and an upsurge in the need for various forms of communication. This laid the 
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foundation for what would be the South African economy’s greatest boost, when gold 
was discovered in Witwatersrand a decade later in 1886.  Gold is to this day still one 
of the economy’s most vital products (Andreasson, 2001:189; Fourie and Mohr, 
2004:84). 
 
3.2.2. 1920s – Present: Emergence as a Semi-Peripheral Power  
This section will look at the next phase of South Africa’s development which entails 
the progress that it made from being a new member of the semi-periphery to one 
which can be described as an advanced entity within this group of countries. 
Approximately half of the economy was still primarily based on agriculture and 
mining at the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910; it is not clear whether it 
had attained semi-peripheral status at that point. Manufacturing accounted for around 
4 percent of GDP at the time but this rose steadily to 7, 4 percent a decade later, as 
industrialisation was promoted through the policy of import substitution during the 
1920s. The country needed to pass through a difficult period during the Great 
Depression, but economic growth and industrialisation increased significantly with 
the onset of World War II and the devaluation of South Africa’s currency. 
Manufacturing overtook both mining and agriculture during the war years to become 
the country’s best performing sector. Theorists agree that South Africa emerged out of 
World War II firmly entrenched in the group of semi-peripheral countries, as it 
produced an indigenous industrialist and capitalist class, due to greater import-
substitution industrialisation (Andreasson, 2001:189; Fourie and Mohr, 2004:84; 
Martin and Wallerstein, 1990:102-103; Stadler, 1987:58-59). 
 
3.2.2.1. The Emergence of Politically-motivated Inequality  
Horwitz (1967) propagates that South Africa’s protectionist policy, which began in 
the 1920s, marked the start of a period of ‘Great Prosperity’ for the country. The 
effect was felt immediately seeing that national income per head at the end of the 
1920s was double the mark set at the end of the previous decade. Furthermore, 
national income per head doubled again at the end of the 1930s. He argues that the 
economic evidence of this affluent period was misleading in spite of the remarkable 
achievement, as the net wealth of African people did not improve under the land-
labour controls enforced by the White polity. Through an understanding of political 
and economic dynamics, he noticed that economic growth was not the overriding 
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motive behind South Africa’s protectionist policy when he looked at the political 
situation at the time. The policy was widely accepted as the polity understood that its 
implementation would ensure the increased employment of Whites, who were also 
referred to as ‘civilised labour’ (Horwitz, 1967:239-241,251).  
 
The Government successfully dealt with the ‘Poor White Problem’ by integrating this 
group into industry, during a relatively short period of time. This process began with 
the formulation of the Customs Tariff Act of 1925 and the greater authority allocated 
to the Board of Trade and Industries, and continued up until the outbreak of World 
War II in 1939. The social system, created under the constitutional framework, 
produced skewed development and resulted in the African population being severely 
inflicted with underemployment and under-consumption. It is a well-known fact that 
the fiscal policy initiated by the Pact Government significantly stifled competition 
within South African industry, considering that protection was largely-based on 
protecting the high wage rates enjoyed by White labour. Horwitz puts the entire 
approach down to the Pact politicians attempting to guarantee votes by meeting the 
needs of Poor Whites seeking employment, who had been migrating by the thousands 
from a depressed agriculture (Horwitz, 1967:247, 251-253).   
 
3.2.2.2. Trade Policy Reform 
South Africa continued to endorse an import substitution trade strategy after World 
War II through a system of import tariffs and quantitative restrictions. The 
introduction of the apartheid regime meant that South Africa was increasingly being 
politically and economically isolated by the rest of the world. The apartheid economy 
enjoyed sustained growth for almost two decades despite this, but began to show signs 
of strain in the mid-1970s. The economy stagnated after the 1973 oil crisis after a 
successful decade during the 1960s when the average GDP growth rate was 6 percent. 
The focus shifted to an export-oriented industrialisation strategy following a 
reassessment in the early 1970s after considerable doubt arose as to whether the old 
approach could provide further employment and growth in the economy. The 
Reynders Commission of Enquiry – created with the purpose of looking at the 
feasibility of expanding the export sector of the economy – suggested providing 
incentives to exporters (Andreasson, 2001:190-191; Holden, 1990:260-265). 
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The country’s economic situation did not improve however as the average GDP 
growth rate declined to 1, 8 percent during 1980s and eventually fell to -1, 1 percent 
during the early 1990s. The period was characterised by mass riots by the black urban 
wage class, a decrease in gross fixed investment and private savings, high levels of 
unemployment and capital flight, and chronic balance-of-payments problems. It is 
evident that the dismal economic environment placed substantial pressure on the 
South African government, and was one of the key factors behind the eventual 
unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the transition to democracy 
through South Africa’s first democratically held elections in 1994 (Andreasson, 
2001:190-191,199).  
 
Holden points out that the major distinction between the development of South Africa 
and the NICs was that the former possessed considerable resource endowments, 
whereas the latter did not. Ironically, the abundance of resources retarded 
development in South Africa, essentially leading to deindustrialisation of sorts. What 
happens is that when the price of natural resources such as gold rises, real wages 
increase throughout the economy as labour shifts to the rapidly developing sector. The 
increase in real wages, as well as the appreciation of the currency in real terms due to 
greater exports, constricts the manufacturing sector. It is as a result of the slowing 
down of this sector that South Africa had not been able to reach the same level of 
specialisation in its manufactured exports as had been achieved in the East Asian 
NICs (Holden, 1990:271-272). 
 
The country had made significant strides towards trade liberalisation by the beginning 
of the 1990s despite the political turmoil it experienced at the time. This meant 
lending itself to a more neutral trade regime; one which did not overlook the need for 
exports by solely endorsing production for the domestic market. According to Bell, 
South Africa had adopted three of the four principal attributes of trade liberalisation 
by 1990, namely direct export promotion measures, devaluation, and the relaxation of 
quantitative restrictions; the final aspect of tariff reductions still needed to be 
addressed. Further progression of South Africa’s trade liberalisation policies, between 
1992 and 1995, had seen the focus shift to import liberalisation through tariff 
reductions. South Africa was obliged to reduce its tariffs on manufactured goods by 
33 percent between 1995 and 1999, following its participation in the Uruguay Round. 
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Furthermore, it needed to provide greater market access for foreign-produced 
agricultural commodities; and was also required to significantly reduce export 
subsidies on agricultural products, following the instruction to lessen the level of 
domestic support for agriculture (Bell, 1997:71, 74; Matona, 1995). 
 
3.2.2.3. Post Apartheid Policy 
Global economic growth rates were relatively low during the period following South 
Africa’s transition to democracy post 1994 elections. Entry into external markets was 
not easy at the time as many of the major industrialised countries had adopted 
protectionist measures. Compounding this, South Africa and other developing 
countries were put under increasing pressure by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)/WTO to open up their domestic markets to imports. The country 
entered the period of transition with many decades of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and technology inflows; a fairly large and diversified manufacturing sector; a 
moderately-sized physical, banking and human resource base; and was globally 
competitive through protective measures in mining equipment, metallurgy, chemicals 
and paper (Michie and Padayachee, 1997:9-10). It faced many obstacles in spite of its 
accomplishments, such as: a small amount of manufactured exports and modest 
productivity growth when compared to similar-sized East Asian NICs; large areas of 
industry that were characterised by low levels of technology and a lack of 
competiveness; and weaknesses in advanced engineering activities as well as in 
mature labour-intensive products like garments and footwear (Lall, 1993:50). 
 
Saul (2004) notes that the ANC has adopted capitalism and democratic principles to a 
large extent since its rise to power in 1994, in spite of the socialist rhetoric of its 
leaders in response to tensions within the party’s governing alliance; South Africa has 
been described as embarking on a ‘national democratic revolution’ following political 
liberation. The ANC still persists with this course regardless of the fact that the 
socialist members of the alliance, namely the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), continue to fervently 
push their agenda for a more equitable distribution of income among the country’s 
citizens (Saul, 2004). It goes without saying that South Africa’s broad policies of 
economic liberalisation have helped the country integrate into the world-economy; its 
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leaders have not lost sight of the importance of implementing development initiatives 
however.  
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) refers to the Industrial Policy Action 
Plan (IPAP) as a good example of this focus and represents one of several industrial 
policy initiatives that have been undertaken since 1994. The purpose of the plan is to 
unlock the country’s industrial development in a sustainable manner through the 
identification of strategic industrial interventions. One of the primary sectoral actions 
involves the fast-tracking of the South African economy’s four lead sectors, namely 
automotives and components; capital/transport equipment and metals; forestry, pulp 
and paper, and furniture; and chemicals, plastic fabrication and pharmaceuticals.  The 
implementation of the second 2010/11 – 2012/13 IPAP, or IPAP II, was approved by 
Cabinet in February 2010 and focuses on escalating the industrial policy interventions 
in order to structure the economy in a manner that provides more work and a 
sustainable livelihood; it also supports the government’s aim to create approximately 
2, 5 million jobs by 2020 (DTI, 2007; DTI, 2011a).  
 
 The following section will look at how South Africa has progressed in the last two 
decades. This will be investigated by conducting a detailed analysis of its current 
position in the modern world-system in order to ascertain whether it still possesses the 
characteristics of an advanced semi-peripheral country. A combination of the 
indicators that were employed by the MWS theorists discussed in the second chapter 
will be utilised in order to affirm whether South Africa is still rooted in the semi-
periphery. The reason for this is that a more thorough understanding of the country’s 
current position in the modern world-system is gained through the usage of a broader 
spectrum of indicators. These include: assessing South Africa’s gross national income 
per capita, the composition and growth of its GDP, the nature of its imports and 
exports, the level of technology and infrastructure, and its hegemonic attributes. 
Political and sociocultural elements will also be uncovered, looking beyond purely 
economic characteristics, in order to assess whether South Africa displays these semi-
peripheral attributes on other levels too. Statistics from Brazil, India, Mexico and 
Turkey were used when comparing South Africa to individual semi-peripheral states.  
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3.3. South Africa’s Current Position in the Modern World-System 
3.3.1. GNI (GNP) Per Capita  
The World Bank makes use of GNI per capita (formerly known as GNP per capita) to 
classify national economies. This refers to the World Bank’s method of measuring a 
country’s gross national income, which is then converted to U.S. dollars using the 
World Bank Atlas method, and is thereafter divided by the midyear population.  
According to the Bank, “GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus 
any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net 
receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from 
abroad” (World Bank, 2011c, 2011d). Using 2010 figures (Table 1), national 
economies are divided into the following four groups:   
 
Table 1: World Bank Country Classification by Income Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2011c. 
 
South Africa forms part of the upper middle income group of countries according to 
the World Bank’s 2010 list of national economies; this is reflected in the country’s 
2010 GNI per capita figure of $6,090. South Africa is joined in this group by 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey (World 
Bank, 2011c). Looking at Table 2, one should take note of the progression that the 
country has made in its national income figures since its first democratically held 
elections in 1994. The dip experienced from 1997 to 2002 was followed by several 
years of steady growth, and has remained stable even in the wake of the global 
financial crisis that began in 2007.  
 
 
Group Name 2010 US$ Indicators
Low Income $1,005 or less
Lower Middle Income $1,006 - $3,975
Upper Middle Income $3,976 - $12,275
High Income $12,276 or more
World Bank Country Classification by Income 
Group
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Table 2: South Africa’s GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 
Source: Statistics provided by the World Bank, 2011c 
 
3.3.2. Composition of GDP by Sector 
During a country’s development it is important to note the relationship between the 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. The primary sector - agriculture and mining - 
dominates the national economy during the initial phase of growth. As development 
continues the secondary sector - manufacturing, water and electricity - begins to take 
over. The next phase of development involves the strengthening of the tertiary sector, 
namely in financial and government services. Table 3 indicates that South Africa’s 
primary sector contribution to GDP dropped from 40, 2 percent in 1920 to 6 percent 
in 1981, and then to 3 percent in 2009. The secondary sector’s share expanded from 
10 percent in 1920 to 46 percent in 1981; it then dropped to 31 percent in 2009. The 
tertiary sector also reflects the country’s development as it increased from 49, 8 
percent to 66 percent. These statistics confirm that South Africa has strengthened its 
semi-peripheral status. (Fourie and Mohr, 2004:85; World Bank, 2011b). 
 
Table 3: Composition of GDP by Sector Comparison 
Source: World Bank, 2011b and Fourie and Mohr, 2004 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
3,610 3,740 3,760 3,680 3,280 3,150 3,050 2,830
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2,620 2,860 3,620 4,850 5,480 5,770 5,860 5,730
2010
6,090
South Africa's GNI per capita
1920 1981 2009
Agriculture % of GDP 40, 2 6 3
Industry % of GDP 10 46 31
Services % of GDP 49, 8 48 66
Comparative Table:                                          
Composition of GDP by Sector
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3.3.3. GDP Growth (Annual %) 
The annual percentage of GDP growth is another good indicator of a country’s 
performance in the international division of labour. South Africa had experienced 
three years of negative GDP growth when McGowan wrote his article in 1993. 
Furthermore, the country’s average annual GDP growth rate between 1982 and 1992 
was a mere 0, 64 percent (World Bank, 2011b). Political instability and social unrest 
during the period added to McGowan’s negative outlook regarding the country’s 
further development in the semi-periphery of the world-system. Table 4 tracks South 
Africa’s annual GDP growth rate from 1994; the substantial rise indicates that the 
country is in a much stronger economic position than it was at the time of McGowan’s 
writing. In fact, South Africa enjoyed an average annual growth rate of more than 5 
percent between 2004 and 2007.  Figures for 2008, 2009 and 2010 were less 
impressive with growth rates of 3.6, -1.7, and 2.8 percent respectively; the Bank 
attributes the negative growth rate for 2009 to the global economic downturn 
(McGowan, 1993; World Bank, 2011b). 
 
Table 4: South Africa’s GDP Growth (Annual %)  
Source: Statistics provided by the World Bank, 2011b. 
 
3.3.4. Nature of Imports and Exports 
Figures related to imports and exports serve as a good indicator of how actively a 
country is participating in the world-economy. In 2009 South Africa had a 0, 49 
percentage share in world total merchandise exports and had a 0, 58 percentage share 
in its imports. It also accounted for 0, 34 percent of the world’s total exports of 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
3.2 3.1 4.3 2.6 0.5 2.4 4.2 2.7
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
3.7 2.9 4.6 5.3 5.6 5.5 3.7 -1.7
2010
2.8
South Africa's GDP Growth (Annual %)
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commercial services and for 0, 45 percent of its imports (WTO, 2011b). Furthermore, 
in 2010 the country’s total exports and imports of goods and services accounted for 26 
percent and 27 percent of its GDP respectively (World Bank, 2011b). These figures 
indicate just how important global trade is for South Africa; the DTI illustrates its 
significance in Figure 5 by plotting the country’s increase in both imports and exports 
post World War II.  
 
Figure 5: South Africa’s Trade Growth: 1948 – 2009 (R’000) 
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 2011b. 
 
The nature of a country’s imports and exports is also important as a determinant of its 
location within the international division of labour. By looking at the broad 
composition of South Africa’s exports during the 1990s, ranging from primary 
products to high-technology exports, Andreasson pointed out that the diversified 
nature of the country’s economy is reflective of semi-peripheral countries. The 
country’s major imports contained a similar mix of products which included raw 
materials, capital goods and semi-manufactured goods (Andreasson, 2001:193-196). 
Illustrating South Africa’s six chief imports and exports for 2010, Table 5 confirms 
that this mix of products still exists, and thus so do the core and peripheral activities 
that is a feature of semi-peripheral countries like South Africa.  
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Table 5: Top Six South African Imports and Exports, 2010 
Source: International Trade Centre, 2011. 
 
In addition, an analysis of the percentage share of South Africa’s imports and exports 
in the agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors provides a further indication of 
the country’s role in the global division of labour. The DTI (2011c) assessed the 
structure of South African trade from 1992 to 2010; Figure 6 illustrates the export 
pattern of a typical semi-peripheral state that exports a fairly substantial amount of 
both mining and manufactured products. The figure also indicates how South Africa 
has become stronger in the semi-periphery since 1992 with manufacturing gradually 
forming a greater share of its exports, as the country’s reliance on mining exports 
slowly subsides. The sector composition of South Africa’s imports (Figure 7) also 
reflects that of a semi-peripheral state seeing that it continues to rely heavily on 
manufacturing imports. 
 
 
 
Industry Import value
Share of Total 
Imports %
All Products 80,139,282
Mineral Fuels, Oils 15,722,549 19.62
Machinery 11,847,504 14.78
Electrical, Electronic 
Equipment
8,568,805 10.69
Vehicles 7,036,010 8.78
Commodities 5,241,608 6.54
Optical, Photo, 
Medical Apparatus
2,088,371 2.61
Products Imported by South Africa, 2010 (US$'000)
Industry
Exports in 
Value
Share of Total 
Exports %
All Products 71,484,309
Pearls, Precious 
Stones, Metals
11,801,431 16.51
Ores, Slag and Ash 9,784,733 13.69
Iron and Steel 7,929,536 11.09
Mineral Fuels, Oils 7,223,353 10.1
Vehicles 6,437,205 9.05
Machinery 5,126,963 7.18
Products Imported by South Africa, 2010 (US$'000)
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Figure 6: Sector composition of Exports                 Figure 7: Sector composition of Imports 
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 2011c 
 
3.3.5. Infrastructure and Technology 
Infrastructure is an important element when assessing a state’s level of development 
and its location in the modern world-system. South Africa possesses six cities with a 
population of over 1 million, with more than sixty percent of the country’s population 
living in urban areas; five major ports; 147 airports with paved runways; world-class 
stadia, having hosted the soccer, rugby and cricket world cups; the 14th longest 
railway network and the 18th longest road network in the world; the most modern 
telephone system in Africa; and approximately the same amount of cellular telephones 
as the country’s total population (World Bank, 2011a). 
 
The level of science and technology also points to a state’s position in the modern 
world-system. Expenditure on research and development (R&D) as a percentage of 
GDP is a good indicator of this; a comparison of this expenditure was made between 
prominent semi-peripheral states using World Bank 2011 figures, based on 2007 
percentages. At 0, 93 percent South Africa’s research and development expenditure 
forms a relatively high percentage of its GDP, when compared to other semi-
peripheral states such as India – 0, 80 percent, Mexico – 0, 37 percent, and Turkey 
with 0, 72 percent; Brazil’s expenditure is slightly higher at 1, 1 percent of its GDP. 
High technology exports as a percentage of manufactured exports can also serve as an 
indicator and are essentially products with high R&D intensity.  Based on 2009 World 
Bank figures, South Africa’s high technology exports comprise 6 percent of its 
manufactured exports. This is an average figure when compared to the countries used 
in the previous comparison; with Brazil (14 percent) and Mexico’s (22 percent) high 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 53 
technology exports comprising a greater percentage of GDP than India and Turkey’s 9 
percent and 2 percent respectively (World Bank, 2011a).  
  
3.3.6. Sociocultural Indicators 
The previous chapter explained the importance of using university rankings as a 
cultural indicator for locating a state in the hierarchy of core, semi-peripheral and 
peripheral countries. According to the 2011 Webometrics Ranking of World 
Universities, five South African universities are ranked in the top 700 global 
universities. These are the University of Cape Town, the University of Pretoria, 
Stellenbosch University, the University of Witwatersrand, and Rhodes University. 
Mexico has four universities in the top 700, Brazil fifteen, India three, and Turkey has 
four. South Africa seems to be on par academically with other semi-peripheral states 
but its dominance on the African continent is clearly evident; this is illustrated by the 
fact that eight out of the top ten universities on the continent are located in South 
Africa (Webometrics, 2011).  
 
South Africa has the highest number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world. 
Despite this, the country’s total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 8, 5 
percent; this is on par with Brazil (9 percent) and is higher than the other states – India 
(4, 2 percent), Mexico (6, 5 percent) and Turkey (6, 7 percent) – used in the semi-
peripheral comparison (World Bank, 2011a). South Africa’s literacy rate for the 
population aged 15 and above is 89 percent; this again is similar to the majority of 
semi-peripheral states used in the comparison – Turkey (91 percent), Mexico (93 
percent), and Brazil (90 percent) – and significantly ahead of India’s 63 percent 
(World Bank, 2011a). 
 
3.3.7. South Africa as a Regional Hegemon 
There have been three global hegemons in the modern world-system, namely the 
Netherlands in the 17th century, the United Kingdom in the 18th century, and the 
United States in the 20th century. A hegemon may also exist in a given world region, 
such as Southern Africa, or Africa (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998a:13). 
Shannon (1989:29) explains that the semi-periphery exports peripheral-like goods to 
the core and core-like goods to the periphery, on the one hand; and receives goods 
produced with labour-intensive, low technology methods from the periphery and 
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capital-intensive, high technology methods from the core, on the other. In order to 
apply his explanation of the semi-periphery’s trading relationship with the core and 
the periphery, South Africa’s trading relationship will be compared with the European 
Union (EU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
respectively. According to the Department of Trade and Industry, SADC is the second 
highest recipient of South Africa’s manufacturing exports. The region served as the 
market for 17, 3 percent of this total in 2011. Despite this, only 1, 2 percent of South 
Africa’s imports of manufactures in 2010 came from SADC countries, placing the 
region in eleventh place. As expected a much higher proportion was received from the 
EU, with 38, 4 percent of the country’s manufacturing imports stemming from the 
region (DTI, 2011c).  
 
The trading relationship is verified again when looking at agricultural trade statistics. 
2011 figures confirm that SADC only received 5, 3 percent of South Africa’s total 
agricultural exports, placing the region in sixth place; the EU received 38 percent of 
these total exports. As anticipated, SADC is the fourth highest exporter of agricultural 
products to South Africa, accounting for 11, 7 percent of the country’s total 
agricultural imports. The mining trade statistics mirror the agricultural trade statistics. 
In 2011 1, 2 percent of South Africa’s total mining exports were received by SADC 
countries, placing the region in ninth place; whereas 14, 5 percent of South Africa’s 
importation of mining products came from SADC, making the region the third highest 
exporter of mining products to the country (DTI, 2011c). 
 
South Africa’s regional hegemonic attributes and dominance in the SADC region is 
demonstrated clearly when comparing it to the country’s total regional trade statistics 
(Table 6). Figures for 2010 indicate that SADC exports accounted for 11, 7 percent of 
South Africa’s total exports, making the region the country’s fourth highest export 
recipient. SADC imports were ranked eighth, however, accounting for only 4 percent 
of South Africa’s total imports. The trade surplus that South Africa enjoys is what you 
would expect from a regional hegemon. When compared to all the regions in the 
world, the SADC region gave South Africa its most favourable trade balance for 2010 
(DTI, 2011c). 
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Table 6: South Africa’s Trade with the SADC Region 
SADC 
Exports
Proportion 
of Total
Rank
SADC 
Imports
Proportion 
of Total
Rank
Trade 
Balance
Rank
SADC 60,784,421 11.70% 4 23,719,197 4% 8 37,065,224 1
2010 South African Trade by Regions (R'000)
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 2011. 
 
3.3.8. Foreign Policy, Military and Democratic Characteristics 
Semi-peripheral states provide stability to the modern world-system and as a result 
conduct foreign policy in a manner that supports the global order. These states do not 
threaten the global status quo, even in instances when they disagree with the hegemon 
of the period and other core states. They conduct their foreign policy in an intervening 
manner in situations of conflict that threaten the world-system (Shannon, 1989). 
Although referring to middle power behaviour, Cooper (Cooper, 1997:9) notes the 
coalition-building and cooperation-building role of this group of countries. The 
characteristics of middle power states differ from semi-peripheral states, but an 
analysis of their foreign policy traits is useful as they essentially comprise the same, 
or similar, group of states. According to Jordaan (2003:169), the relative inability of 
these states to act unilaterally to enforce global structural change means that they need 
to resort to multilateral cooperation, through mediums such as international 
institutions. Ruggie (1993:7-8) asserts that multilateralism is not limited to 
multilateral organisations, which is a relatively recent occurrence, and refers to 
international security cooperation as a good example of multilateralism. What the 
term should refer to is the coordination of relations among three or more states in 
accordance with certain principles. 
 
According to van der Westhuizen (1998:435-437), South Africa has been playing an 
increasingly active role in global affairs. Its diplomatic activities have extended 
beyond southern Africa, such as Nelson Mandela’s offer to mediate between the USA 
and Iraq in 1997, as well as his attempt to broker a settlement between Tripoli and 
London over the Lockerbie incident during the same year. Other examples of South 
Africa’s peacemaking diplomatic activities include its involvement in the conflict in 
Northern Ireland; the peace process in Israel and Palestine; the conflict in Sudan; the 
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East Timor question; and the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes. South Africa has 
furthered its presence on the international stage of late; this is displayed in the 
country’s increasing participation in the Annual Meetings of the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the G-20, and the G-24. President Zuma has 
made a point of collaborating with other emerging economies through alliances such 
as IBSA and BRICS. The successful hosting of the FIFA 2010 World Cup has also 
gone a long way toward establishing South Africa on the international scene. The 
country will also be hosting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in 2011 (World Bank, 2011e). 
 
Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP – this includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces, defence ministries, and paramilitary forces – is also 
a good indicator of a state’s political role in the modern world-system. South Africa 
allocates 1, 4 percent of its GDP to military expenditure; this percentage level is 
similar to Brazil’s (1, 6 percent), is lower than India (2, 7 percent) and Turkey’s (2, 8 
percent) and is higher than Mexico’s (0, 5 percent) (World Bank, 2011a).  
 
Political risk assessments can also be used for locating a state in the modern world-
system. Andreasson (2001) argues that the more advantageous a state’s position is in 
the world-system the better equipped it is to safeguard democracy against erosion and 
reversal; peripheral states are thus less likely to possess the resources necessary for 
democratic consolidation. Maplecroft’s Political Risk Index includes risks such as 
regime stability, the rule of law, corruption, conflict and terrorism, expropriation, the 
business environment and the macroeconomic context. South Africa’s medium risk 
rating seen in Figure 8 could perhaps serve as an additional political indicator of its 
semi-peripheral status. It can be argued that states that are not democratic can also 
experience a relatively low level of political risk; the predominant trend however is 
that the majority of democratic states are characterised by low levels of political risk 
and that many of these states are advanced enough in the world-system to protect their 
democracies.  
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Figure 8: Political Risk Map 2011 
Source: Maplecroft, 2011 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has reaffirmed previous studies that claim that South Africa is currently 
an advanced semi-peripheral country. This assessment is based on several economic, 
political and sociocultural indicators that resemble aggregated characteristics of this 
group of countries. South Africa was incorporated into the modern world-system 
around the 1840s through the production of wool and sugar, which was followed by 
the boom in diamond and gold mining activity a couple of decades later. Its peripheral 
status came to an end around the 1920s as the country adopted an import substitution 
strategy. The last ninety years or so has seen South Africa not only solidify its semi-
peripheral status but develop into an advanced entity within this phase. The fourth 
chapter will look at the developmental strategies adopted by older developed countries 
as well as those adopted by recent ascents in the MWS. The chapter will shed some 
light on whether the developmental paths suggested by MWS theorists are fixed or 
whether elements of the strategies can be adopted simultaneously. The impact that 
WTO rules have had on South Africa’s policy space will also be assessed.  
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Chapter Four 
Recent Ascents in the Modern World-System 
 
 Introduction 
The fourth chapter will assess whether the nature of the world-system has changed 
since the inception of the WTO. It is anticipated that these new dynamics have 
resulted in a shift in strategy for countries wishing to ascend in the modern world-
system. The chapter will firstly evaluate the development strategies of the established 
core powers. This will be followed by a comparative analysis of recent ascents (post-
World War II) in the modern world-system that have implemented different 
development strategies. The purpose of the comparison between China and Russia 
(self-reliance), Mexico and Brazil (import substitution), and South Korea and Taiwan 
(export-led growth), is to assess whether their strategies are completely distinct or 
whether there is a degree of compatibility. The chapter concludes with an analysis of 
how contemporary strategies for development have been moulded by restrictive WTO 
policies, with the intention of applying these findings to South Africa’s future 
strategy.  
 
  Evolution of the International Trading System  
The majority of developing countries, according to Gilpin (2001), adopted 
interventionist and protectionist policies after World War II and had minimal 
involvement in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Despite this, global trade 
expanded considerably during the post-war period as trade barriers were reduced 
substantially after several rounds of trade negotiations. Average tariff levels of 
industrialised countries were greatly lowered from around 40 percent to merely 6 
percent during the last half of the twentieth century. National economies became more 
open to imports from the late 1970s due to the gradual adoption of neoliberal 
economic policies privatisation and deregulation. Despite further trade expansion 
through technological advances, reduced transportation costs, and greater business 
participation in international markets; the majority of trade is conducted among the 
three advanced industrialised economies, namely Western Europe, the United States, 
and Japan, as well as a small number of emerging markets in vast areas such as in 
East Asia and Latin America. The less developed world is excluded from this 
arrangement and at best fulfils a peripheral role in the modern world-system that is 
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characterised by the exportation of food and raw materials; this makes up a minimal 
proportion of total global exports. Sub-Saharan Africa can attest to this as it is 
estimated that the region accounted for only approximately 1 percent of total world 
trade in the 1990s (Gilpin. 2001:6; Sally, 2000:403). 
 
The world-economy changed considerably after the conclusion of the Cold War 
considering that prior to this event it had functioned within the framework of the 
alliance structures during the latter half of the twentieth century. Gilpin (2001) 
explains that in essence, alliance unity and security interests served as the political 
glue that overcame contending national economic issues and kept the world-economy 
together. Economic cooperation among the capitalist powers diminished at the end of 
the Cold War, whilst the avid participation in the market system by the formerly 
communist and Third World countries resulted in a substantially more market-
oriented world. This was illustrated by the upsurge in participation in the WTO by the 
less developed countries (LDCs). The dramatic expansion of world trade led to far 
greater international competition; the industrialising economies in East Asia added to 
this trade competition during the 1980s and 1990s as they shifted from an import 
substitution growth strategy to one which focussed on export-led growth (Gilpin. 
2001:5). Sally observed this trade policy reform in her analysis that thirty-three 
developing countries, which constituted approximately half of all developing 
countries with protectionist policies, shifted from fairly closed to fairly open trading 
regimes between 1985 and 1995. Added to this, the number of those countries with 
liberal regimes of cross-border capital movements jumped from nine to thirty during 
roughly the same period (Sally, 2000:403). 
 
4.2.1. From GATT to the WTO 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was established in 1947 with the 
objective to free global trade. Its most important aspect is the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) principle, which states that any concession that one state receives from another 
should be provided to all other states. The evolution from GATT to the World Trade 
Organisation came about after a series of negotiations, referred to as ‘rounds’. The 
WTO replaced GATT in 1995 after the latter’s final round, known as the Uruguay 
Round, was wrapped up in 1994 following its commencement eight years earlier. 
McGowan and Nel (2002) note that where GATT was created by the United States 
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and its allies, promoting liberal trade values and objectives corresponding with U.S. 
political and military strategic objectives, the WTO tries to manage the entire 
international trade system by means of a multinational effort. The difference between 
the two is that GATT was just an agreement, whereas the WTO is an actual treaty. 
Thus, the WTO packs a lot more punch as its ‘dispute–settlement mechanism’ clearly 
illustrates, giving it the authority to impose trade sanctions on member states that are 
not loyal to trade agreements (McGowan and Nel, 2002:81,89; WTO, 2011a). 
 
The WTO is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, consists of 153 members and 
accounts for more than 90 percent of world trade. At its heart are the WTO 
agreements, which have been signed and negotiated by most of the world’s trading 
nations. These agreements create the legal ground rules for global commerce and are 
fundamentally contracts that bind governments to keep their trade policies within 
agreed limits. The WTO’s main functions include: administering WTO trade 
agreements; handling trade disputes; creating a forum for trade negotiations; 
providing technical assistance and training for developing countries; monitoring 
national trade policies; and cooperating with other international organisations. When 
it comes to decision-making its members undertake the often arduous task of reaching 
consensus. The WTO’s highest-level decision-making body is the General Council, 
which is composed of ambassadors and delegation heads that meet several times a 
year in Geneva and also partake in the Ministerial Conference that commences at least 
once every two years. The Ministerial Conference brings together all members of the 
WTO, all of which are countries or customs unions, and carries out decisions on all 
matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements (WTO, 2011a). 
 
4.2.2. Impact on Development 
In theory, the WTO holds development as a core principle in its negotiations; in 
reality however the general sentiment is that these negotiations do not meet the 
demands of developing countries. The unbalanced nature of the contemporary global 
trading system tilts in favour of the industrialised nations and further perpetuates their 
economic and political dominance. This imbalance translates into a significantly 
skewed global distribution of income as expressed by the UNDP in Figure 9 below.  
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Figure 9: The U.N. Development Program’s famous “champagne glass” figure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Athanasiou, 2000 
 
According to Rodrik (2001), the central objective of the WTO for its founding fathers 
was to raise the standards of living and enhance sustainable development through 
trade expansion. The G7/8 capitals and a number of leading multinational agencies 
have also added their weight in support of greater trade expansion. For them, greater 
integration into the global economy is seen as an essential ingredient for economic 
growth and development.  The WTO has insisted that market liberalisation and free 
trade is the only way in which to stimulate this growth (Rodrik, 2001:1-5). The 
Organisation aims to make the multilateral trading system more inclusive with regards 
to its membership and desires a greater command over trade-related issues. In order to 
gain popular support for its mandate it assures that doing so will benefit all of its 
member countries. A different picture is painted in reality as major differences 
between developed, developing, and least-developed member countries persist; this is 
none more so than the unequal distribution of proceeds brought about by multilateral 
trade negotiations (Oyejide, 2004:68). Rodrik (2001:44) argues that the focus should 
not lie on evaluating the trade regime from the perspective of whether it maximises 
the flow of trade, but should rather be on ascertaining whether the trading 
arrangements maximise the possibilities of development.  
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In recent years, we have been witnessing vigorous civil society critique of free 
markets and unbridled capitalism which has become increasingly evident in today’s 
multilateral trading system. Ismail (2005) says that the call to free trade, deregulated 
financial markets, and the privatisation of state enterprises by the G7/8 capitals and 
leading multinational companies, do not take into account how these policies will 
impact the poor in developing countries; but is merely concerned with the commercial 
and capitalistic interests of these actors. He added that the increasing proliferation of 
free trade agreements initiated by the major developed countries, as they seek to gain 
advantage in global markets, has raised concerns that the diversion of trade towards 
developed country markets would increase the marginalisation of those excluded from 
these arrangements (Ismail, 2005:14-16). 
 
Low-income countries constitute approximately 70 percent of the WTO. These 
countries, with a per capita income of US$1,000 or less, argue that the multilateral 
trading system does not take their development concerns into account despite the 
Organisation aspiring to globalism. These countries criticise the multilateral trading 
system for: being more concerned with the interests of high-income countries; 
preventing pro-poor growth, by leaving trade barriers intact; making the maintenance 
of trade-related institutions – created by WTO Agreements – too costly for low-
income countries to have any significant impact; and negotiating multilateral trade-
related rules that are not conducive to the environment and practices found in low-
income countries (Oyejide, 2004:68-69). 
 
The US and the UK, according to Wade (2003:622), are leading developed country 
governments in the opening up of the global market whilst propagating technology-
rent-protecting regulations. These measures are being enforced through international 
treaties, multilateral economic organisations and bilateral agreements. The 
international agreements legitimise a degree of intrusion into the economies and 
polities of developing countries. Interestingly, globalisation has not diminished the 
authority of states to regulate, but has instead obliged developing country 
governments to impose greater regulation both on themselves and on their national 
firms (2003:622). This has not been reciprocated, however, as the US and the EU 
have limited developing country access into their own markets by closing off 
significant portions of their economies (2003:622).  
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Wade (2003) goes on to say that this represents the shrinkage of both development 
and ‘self-determination’ space, despite the rhetorical commitment to universal 
liberalisation and privatisation, as the developing nations are subject to the market 
opening agenda purported by developed nations. He adds that due to the rules that are 
being written into multilateral and bilateral agreements, developing countries are 
actively being prevented from adopting the kinds of industrial and technology policies 
that were adopted by the older developed countries when they were developing, and 
by the newly developed countries of East Asia. The development policy options of 
these countries have been limited by three major agreements that stemmed out of the 
Uruguay Round; they are related to trade in services (GATS), investment measures 
(TRIMS), and intellectual property rights (TRIPS). These agreements have restricted 
the possibility for developing countries to mirror the industrial policy instruments that 
were the driving force behind the successful development of the East Asian region. 
TRIMS and GATS have disempowered developing country governments by 
preventing them from controlling the decisions of companies operating in their 
territory, whilst TRIPS compels these governments to enforce the meticulous property 
rights of international companies. The developing countries have not benefited from 
these agreements, as promised by the G7/8 states; they have in fact strengthened the 
political, economic and military dominance of the core states in the world-economy 
Wade (2003:621-622). The manner in which the agreements reflect the actual 
reduction of development space for developing nations will be looked at in more 
detail in a latter section. 
 
4.2.3. How the Core Powers really Developed: Argument against the Neoliberal 
Fallacy 
4.2.3.1. A Case of ‘Kicking away the Ladder’ 
The neoliberal development agenda, otherwise referred to as the Washington 
Consensus, aims to craft corruption-free public sectors, rent-free markets and an 
autonomous civil society based on democratic principles (Wade, 2004:184).  Chang 
(2003) points out that even though this agenda is prescribed for countries hoping to 
realise their developmental goals, it does not mirror the history of development that 
was undertaken by the advanced European and North American countries or that of 
the successful developers during the post-World War II period. On the contrary he 
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argues that the history of development always involved some form of infant industry 
nurturing.  
 
Developing countries have been placed under significant pressure from the 
international development policy establishment, which is controlled by the developed 
world, to further their economic development through the implementation of a set of 
‘good policies’ and ‘good institutions’. ‘Good policies’, which have been set by the 
Washington Consensus, include the liberalisation of international trade and 
investment, restrictive macroeconomic policy, and privatisation and deregulation. 
‘Good institutions’, which essentially belong to developed countries, include 
democracy; transparent and market-oriented corporate governance and financial 
institutions; the protection of private property rights; a high-quality bureaucracy; and 
an independent judiciary. In his book, aptly named ‘Kicking away the Ladder’, Chang 
questions the applicability of these ‘good’ policies and institutions and whether they 
were in fact adopted by the developed countries during their own development 
process.  He investigated how the rich countries actually gained their wealth and 
whether these countries were actually attempting to hide the ‘secrets of their success’. 
In short, he believes that developed countries did not make use of the policies and 
institutions that they are currently recommending to developing countries. He goes on 
to say that the majority of developed countries used ‘bad’ trade and industrial policies, 
such as infant industry protection and export subsidies, practices that are prohibited by 
the WTO (Chang, 2003:2-3).  
 
Chang’s argument is by no means a new one. The infant industry argument had been 
advanced by List in the nineteenth century when he stated that developing countries 
could not expand industrially without state intervention, particularly in the area of 
tariff protection. He identified this trend within his analysis on the development of 
Britain and the USA, the greatest advocates of today’s liberal economic policy. The 
latter remained closed for about a century, despite pressure from Britain to participate 
in the open market. The majority of developed countries adopted this approach to 
development, although Britain was the first country to perfect the art of infant 
industry promotion. List went on to say that free trade was only favourable among 
countries at similar, not different, levels of industrial development. This is why he 
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argues that British economists and politicians advocated free trade during that period 
for nationalistic reasons (List, 1885; Chang, 2003:3-4). 
 
4.2.3.2. Country Mobility as Evidence 
Upon closer inspection, there appears to be supporting analytical evidence that the 
neoliberal development agenda seems to maintain the status quo as country movement 
between the income zones is relatively static. Country mobility is a good indicator of 
the degree to which development is currently achieved within the world-economy; 
Wade emphasised that there is a relatively low rate of mobility up and down the 
hierarchy.  Babones (2002) conducted a study where he compared the real Gross 
National Product (GNP) per capita of 100 countries between 1960 and 1999. In noting 
the three income zones – core, semi-periphery and periphery – he discovered that 72 
of the countries stayed in the same income zone, whilst the outstanding 28 countries 
moved at least once from one zone to another. Interestingly no country ascended, or 
descended, more than one zone; and there is relative parity in the cases of upwards 
and downwards movement. Wade argues that country immobility – the fact that more 
than 80 percent of countries remained in the same zone over the 40 year period – 
cannot be put down to ‘bad’ or ‘good’ policies, but should rather be attributed to other 
powerful forces such as the rules that govern international trade (Wade, 2004:167-
169). 
 
University rankings serve as a good cultural indicator for locating a state in the 
hierarchy of core, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries; these rankings also point 
to the lack of mobility experienced by states in this hierarchy considering that they 
reflect the long-established dominance of the current core group of countries. The 
2010-2011 Times Higher Education World University Rankings illustrate this 
occurrence as the top 100 universities are situated in core countries, barring China. 
The table below (Table 7) demonstrates this dominance enjoyed by the core; it must 
be noted that these rankings tend to fluctuate annually, but what is important for this 
study is that the top 100 rankings change between universities that are situated in the 
core group of states and not between those that located in the semi-periphery or the 
periphery. 
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Table 7: Top 100 World University Rankings 2010-2011 by Country 
Country
Number of Universities in 
the Top 100
United States 53
United Kingdom 14
Australia 5
China (including Hong Kong) 5
Switzerland 4
Canada 4
France 3
Germany 3
Japan 2
Republic of Korea 2
Sweden   2
Ireland 2
Singapore 1
 
Source: 2010-2011 Times Higher Education World University Rankings 
 
The composition of GDP by sector is another important indicator that can be used for 
locating a state in this hierarchy and can also illustrate its relatively static nature. 
Table 8 looks at the percentage contribution that agriculture, industry and services 
make towards the GDP of a selection of core, semi-peripheral and peripheral states. A 
comparison has been made between the 1981 and 2009 World Bank figures of these 
states in order to assess whether there was a significant change in the composition of 
their GDPs; the greater the change in these figures indicates that the selected states are 
most likely playing a different role in the global division of labour and hence also 
indicates greater mobility within the hierarchy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 67 
Table 8: Composition of GDP by Sector Comparison 
1981 2009
United States 3 1
United Kingdom 2 1
Netherlands 4 6
South Africa 6 3
Brazil 10 6
India 34 18
Mongolia 17 20
Sudan 36 30
Honduras 22 13
United States 34 21
United Kingdom 40 21
Netherlands 33 24
South Africa 46 31
Brazil 44 25
Mongolia 25 33
Sudan 15 26
Honduras 23 27
United States 63 78
United Kingdom 58 78
Netherlands 63 74
South Africa 48 66
Brazil 46 69
India 40 55
Mongolia 58 47
Sudan 49 44
Honduras 55 60
Semi-Peripheral States
Core States
Industry % GDP
Peripheral States
Semi-Peripheral States
Semi-Peripheral States
Peripheral States
Comparative Table
Core States
Industry
Peripheral States
Services % GDP
Core States
Composition of GDP by Sector
 
Source: World Bank, 2011a 
 
The results of the comparative study suggest that the most significant change in the 
composition of GDP by sector during the time period took place within the semi-
periphery; this is not surprising considering that these states develop at a faster rate 
than core and peripheral states. South Africa, Brazil and India’s reliance on 
agriculture diminished significantly as their focus has moved toward industrial and 
service-based economies. Core reliance on agriculture remained minimal over the 
period and the group experienced a gradual increase in services, and less in industry, 
as their economies strengthened. Peripheral states generally remained static in all 
three sectors. The results of the analysis support the notion that the hierarchy of core, 
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semi-peripheral and peripheral states is characterised by a relatively low degree of 
mobility.  
 
4.3. Recent Strategies for Ascent in the Modern World-System  
4.3.1. 1947-1995 
Of the newly industrialising countries several have developed through self-reliance 
and import substitution. These include countries such as Russia, China, Mexico and 
Brazil. The East Asian NICs, such as Korea and Taiwan, adopted the industrialisation 
strategy based on export-led growth, despite the fact that during the 1950s Korea and 
Taiwan had actually based their industrialisation strategy on import substitution. The 
two growth trajectories, one closely tied to world markets and the other inward-
looking, are significantly different (Haggard, 1990:9).  
 
4.3.1.1. China and Russia (Self-reliance) 
The development strategy of self-reliance was encapsulated by the Soviet model of 
central planning. A number of countries rejected the market in favour of this strategy 
during the post-war period. Key aspects of this approach included the use of state 
trading monopolies to control foreign trade; large state owned enterprises (SOEs); 
price, wage, interest and exchange rate control; intolerance of the private sector; and 
collectivised agriculture. Reintegration into the world-economy occurred decades later 
as the model was rejected in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and resulted in a shift 
from planned to market economies. The GNP growth rates of these countries were 
impressive between the 1950s and 1960s, but they began to taper off in the 1970s, 
reaching a point of chronic economic stagnation in the 1980s.  There were positive 
accomplishments for employers of the self-reliance strategy, despite deficiencies such 
as significant sectoral distortions and a lack of incentives. These included: 
successfully achieving industrialisation, a reasonably equal income distribution, the 
creation of a welfare system, and adequate provision in fundamental areas such as 
healthcare, housing, education, and job creation (Harvie, 1999:1091-1092). 
 
There was a general belief that the Soviet Union was separate from the world-system, 
but theorists such as Shannon (1989) and Chase-Dunn (1981) argued that its strategy 
can be compared to that of a typical semi-peripheral state endeavouring to achieve 
core status, whereby it would initially limit economic links to the core in order to 
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propagate its semi-peripheral status by avoiding involvement in the world-economy. 
This allowed for the creation of a protected national economy, which isolated its less 
efficient and growing industries from core competition. The Soviet Union’s economic 
policies became more capitalist thereafter due to its increasing participation in the 
global division of labour. The competitive nation-state system pushed the Soviet 
Union even further in a capitalist direction because it needed to undergo rapid 
industrialisation in order to remain on par with the military capacity of core powers 
(Shannon, 1989:108-109; Chase-Dunn, 1981). 
 
The remainder of the socialist states were peripheral with China being the largest. 
China was less developed than the Soviet Union and after the 1949 revolution 
attempted to industrialise completely outside of the world-system (Shannon, 
1989:110). China created a strong state between 1949 and 1978, in the backdrop of 
the Cold War, and managed to build its wealth and infrastructure significantly during 
this period without incurring a large foreign debt. China continued its developmental 
focus post 1978 despite the conclusion of the Cold War and the socialist development 
model. The period was characterised by the emergence of younger and more 
innovative leaders, as well as the need for lower cost production sites by its 
neighbouring countries (Bunker and Ciccantell, 2004:567-568).  
 
4.3.1.2. Mexico and Brazil (Import Substitution) 
Mexico and Brazil’s shift toward import substitution industrialisation came about as a 
result of the twin shocks of the depression and World War II during the 1930s and 
1940s. The primary aim of the ISI strategy is to strengthen domestic industries to the 
point where they can displace imported manufacturing goods.  Measures that were put 
in place included the endorsement of state-owned companies, high tariffs and the 
financial and fiscal support of domestic industry. The two countries underwent 
significant difficulties when undergoing the third, and final, phase of ISI during the 
1960s and 1970s. They did not depart from their commitment to ISI, however, despite 
the new balance-of-payments problems that they experienced as the result of the oil 
shocks during the period. A shift in strategy toward the export-led approach was not 
possible at the time considering that there were many vested interests in maintaining 
the status quo, whilst these countries had to contend with substantial political 
pressures to maintain high levels of economic growth (Haggard, 1990:161-188). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 70 
 
Looking at Latin America as a whole it gained from the post-1950 worldwide 
expansion as there was significant demand for its commodities whilst also attracting 
foreign investments in infrastructure, industry, and agriculture; real GDP per person 
grew steadily until the 1980s when it began to fall sharply. After considerable 
pressure from the United States, Latin American countries started to adhere to tight 
economic reforms, and replaced state protectionism with import liberalisation and 
privatisation. They had to also commit to the creation of democratic regimes, placing 
a lot of pressure on the political leadership as a result of the economic difficulties 
experienced by countries in the region (Kennedy, 1993:202-207). 
 
4.3.1.3. South Korea and Taiwan (Export-led Growth) 
Both Korea and Taiwan immediately adopted import-substituting policies after World 
War II. This was as a result of major constraints such as post-war reconstruction, 
balance-of-payments problems, external shocks, and the severing of traditional market 
ties. The countries formed part of the American security sphere during that period due 
to the Korean War. Both of their private manufacturing sectors experienced 
significant growth in the 1950s but they had become dependent on American aid to 
finance ISI. Korea and Taiwan moved toward export-led growth in the early 1960s, 
focussing on the production of high volume, labour-intensive goods for export. These 
countries were in effect forced into this change of approach by the United States, 
since it had begun to decline the aid commitments it had provided them since World 
War II as a result of persistent balance-of-payments concerns (Haggard, 1990:51-99).  
 
South Korea’s growth can be described as nothing short of astronomic considering 
that at in 1957 its per capita GNP was exactly the same as Ghana’s. Added to this 
phenomenon is the fact that both countries were under colonial rule for half a century 
and possessed a primarily agrarian economy. While Ghana’s progress has been 
modest at best, South Korea is one of the wealthiest countries in the world having 
progressed to the core. This performance has been consistent throughout the region, as 
East Asian economies grew 7, 4 percent annually during the 1980s compared to the 1, 
8 and 1, 7 percent in Africa and Latin America respectively. With their export-
oriented manufacturing focus and pressing for low commodity prices, the economic 
structure of the East Asian nations diverged considerably from the predominantly 
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commodity producing developing regions who fervently backed higher raw material 
prices (Kennedy, 1993:193-195). 
 
Kennedy emphasises that the region’s economic growth has not been uniform and 
breaks it down into different stages of economic and technological development. 
Japan is East Asia’s powerhouse and is at the forefront of technological advancement; 
it is followed by the Newly Industrialised Economies of South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong.  The group adopted an export-led growth strategy and the 
countries were later dubbed the East Asian ‘tigers’ or ‘dragons’. The next group 
comprises the Southeast Asian states of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and arguably 
the Philippines, whose economic growth had been primarily fuelled by Japanese 
investment. The underdeveloped countries of North Korea, Cambodia, Vietnam, and 
Myanmar formed the rear of this staggered level of development which became 
known as the ‘flying geese’, with Japan leading the way. One of the key elements that 
the ‘tigers’ shared was the commitment to exports, as opposed to an import-
substitution strategy. Exports were increased and imports were reduced by 
maintaining the low value of the currency. They protected their own industries from 
foreign competition whilst taking advantage of the open international trading order 
and benefiting from favourable global conditions such as cheaper labour costs 
(Kennedy, 1993:196-200). 
 
4.3.1.4. ISI and Export-led Growth: The Compatibility of Divergent Trajectories 
No matter how strong the argument for open markets and an export-led growth 
strategy is, Hout (1996) argues that some of the most thriving export-oriented 
countries have developed industrial sectors through the application of import 
substitution. He refers to examples in the East Asian region where the Malaysian and 
Indonesian governments had not completely adopted international market integration 
policies by maintaining a separate automobile industry and by building medium-sized 
aircraft for the civilian market respectively. The adoption of export-led growth or 
import substitution is not as fixed a development decision as theorists like to depict. In 
reality they can be mutually beneficial whereby governments can implement both 
strategies, by giving greater weight to one or the other in varying sectors of the 
economy. Hout points this out in his study where he compared data between 84 
developing countries over three periods between 1965 and 1992.  He discovered that 
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there was a positive association between the two variables during the stated period, 
which led him to his argument that countries can adopt elements of export orientation 
and import substitution policies simultaneously. For example, both development 
strategies had a positive influence on foreign, as opposed to domestic, investment; 
foreign investors are able gain an economic rent in a protected market and are also 
attracted to the cheap labour force that might be available in a developing country that 
adopts an export-led growth strategy (Hout, 1996:603-605,618) 
 
In comparing the development paths of Latin American and East Asian countries, 
Haggard noted that both sets of countries in fact adopted import substitution and 
export-led growth strategies. He argues that neoclassical theorists, who looked to 
promote export-led growth through the success of the East Asian NICs, have ignored 
the economic, institutional, and legal reforms that accompanied the shift to export-led 
growth. In fact just about all developing countries entered the world-economy as 
exporters of primary products, the majority of whom have remained dependent on 
commodity exports. Local purchasing power is strengthened through these exports as 
they provide the finance needed for the importation of consumer goods. The next 
transition is toward the first phase of import-substituting industrialisation; the 
importation of selected producer goods and foreign borrowing create the foundation 
for local manufacturing, normally starting with nondurable consumer goods. The 
duration of ISI is usually dependent on the size of the domestic market, with the time 
period increasing proportionately with the size of the market. The second ISI stage is 
still characterised by the exportation of primary products and foreign borrowing, since 
the demand for imported capital and intermediate goods is increased due to 
investment in new industrial capacity. The further protection of new sectors 
perpetuates the resistance against exports. During the 1970s and 1980s Latin 
American countries underwent the final ISI phase of growth; this is when import 
substitution is supplemented with the rise of manufactured exports, although special 
incentives are usually required to promote exports (Haggard, 1990:13-14,25-26). 
 
The industrialisation of countries currently adopting export-led growth strategies was 
preceded by a period of primary-product exportation followed by the first phase of 
import substitution. Import substitution continued in certain sectors but the major shift 
took place when incentives were directed toward the exportation of light, labour-
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intensive manufactures. The policy of export-led growth differed considerably from 
import-substituting growth, in that both imports and exports began to increase 
considerably. The second phase of export-led growth was characterised by the 
development of more capital- and technology-intensive sectors. This phase is similar 
to the third stage of import substitution in many ways, despite the significantly more 
open nature of an economy that is predominantly based on exports (Haggard, 
1990:26-27). 
 
4.3.2. WTO-imposed Limits on Policy Options for Growth 
4.3.2.1. The TRIPS Agreement 
The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was 
implemented after having been negotiated in the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round. Its 
influence pertains predominantly to copyrights and patents, but also includes trade 
secrets, trademarks and industrial designs. With regard to patents, WTO members are 
compelled to enforce minimum standards for intellectual property protection; tied to 
this is a dispute resolution and enforcement mechanism (WTO, 2011c). 
 
The agreement has impacted developing countries negatively on both political and 
economic levels. One of the major TRIPS political handicaps lies in the difference in 
enforceability, which involves an imbalance whereby developing countries’ 
obligations and developed countries’ rights are enforceable; whereas developing 
countries’ rights and developed countries’ obligations are unenforceable. The dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO is used when the patent-using (developing) 
countries do not meet their obligations; this does not apply when patent-holding 
(developed) countries do not meet their obligations.  No developing country has made 
use of the DSM when a developed country has not met the obligation of transferring 
technology. The predominant reason for this lies in the substantial cost involved in 
mounting a case, as well as the possibility that the US and EU may retaliate. The 
second political handicap lies in the US and EU making use of the TRIPS’ standards 
as the basis for bringing about more stringent ‘TRIPS-plus’ standards of patent 
protection in bilateral trade and investment treaties. The net result for developing 
countries would be a further diminishing of protection under TRIPS (Shadlen, 2002; 
Wade, 2003:623-625; WTO, 2011c). 
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The market for knowledge provides the space through which economic handicaps 
operate. By merely looking at the source of patent applications it is clear that the 
North is a net producer of patentable knowledge, whereas the South serves as a net 
consumer. The price of patentable knowledge to consumers is raised through TRIPS 
which in turn increases the flow of rents from South to North (Shadlen, 2002; Wade, 
2003:624). Shadlen, Wade and Helpman (1993) question the claim purported by 
TRIPS defenders that increasing returns to knowledge generation in the North will 
result in greater innovation which will spread to the South. Furthermore, they feel that 
these price escalations further limit the South’s access to scientific knowledge. 
 
4.3.2.2. The TRIMS Agreement 
Like TRIPS, the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures was created 
during the Uruguay Round.  It goes even further than TRIPS in limiting the 
development space of developing countries; this is because it deals with a wider-
ranging spectrum of their economic activity, whereas TRIPS is predominantly 
associated with patentable or copyrightable activity.  Under TRIMS, trade rules were 
moved from the principle of ‘avoid discrimination’ between countries to ‘avoid trade 
and investment distortions’. It aims to prohibit the majority of ‘performance 
requirements’ on foreign firms and views them as distortions. Performance 
requirements are banned under the TRIMS agreement in areas related to trade 
balancing, local content, export requirements, as well as requirements on public 
agencies to acquire goods from local suppliers. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism is 
utilised when a country attempts to enforce these requirements. The US and EU have 
been attempting to revise the current TRIMS agreement even further in order to forbid 
all performance requirements, which includes technology transfer, research and 
development, and joint venturing. India and Brazil prevented the ban from being 
approved as the US and EU pressed their agenda during the 2001 Doha Ministerial 
meeting (WTO, 2011c). 
 
Supporters of the TRIMS agreement emphasise that exemption clauses were put into 
place to assist with the growth of developing countries. These clauses allow categories 
of developing countries ‘special and differential treatment’, but Pangestu (2002) states 
that these exemptions refer only to the time period for complying. The time period 
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does not relate to competitiveness or to the cultivation of infant industries, but is only 
focused on the administrative and legal handicaps that need to be overcome whilst 
getting in line with TRIMS enforcement. The range of ‘special and differential 
treatment’ that is permissible for developing countries is narrower as a result than it 
was prior to the inception of the TRIMS agreement.  
 
4.3.2.3. The GATS Agreement 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services, another Uruguay Round initiative, 
signifies the expansion of WTO rules from trade in products to trade in services. It 
offers total coverage in all internationally-traded services from banking to 
telecommunications and professional services. Many countries opposed the 
introduction of rules on services into the multilateral trading system but the WTO 
argues that FDI inflows will be significantly enhanced for developing countries 
through compliance with GATS commitments (WTO, 2011c). 
 
As with TRIMS, GATS is grounded in its aspiration toward market liberalisation and 
fairness. The articles of the agreement are based on three predominant requirements, 
namely the ‘most favoured nation’ treatment, whereby all WTO member firms must 
receive equal treatment by a given government; ‘national treatment’ which 
emphasises the equality of treatment between all foreign service providers and 
domestic firms; and the ‘market access’ requirement which prohibits a government 
from capping the number of service suppliers and where they operate. GATS has a 
more substantial exemption provision than the TRIPS and TRIMS agreements, 
whereby governments can indicate the limitations that they experience in 
implementing certain commitments in specific service sectors; these exemptions have 
to be signalled right from the start however (WTO, 2011c). The GATS agreement 
interferes far more in domestic political economy than TRIPS and TRIMS do as it 
diminishes the ability for government to carry out its responsibility to its citizens 
through the provision of public services. Developing country governments are not 
able to follow the example set by successful developers of the past by shielding their 
own service industries from competition by major foreign firms (Grieshaber-Otto and 
Sinclair, 2002; Wade, 2003:628-629). 
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4.3.3. Contemporary Strategies for Development 
4.3.3.1. The ‘New Economic Model’ 
Economic reform undertaken in the post-WTO developing world has involved 
integrating national economies with the world-economy. Integration went beyond 
merely increasing market-based trade and financial flows, and included the 
harmonisation of ownership patterns, tax systems, legal codes and trade policy. Both 
Russia and China, former socialist states, have further entrenched themselves into the 
world market system, despite the former not being a fully-fledged WTO member as 
yet. China began its reform process in 1978 and underwent substantial trade and FDI 
liberalisation before its WTO accession in 2001 (Åslund et al, 1995:1-2; Wolf, 
2001:185; WTO, 2011c). Countries that formerly adopted the ISI approach, as with 
the former socialist states, have directed their policies toward export-led growth. 
Theorists refer to this as the ‘New Economic Model’ (NEM), whereby economic 
growth is promoted through FDI and international trade. The model is based on the 
success of the East Asian NICs, but as eluded to earlier, it overlooks the fact that these 
countries were also interventionist despite their export-oriented approach (Narula, 
2002:1).  
 
Policies have shifted in Latin America in accordance with the NEM as tariff rates fell 
significantly from 24, 1 percent during 1986-90, to 11, 1 percent during 1996-1999; 
equivalent figures in East Asia show how tariff rates reduced from 20, 7 percent to 10, 
4 percent. NEM has not been implemented evenly though, with Brazil and India 
managing to find a balance between the NEM-type liberalisation and ISI, whereas 
Mexico has adopted the model meticulously (Narula, 2002:1-2).  
 
4.3.3.2. Trying to Circumvent the WTO  
The WTO has essentially threatened the existence of the developmental state. 
Economic development is at the forefront of government policy for this type of state 
and it fashions efficient instruments to attain this goal. These include creating new 
formal institutions; capitalising on fresh opportunities for trade and profitable 
production; and ensuring collaboration between citizens and officials through the 
creation of formal and informal networks. Bagchi notes that an important feature of a 
successful developmental state is that it is able to shift from state-directed to market-
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directed growth, or vice-versa, and is also able to combine both state and market 
direction in a synergistic manner, when required (Bagchi, 2000:398-399). 
 
Wade (2003) supports the adoption of the state-led approach and argues that despite 
negative criticism directed toward the implementation of the ISI approach, import 
replacement should be done better, not done less. He adds that protection alone is not 
enough but should form part of a larger industrial strategy whereby government-led 
import replacement goes with government-encouraged export development. He draws 
on the East Asian experience to illustrate how trade policy restrictions on certain 
imports did not prevent the rapid growth of other imports, resulting in an increase in 
the demand for foreign exchange; thus trade protection does not need to be ‘anti trade’ 
(Wade, 2003:634). 
 
Gallagher (2007) agrees that developing countries need to preserve their national 
policy space. He uses empirical evidence to prove the success of the state-facilitated 
development policy that was adopted by the East Asian tigers and modern-day China. 
China is an example of a country following both approaches simultaneously, by 
forcefully exporting in accordance with changing comparative advantage, and by 
substituting certain imports as had been done by the successful East Asian developers. 
Developing countries need to utilise government policies to correct for market failures 
as trade is liberalised; these market failures include information, environmental, and 
coordination externalities, as well as imperfect competition (Gallagher, 2007:1; Wade, 
2003:636). 
 
Looking at statistics between 1980 and 2000, it is evident that those nations that 
adopted these policies experienced far greater per capita growth rates. East Asian 
nations adopted them, resulting in 5 percent per capita growth rates per year during 
the period, whereas Latin American countries experienced limited growth of around 1 
percent during the same period as they implemented straight liberalisation strategies 
(Gallagher, 2007:1). Table 9 illustrates the various policy tools utilised by developing 
countries to correct for market failures and also indicates whether these instruments 
are still allowed by WTO rules. The symbols represent the following:  
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“X”   – not permitted under WTO 
“*”   – considered for elimination in the Doha Round 
“º”    – still permitted 
 
    Table 9: Policy Space for Development              Table 10: History and Policies of GATT           
 and the WTO 
 
Source: Gallagher, 2007:1         Source: Florida Gulf Coast University 
 
It is apparent that there is a stark contrast between the trade policy regimes that were 
in place before and after the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (refer 
to Table 10). GATT itself was somewhat detached from its developing country 
members in that there was little reaction to their policy violations. The introduction of 
a new policy regime in 1994 under the newly formed WTO resulted in a broader 
spectrum of regulations accompanied with measures to ensure their enforcement. 
WTO case law pertaining to these policies needed to be investigated in order to assess 
how WTO rules have restricted development measures, as well as how effectively 
they have been enforced (DiCaprio and Gallagher, 2006:781). 
 
Gallagher emphasises the difficulty that countries face in attempting to evade the 
clutches of the WTO in order to encourage development. The rules negotiated in the 
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Uruguay Round limit the scope for countries wanting to implement aggressive 
development policies; furthermore the WTO has been stringent in the enforcing of 
these rules through its dispute panels. In fact, between 1995 and 2005 more than 25 
percent of all WTO cases dealt with eroding the policy options at the disposal of 
developing countries and in all the cases the final ruling upheld the demand to 
eliminate the industrial promotion tool. Judging by the cases brought before the panel, 
it is clear that policies banned under WTO rules are still employed by developing and 
developed nations (Gallagher, 2007:1-2). 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter contends that the core powers have always adopted a degree of 
protectionism and infant industry nurturing during their development. The argument 
put forward is that the WTO prevents developing countries from adopting similar 
industrial and technology policies that were integral to the growth of older developed 
countries as well as the newly developed countries of East Asia. The three major 
agreements that limit these development policy options are GATS, TRIMS and 
TRIPS. The analysis of recent ascents in the modern world-system counters the myth 
of isolated developmental strategies. The work of Hout and Haggard suggests that 
successful developers generally adopt elements of export orientation and import 
substitution policies simultaneously. Being unable to shift from state-directed to 
market-directed growth, or vice-versa, significantly limits the policy options for the 
growth of developing countries. WTO rules make it difficult for South Africa to 
preserve its national policy space. The following chapter will propose development 
strategies for South Africa in spite of these restrictions. 
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Chapter Five 
How South Africa can get into the Core  
 
5.1. Introduction 
It was stated from the outset that the proposed strategies for South Africa’s growth 
would be made holistically by making use of the modern world-systems theoretical 
approach. The time scope used for this analysis is a 15-20 year period. The strategies 
that endeavour to foster South Africa’s future growth toward the core group of states 
need to be sensitive to the global environment that the country is likely to operate in 
during the period. A deeper understanding of what the nature and structure of the 
world-system will look like in 2025 is therefore needed; this will involve predicting 
what the balance of power in the system will be around this time. The development 
strategies that will be proposed after this will follow the holistic approach set out by 
MWS theory. These strategies, although meant to be viewed as one combined 
approach, will be broken down into political, economic and sociocultural 
development strategies. 
 
5.2. The Structure of the World-System in 2025 
After assessing of the trajectory of the world-system as a whole up until 2025, 
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1996) believed that one of two possibilities will occur. In 
the The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World System, 1945-2025, they 
postulated that the world-system will either continue as it has done for the last 500 
years, or it will decline gradually until it reaches a point of systemic chaos. More than 
a decade later, Wallerstein (2011) believes that the world-economy is not 
experiencing a recession, but rather a depression and that it has been stagnant since 
the 1970s. He notes that during this period unemployment increases drastically, and 
politicians call for austerity as they attempt to deprive the elderly and the pre-
working-age population of income in order to pacify their working-age voters; this 
entails cutting pensions, education and child care. As stagnation continued the media 
began to talk about a financial crisis and its impact has been felt across the globe 
(Wallerstein, 2011). 
 
Every state in the United States, according to Wallerstein (2011), is required by law 
to maintain balanced budgets and thus are not permitted to meet current budgetary 
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needs through borrowing. The countries in the euro zone are experiencing a similar 
problem considering that they cannot meet their budgetary needs by deflating their 
currencies; these countries have to deal with excessive unsustainable costs because 
they are able to borrow. Wallerstein notes that emerging economies, especially the 
BRICS countries, have been experiencing sustained growth during the last few years; 
but emphasises that global economic stagnation has impacted these countries 
significantly despite this. The Chinese government is concerned over the threat of 
inflation, and the resultant increase in layoffs, due to the loose lending practices of 
Chinese banks; Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, is believed to be anxious about 
the competiveness of her country’s exports being threatened due to an overvalued 
Brazilian currency that is operating alongside what she views as deflated U.S. and 
Chinese currencies; the Russian, Indian and South African governments are grappling 
with widespread discontent from population groups that feel that they are not 
benefiting from the economic growth that their countries are experiencing. The states 
in the world-system will also have to look beyond domestic problems brought about 
by the economic downturn as the prices of energy, food, and water increase 
substantially (Wallerstein, 2011). 
 
For the purpose of this study it will be assumed that the world-system will continue as 
it has done. Even if it were to undergo a transformative phase, whereby the system 
potentially collapses and is replaced by another one, it is unlikely that this will occur 
within the next fifteen years. With the world-economy still in a B-phase (1973-2025), 
capital needs to be moved from the declining to the rising sectors in order for profit 
rates to improve, i.e. from the core to the periphery or semi-periphery; these countries 
will benefit from this and will have the opportunity to move up the system. The next 
section will focus on the balance of power that will ensue within the world-system 
around 2025. The argument put forward is that the ushering in of a new hegemon is a 
lengthy process, one that will probably not have taken root by this time; thus 2025 
will almost certainly be characterised by a multipolar world-system. The true impact 
of China and India’s growth will most likely only be felt closer to 2050. 
 
5.3. Power Shift within the Multipolar World-System 
Wallerstein proposed that a system characterised by out of control economic 
fluctuations and multipolar anarchy, presents the most likely scenario for the balance 
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of power in the world-system in 2025. This is the result of a long and difficult process 
of hegemonic transition and because of the problems that will be experienced in 
global capital accumulation (Wallerstein, 2006). The National Intelligence Council in 
America compiled a comprehensive report entitled ‘Global Trends 2025: A 
Transformed World’, wherein it identified key trends that are likely to occur in the 
next fifteen years. According to the report, it is a relative certainty that a global 
multipolar system will emerge by 2025, primarily driven by the rise of China and 
India. Power will be more dispersed because of this change and could potentially lead 
to the weakening of traditional Western alliances, as new rules are likely to be 
introduced by the newer players. China’s alternative developmental model will begin 
to become more attractive to developing countries as opposed to Western models of 
political and economic development. The overarching and undeniable trend driving 
these changes is the intensification of the transfer of economic power roughly from 
West to East (National Intelligence Council, 2008: iv,28-36). 
 
Wallerstein recalls that as recently as 2003 discussions pertaining to the decline of the 
United States were deemed to be outlandish; this opinion has changed considerably 
however as this belief has become prevalent among theorists, policymakers, and the 
media. The United States’ pre-emptive invasion of Iraq proved to be one of the key 
indicators of its waning political, economic and cultural influence; the invasion 
transformed the situation from one of gradual decline into one of imminent collapse. 
Not only had the United States lost its credibility as the sole political and economic 
leader of the world-system, but its extensive military power had also begun to erode 
rapidly. Despite recent events, Wallerstein claims that American hegemony reached 
its peak around 1970 and has been fading ever since (Wallerstein, 2007:54). He 
observes that U.S. decline has reintroduced multipolarity in the world-system and 
only views the country as a strong power in the multipolar world; its position will 
become even less influential as this new geopolitical situation develops (Wallerstein, 
2007:59). 
 
The European Union is an impressive structure according to Wallerstein (2010); it 
houses a common currency, and has a central bureaucracy and a human rights court. 
He contends that Europe is imploding in spite of this structure, predominantly due to 
Greece and Belgium. The severe sovereign debt crisis currently being experienced in 
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Greece has been well publicised, and the fact that it is a member of the eurozone 
means that it cannot devalue its currency to lighten the financial strain. Wallerstein 
postulates that if Greece receives financial aid, which it is likely to receive in 
November 2011, it will be closely followed by other European countries making 
similar demands, such as Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. The Greek problem 
threatens to be replicated elsewhere in Europe and time will tell whether the euro can 
survive. The Belgian problem could pose a much greater threat to the stability of the 
EU on the political and cultural levels. Belgium was created as a result of pan-
European politics and has undergone a constant struggle for power between the 
Dutch-speaking “Flemish” and French-speaking “Walloons”. The country has been on 
the verge of coming apart for some time now and a crisis in Belgium could easily spill 
over into a European crisis. The reason for this is that both parts of Belgium are 
members of the EU and a split could potentially lead to the break-up of other existing 
European states; furthermore, Brussels is more than just the capital of Belgium, it is 
the capital of Europe and its fate cannot be arranged without difficulty (Wallerstein, 
2010). 
 
According to the National Intelligence Council, growth projections for the BRIC 
countries alone – prior to South Africa’s inclusion – indicate that by 2040-2050 this 
group of countries will at the very least match the share of global GDP held by the 
original G-7 countries. Figure 10 illustrates how dramatic this shift in power will 
already be in the direction of these emerging countries by 2025. The Council predicts 
that China will exert a greater influence on the international system over the next two 
decades than any other country. It estimates that it will have the world’s second 
largest economy, overtaking the entire EU, and will be a significant military power, 
by 2025. Brazil, India, and Russia will also experience rapid economic growth during 
the period. This is especially the case for India who will probably push for a 
multipolar world with New Delhi as one of the poles. China, India, and Russia have 
largely adopted ‘state capitalism’ as their model for self-development, instead of the 
Western liberal model. The term refers to a system of economic management wherein 
the state carries out a central role and is not a new method of development, as recent 
developers like Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore can attest to (National 
Intelligence Council, 2008: vi-vii,28-36; National Intelligence Council, 2010:11). 
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Figure 10: The New Players by 2025 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Intelligence Council, 2010 
 
Sengupta (2003) believes that China’s entrance into the WTO is the most important 
factor aiding its ambition to become an economic superpower. This has given rise to 
new possibilities for foreign investments, as large firms will be able to take advantage 
of the massive Chinese market. The considerable size of the Chinese population 
proves to be another major factor leading to its economic growth. Rising incomes and 
an increasing demand for consumer goods has significantly increased domestic 
consumption, providing a window of opportunity for foreign businesses. China 
should be able to successfully develop its economy if it continues to make use of its 
large population and open up to world economies (Sengupta, 2003:392-395).  
 
It is important to look at India’s growth in relation to China’s, as they are undergoing 
similar growth patterns having recently been peripheral states. Eslake (2005) believes 
that although China has the competitive edge over India, this could change in the 
longer term as India is more efficient with regard to capital investment and energy 
consumption. Another important issue relates to the demographic challenge that 
China faces. Its ‘one-child’ policy has resulted in a population with a median age of 
34, compared with 25 in India. By 2025 13, 7 percent of China’s population will be 
aged 65 or over, with only 8, 1 percent in India. The United Nations estimates that 
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India’s working age population will overtake China’s by 2030. It is also a more 
politically stable country, guided by democratic principles; the same cannot be said 
for China (Eslake, 2005: 5).  
 
Figure 11 illustrates that China’s hegemonic aspirations move beyond competing in 
the world-economy, as it is currently the world’s second highest military spender. The 
country’s defence spending has increased by approximately 200 percent since 2001 
and is believed to have reached around $119 billion in 2010; this expenditure has 
remained relatively constant as a share of China’s GDP despite the substantial 
increase. The United States is still far ahead of its competitors in its defence spending 
as the $700 billion it spent on the military in 2010 is larger than the next 17 countries 
combined; the country’s budget crisis, however, could potentially lead to a reduction 
in defence spending however. It is noteworthy that four out of the five BRICS 
countries are among the top 11 biggest military spenders in the world (The 
Economist, 2011). South Africa has clearly allowed its military to diminish in size 
and influence, and at best can be described as fulfilling a peacekeeping role. This 
indicates that the country does not have hegemonic aspirations, but that does not 
mean that it does not desire to reach core status. 
 
Figure 11: Biggest Military Spenders in 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Economist, 2011 
 
In summary, major changes will not occur in the power structure of the world-system 
by 2025 seeing that it is not too far ahead in the future.  This means that the outcome 
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of the transitional phase within the world-economy will not reach fruition by the end 
of this period. More accurate predictions could be made if the aim was to assess what 
the world-system would look like in say 2050.  China is unlikely to become a fully-
fledged hegemon in the next fifteen years, as it will still be militarily weaker than the 
U.S., even if it could overtake the superpower in economic terms. Nor will the status 
of hegemon be reached by the EU or by a rapidly expanding India during this period. 
The year 2025 will serve as a crossroads, with the balance of power at that moment 
being multipolar. Nevertheless, it is evident that the power structure within the 
current multipolar world-system is beginning to shift toward the Global South. 
 
5.4. South Africa’s Internal and External Strategies for Ascent 
In keeping with the holistic approach promoted by modern world-system theorists, 
McGowan included economic, political, and cultural factors, in his evaluation of what 
the necessary components for national development entail. He purports that ascent in 
the political-economic hierarchy of core, semi-peripheral and peripheral states, is 
dependent on a combination of attaining long-term economic development, which 
forms the base for upward mobility in the world-system; a strong state that is viewed 
as politically stable and legitimate (combined with sound public and foreign policies 
by the state); and domestic and international cultural strength and influence 
(McGowan, 1993:37). The development strategies that will be proposed in this section 
follow the holistic blueprint set out by MWS theory; this will be combined with an 
assessment of whether South Africa is poised to utilise the most optimal ones in order 
to put the country in the best possible position to attain core status within the next 
fifteen years. These policies will be placed within the context of the internal and 
external constraints and incentives that need to be addressed and exploited 
respectively; they will be discussed in the following chapter.  
 
5.4.1. Economic Strategy 
5.4.1.1. Attaining the Right Mix of Strategies 
According to the modern world-system theoretical approach there are three available 
strategies for ascent within the world-system. They are ascent by means of seizing the 
chance (import substitution); promotion by invitation (an export-led growth strategy); 
and ascent through the strategy of self-reliance (closed national approach). In 
addition, purely semi-peripheral growth requires a state to have a large enough market 
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for its products that are produced as cost-effectively as possible; the semi-peripheral 
growth strategy should not be viewed in isolation and will form part of South Africa’s 
political and economic incentives discussion in the final chapter.   
 
Chapter four focused on recent ascents in the world-system that have adopted these 
strategies, with Mexico and Brazil adopting an import substitution industrialisation 
strategy, South Korea and Taiwan focusing on export-led growth, and China and 
Russia favouring the path of self-reliance. The chapter also discussed WTO-imposed 
limitations on policy options that are at the disposal of countries wanting to 
implement protectionist policies. Wade (2004) and Chang (2003) described the 
neoliberal development agenda as an attempt by the core countries to maintain the 
status quo, essentially ‘Kicking away the Ladder’. The reason behind this argument, 
one held as far back as the writings of List (1885), lies in the fact that during their 
paths to development the majority of core countries actively endorsed protectionist 
policies.   
 
Trade is an important element in any country’s development; it is for this reason that 
self-reliance should not be considered as a conceivable strategy for South Africa’s 
ascent in the current world-system as this will only lead to the country’s isolation. 
South Africa’s long-term economic growth strategy should rather focus on a 
combination of the ISI and export-led growth strategies (Table 11). These strategies 
are mutually beneficial and the limitations inherent in each one, when adopted in 
isolation, can only be overcome by attaining the correct balance between the two in 
different sectors of the economy. It was already mentioned that Latin American and 
East Asian countries adopted both sets of strategies during their recent development. 
Bagchi (2000) described earlier how a successful developmental state has the ability 
to switch gears from market-directed to state-directed growth. It was also mentioned 
that Wade (2003) supported the state-led approach but insisted that every effort 
should be made to implement import replacement more effectively. He added that this 
needs to form part of the government’s larger strategy which also incorporates the 
encouragement of export development.  
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Table 11: Development Strategy Proposal for South Africa 
 
 
 
Where has the introduction of the WTO left South Africa considering that these 
authors, as well as Hout (1996) and Haggard (1990), noted that the majority of 
successful developers did so by adopting a combination of the import substitution 
industrialisation and export-led growth strategies; despite the neoliberal contention 
that their development was achieved purely through the latter strategy. The possibility 
of circumventing the WTO was explored toward the end of the fourth chapter, but 
DiCaprio and Gallagher (2006) and Gallagher (2007) emphasised how difficult it 
would be for countries to implement aggressive development policies considering that 
these rules have been rigorously enforced through the organisation’s dispute panels.  
 
Seeing that South Africa cannot maneuver itself effectively within the WTO, it would 
appear that the institution has threatened the existence of the developmental state for 
the most part. This may well have been the case if it were not for new, and potentially 
transformative, developments within the power structures of the world-system at 
large. The real incentive for South Africa might actually lie in the extension of South-
South trade whilst the world-system is in its current B-phase of growth; the phase that 
allows the semi-periphery to push for structural and institutional change. The 
neoliberal development agenda could be challenged by the emergence of what is 
being termed the ‘Beijing Consensus’, which could provide South Africa with the 
opportunity to preserve its national policy space by adopting a state-facilitated 
development policy. Wade (2003) and Gallagher (2007) mentioned how China has 
benefited from adopting this approach through a combination of the ISI and export-
led growth strategies. This could serve as one of South Africa’s major economic 
incentives over the next fifteen years in an attempt to move into the core group of 
countries. 
 
Import Substitution Self-Reliance Export-Led Growth
Proposal for South 
Africa a x a
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5.4.2. Political Strategy 
5.4.2.1. Government Policies to Resemble that of a Developmental State 
Despite there being no single definition of a developmental state, Gumede defines it 
as a state that is “active in pursuing its agenda, working with social partners, and has 
the capacity and is appropriately organised for its predetermined developmental 
objectives” (Gumede, 2011:2). The question pertaining to whether or not South Africa 
can be classified as a developmental state has resulted in many ongoing debates that 
have reached little consensus. Weiss (2000) believes that South Africa is a 
developmental state because it exhibits a commitment to create a developmental state; 
it possesses an independent political and technocratic elite; and the government is 
relatively well connected to the private sector.  Edigheji (2005) argues that South 
Africa embodies the four principles of a democratic developmental state, namely state 
driven socio-economic development; economic growth; electoral democracy and 
popular participation in the development and governance processes; and embedded 
autonomy.  
 
Gumede (2011) supports neither argument but rather believes that South Africa can be 
classified as a developmental state in the making, but identifies the country as a fairly 
weak one. He explains this further by contending that even though South Africa 
cannot be classified as a fully fledged developmental state, it has many of the 
necessary attributes and most of all it appears that concerted efforts are being made to 
make sure that it becomes one. South Africa is one of the only countries to have 
publicly declared that it wants to be a developmental state and it is clearly captured in 
the ANC’s revised 2007 Strategy and Tactics document. The government also 
launched the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) for 2009 to 2014 in 
response to the country’s developmental challenges; it is clear that the MTSF contains 
the same vision of a developmental state: 
 
“These efforts have the potential to lay the foundation for a social compact among South African social 
partners in ensuring a speedy recovery and setting the country on a higher and more inclusive growth 
and development trajectory. At the core of this should be efforts to build a developmental state with the 
strategic, political, administrative and technical capacity to give leadership to this process, and an 
active civil society” (South African Government, 2009:5). 
 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions had already begun to analyse why the 
countries of East Asia managed to industrialise so rapidly in its policy document 
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drafted for the central committee in 2005 entitled ‘A Development State for South 
Africa’. The union proposed that South Africa’s development strategy should focus 
on improving socio-economic conditions and the reduction of inequality. Its primary 
economic proposal was that the country should base the building of its export 
industries on the development of the domestic market instead of relying on world 
markets to spontaneously bring about their emergence (COSATU, 2005:1-16). 
 
According to Edigheji (2010), the financial crisis has reinforced the notion that 
markets cannot always be self-regulating and has emphasised the importance of state 
interventions; thus making a stronger case for the formation of developmental states. 
He agrees that the ANC has already recognised the importance of creating such a state 
in order to address the country’s developmental challenges and feels that South Africa 
is in a better position than most late developers to construct a democratic 
developmental state because of this early realisation. Sceptics do point out, however, 
that the potential for a developmental state in South Africa is fraught with difficulties. 
One of the reasons is that the country’s constitutional democracy cannot coexist with 
development considering that democracy and development are often viewed 
incompatible ideals; it is difficult for a state to promote economic growth and address 
poverty, inequality and unemployment at the same time. The fact that developmental 
states generally occur in resource-poor countries, such as in East Asia, could prove to 
be another obstacle. One of the major talking points in the debate on the formation of 
a developmental state in South Africa has involved the utilisation of the country’s 
mineral wealth; the ANC Youth League has for example been pushing for the 
nationalisation of the mines. Rising levels of corruption in the public and private 
sectors serves as another deterrent to the government’s ability to create a democratic 
developmental state (Edigheji, 2010:1-4).  
 
Andreasson (2007) questions whether South Africa has the social preconditions to 
create a developmental state. He argues firstly that the government does not have the 
ability to carry out national mobilisation due to historical domestic divisions within 
the country. He rightfully argues that divisions exist within the ANC’s tripartite 
alliance as well when one considers that the government’s economic policy is almost 
completely market-driven, even though COSATU and the South African Communist 
Party continue to promote socialism (Andreasson, 2007:7-8). Andreasson took note of 
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the fact that successful developmental states ensured improvements across all of the 
dimensions of development, which includes the levels of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment. He also brings the country’s skills shortage, and poor health and 
violent crime records into the discussion in his assessment that there is no evidence of 
this developmental success in South Africa. Another important point relates to the 
social cohesion that is required in order to mobilise the nation toward a developmental 
state. Andreasson believes that development will continue to be hindered in South 
Africa until it finds a regional solution to deal with Zimbabwe’s problems, as he feels 
that national borders cannot confine social stability (Andreasson, 2007:8-10).  
 
Andreasson and Edigheji raise valid points regarding the difficulty in creating a 
developmental state in South Africa such as a lack of social cohesion, poor 
socioeconomic conditions and high levels of corruption. The argument here however 
is not that South Africa should recreate the modern-day developmental state of a 
country like China. What opponents to this approach neglect to raise is that all 
successful developers in the modern world-system have relied on a strong, 
development-oriented, state that could direct the country’s economy back-and-forth 
from an inward to an outward-oriented approach in various sectors of the economy 
and at different stages of that country’s development. None of the developed states 
contained all of the attributes required for a developmental state when they were first 
incorporated into the periphery of the world-system. The cultural and socioeconomic 
preconditions were only created once strong political structures were put in place with 
the intention and ability to direct the country’s development. The South African 
government clearly shows the necessary intention to drive the country’s growth, 
despite the drastic need for improved socioeconomic conditions proving to be a major 
obstacle. South Africa may well possess the social cohesion necessary for a 
developmental state; this and the other significant cultural aspects will be looked at in 
the following section. 
 
5.4.3. Sociocultural Strategy 
5.4.3.1. Improving South Africa’s Soft Power in the World-System 
Cultural strength and influence is a crucial, although often overlooked, component for 
national development. Wallerstein (1984) explains the cultural component as the 
extent to which the values of the state and society complement each other. He argues 
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that these values are more closely matched in core and semi-peripheral states than in 
peripheral ones. According to McGowan, key cultural drivers include a state’s 
linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural, educational and sporting achievements and 
characteristics. He mentioned how important the interconnection of cultural, 
political/military and economic strength is to the United States. American success in 
the cultural sphere is attributed to its ‘Coca Cola’ culture, illustrious universities like 
Harvard and MIT, and ‘high’ cultural organisations such as the Metropolitan Opera in 
New York (McGowan, 1993:37; 41). Mingst (1998) supports McGowan’s view that a 
stronger national identity is formed in countries that possess a number of ethnic 
groups; she also points out that cultural integrity, or homogeneity, is promoted in 
those that share a common language.  
 
South Africa’s global cultural influence is enhanced by its peace-promoting foreign 
policy as well as through its participation in global forums such as the G-20, the G-24, 
IBSA and BRICS. McGowan (1993) believes that the country’s greatest cultural 
strength vis-à-vis the group of upper middle income countries, lies in the fact that it is 
a member of the English-speaking world. It was mentioned previously that the quality 
of South Africa’s academic institutions also sets the country apart, as it possesses 
eight of the top ten ranked universities on the African continent and five out of the top 
700 global universities. The exportation of popular culture has resulted in impressive 
achievements in music and cinema added to the fact that the country hosts a number 
of prestigious cultural festivals; but it is through its achievements on the sporting front 
that South Africa has gained prominence of late (McGowan, 1993:342-43; Van der 
Westhuizen, 2002:9-10; Webometrics, 2011) 
 
National sentiment was at an all time high in 2010 due to an exceptionally well hosted 
2010 FIFA World Cup. With the eyes of the world focused on South Africa during 
June and July that year, the event served as a major boost for the country’s global 
marketability. Furthermore, the event eclipsed the unifying force that was experienced 
by the country’s multicultural society during the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Events such 
as these prove McGowan’s (1993) notion that South Africa’s linguistic, cultural, 
ethnic and racial diversity should not be viewed as an inherent cultural limitation that 
weakens the economy and leads to political instability and violence.  
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Mingst (1998) believes that societal congruity is also promoted through the 
government’s support of employment, education and healthcare; this reinforces the 
population’s belief that it forms part of an integrated society. Sunter (2008) mirrors 
this argument by stating that the developed countries, which he refers to as Premier 
League teams, exhibit inclusive leadership and unity. He noted recently that there was 
a greater sense of unity and purpose amongst South Africans during the World Cup; 
crime statistics even fell sharply during the tournament (Sunter, 2011). Sunter views 
social harmony and unity of spirit as a necessity if South Africa aims to achieve long-
run success in the global economy. This type of harmony or enhanced sense of 
patriotism requires an inclusive economy, which is why socioeconomic conditions 
will be included in this discussion because of the potentially divisive role it can play 
in the fostering of a unified culture in South Africa’s multicultural society (Sunter, 
2008).  
 
One need look no further for the importance of improving the country’s 
socioeconomic conditions than Julius Malema, who has grabbed headlines due to his 
populist tactics directed toward unemployed and marginalised South Africans. Sunter 
(2011) lauds Malema for putting pressure on the country’s business and political 
establishment to implement more radical measures to transform a society which can 
be described as lop-sided and elitist. He does however challenge Malema’s tactics to 
get there, most notably nationalisation and land grabs, and says that they are “dead-
end policies” regardless of whether compensation is provided or not. Nationalisation 
without compensation will most likely lead to the reintroduction of sanctions against 
South Africa by the U.S. and EU; whereas nationalisation with sanctions will mean 
that approximately a trillion rand will be required to purchase the targeted assets, 
which will either be sourced by government borrowing or by diverting funds from 
welfare, education, health and law and order. The impact that land grabs could have 
on the country is not certain; the worst case scenario is that it could result in a civil 
war, especially when liberation songs like ‘Kill the Boer’ are used to antagonise 
portions of the population. Sunter believes that in order for unity to prevail in South 
Africa, and improve the country’s prospects for economic development, black South 
Africans should stop singing provocative songs about white South Africans, who in 
turn should stop being ignorant by dismissing African history (Sunter, 2011). 
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It is evident from the aforementioned that South Africa should focus on promoting a 
greater sense of unity and developing its current cultural strengths, such as the hosting 
of international sporting events, furthering its participation in global organisations, 
and increasing its investment in its higher education institutions. South Africa’s 
socioeconomic situation is less impressive however and it should address its 
limitations in health, education, unemployment, inequality and poverty urgently 
before it erodes the unity that the country has built up since the first democratic 
elections in 1994.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter put forward economic, political and sociocultural strategies for South 
Africa’s ascent in the modern world-system. Economically it was proposed that South 
Africa should continue with the developmental approach utilised by the current core 
powers, which entails a combination of the outward strategy of export-led growth and 
the protectionist strategy of import substitution. Politically is was suggested that the 
South African government should adopt a developmental approach similar to the 
structure of developmental states; and on the sociocultural level the country should 
strengthen its domestic and international soft power and work on fostering a sense of 
unity amongst its citizens.  
 
The final chapter will assess whether South Africa is poised to utilise the most 
optimal strategies proposed in this chapter in order to put the country in the best 
possible position to attain core status within the next fifteen years. These development 
strategies will be placed within the context of the internal and external political, 
economic and sociocultural constraints and incentives that need to be addressed and 
exploited respectively.  
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Chapter Six 
Concluding Remarks  
 
6.1. Introduction 
The final chapter will assess whether South Africa is well positioned to adopt the 
development strategies proposed in the fifth chapter by placing them within the 
context of the internal and external constraints and incentives that need to be 
addressed and exploited respectively. The impact of these constraints and incentives 
will be assessed by placing them within their economic, political and sociocultural 
spheres of influence. Economic incentives include South-South trade in the current B-
phase and capitalising on Africa as South Africa’s external market. Economic 
constraints comprise the mineral-energy complex, the limited control over the wage 
effects of labour unions, levels of technology and infrastructure, and affirmative 
action and the brain drain. Influential political incentives that have been identified are 
democratic consolidation and utilising foreign policy as a partnership-building tool; 
whereas corruption, crime and xenophobia serve as noteworthy political constraints. 
A significant sociocultural incentive involves developing Brand South Africa; 
unemployment, poverty and inequality are major sociocultural impediments. The 
chapter and thesis will end off with a summary of the findings for the study and will 
be followed by the drawing of a conclusion, as well as recommendations for further 
research. 
 
6.2. Incentives and Constraints for Development 
6.2.1. Economic Incentives 
6.2.1.1. South-South Trade in the Current B-Phase 
Arrighi and Zhang (2010) termed the occurrence of China’s increasingly strong 
economy and the rapidly changing relations between the global North and South, the 
‘strange death of the Washington Consensus’. What they feel is odd about this ‘death’ 
is that it has gone largely unnoticed during a period characterised by the 
unquestionable acceptance of the neoliberal doctrines promulgated by the Consensus. 
Even though the Washington Consensus was declared as a new developmental 
strategy, its primary aim was the reestablishment of U.S. power. Purporters of the 
neoliberal developmental approach have justified its adoption by pointing to trends 
since 1980 that state that there has been a reduction in global levels of income 
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inequality and poverty. Arrighi and Zhang, as well as other theorists such as Berry 
(2005), purport that this occurrence can only be attributed to the combined 
performance of China and India (Arrighi and Zhang, 2010:1-4). 
 
The Chinese ascent in the world-system has discredited and challenged the 
Washington Consensus. According to Arrighi and Zhang, this has resulted in the 
move toward a ‘new Bandung’ with the emergence of a new Southern Alliance, 
stronger than the one created at Bandung in the 1950s which had been predominantly 
politically and ideologically motivated. Ramo (2004) believes that the emergence of 
China represents the withering away of the Washington Consensus and the ushering 
in of a Beijing Consensus (although no formal consensus exists); which does not 
advocate adopting standardised solutions for each situation, but rather promotes 
flexibility in development paths and independence by giving countries the freedom to 
protect their policies, interests, and national borders (Arrighi and Zhang, 2010:28; 
Ramo, 2004:3-4). 
 
Southern Cooperation currently takes place in a variety of fields and is based on 
increasing the competitiveness of Southern countries in world production through 
South-South trade and investment. The four countries that are most prevalent behind 
the move in this direction are China, India, Brazil, and South Africa (CIBS). Arrighi 
and Zhang (2010) argue that criticism directed toward the exploitative relationship 
between the CIBS countries and other Southern countries does not take account of the 
entire picture. This relationship affords other Southern countries greater terms of 
trade, investment, and aid, than that provided by Northern countries. This also creates 
an environment which compels Northern countries to give in to competitive pressures 
by providing Southern countries with more favourable terms of trade than they 
otherwise would have done (Arrighi and Zhang, 2010:33-34). 
 
South-South trade predominantly through the CIBS countries has led to, and will 
increasingly lead to, a change in the balance of power in the world-system. This is no 
surprise considering that the modern world-system theory states that semi-peripheral 
mobility is much more likely when the world-economy is in a B-phase of growth. 
South Africa should make use of this opportunity to further its trade within the Global 
South. Furthermore, this Southern Alliance should provide the country with the 
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opportunity to tilt the terms of trade, which it currently holds with the core powers in 
the North, in its favour. As a semi-peripheral state, South Africa is still heavily reliant 
on trade with these countries but the increased relational power that it enjoys vis-à-vis 
the industrialised North may provide it with the window of opportunity that it needs 
to challenge for core status.  
 
6.2.1.2. Africa as South Africa’s External Market 
The DTI (2011d) describes South Africa as the economic powerhouse of the African 
continent and as one of the most sophisticated emerging markets globally. That is not 
surprising when one takes note of the fact that the country’s GDP of R2, 3 trillion is 
four times larger than its Southern African neighbours combined, and comprises 30 
percent of the entire continent’s GDP. The country accounts for around 40 percent of 
Africa’s industrial output, 45 percent of its total mineral production, and generates 
more than half of the continent’s electricity (DTI, 2011d). South Africa is clearly the 
dominant economic player on the African continent and considering that one of the 
prerequisites for a country’s growth beyond the semi-periphery involves securing a 
large enough market for its national products; South Africa finds itself in the perfect 
position to utilise its relational power in order to capitalise on the African market.  
 
According to Alden and Soko (2005), having understood the opportunity that this 
market presents for the country’s development, the South African government 
believes its long-term political and economic future to be tied to Africa. The continent 
forms an integral part of the country’s South-South cooperation, something which the 
DTI terms the ‘butterfly strategy’; which depicts South Africa at the proverbial head 
of the insect with rest of the African continent comprising the body. By using this 
strategy the country’s trading wings can open up from Africa to North and South 
America and to East Asia (Alden and Soko, 2005:369). It is vital that the South 
African government structures its foreign policy in a manner that allows it to get the 
most out of its economic relationships in Africa and further afield, as chapter three 
painted a negative picture pertaining to the hegemonic attributes found within South 
Africa’s regional trade activity. The most appropriate structure of the country’s 
foreign policy will be looked at in greater detail in the political section, in order to 
avoid the growing negative sentiment that African countries hold pertaining to South 
Africa’s influence on the continent. 
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6.2.2. Economic Constraints 
6.2.2.1. Mineral-Energy Complex 
Padayachee (2006) contests the upbeat point of view that is often depicted regarding 
the South African economy and states that since 1994 it has been characterised by low 
levels of growth and investment, and a moderate increase in employment. Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996) explain that the structure of South Africa’s economy should not be 
looked at conventionally as a breakdown of agriculture, mining and industry; but 
should rather be understood through the historical legacy of the mineral-energy 
complex. The authors argue that the country’s various economic activities that are 
centred on heavy materials management were developed through its initial financial 
and material base in gold mining. They point out that the powerful financial groupings 
that put the structures in place for gold and diamond mining were responsible for past 
successes in industrial metals mining such as iron, steel, timber and chemicals. By 
looking at South Africa through the mineral-energy complex, it fosters greater 
understanding as to why the country’s capitalists and policy makers are so fixated on 
this specific industrial path, and sheds some light upon why it does not fit well into 
international models of industrialisation. The authors contend that industrial 
restructuring and the endorsement of small and medium-sized enterprises will take a 
long time to deflect economic forces from this path; but call for a more demand-rich, 
inclusive and skills-based economy nonetheless (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996).  
 
It was mentioned in previous chapters that South Africa shifted from an ISI growth 
path in the early 1990s to a more open approach that entailed having to compete in the 
global economy. Manufacturing enterprises were supposed to be equipped with the 
tools necessary to deal with this increased competition through a new industrial policy 
environment and government support measures. Padayachee contends that only a few 
segments of industry were able to upgrade sufficiently enough to achieve 
manufacturing excellence; in fact the majority of firms continued to be uncompetitive 
(Padayachee, 2006:7-8). The fact that South Africa’s service sector has expanded 
significantly during the last couple of decades indicates the longer-term trend of the 
economic growth being dependent on services as opposed to primary and 
manufacturing production (Cassim, 2006:57-58). 
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6.2.2.2. Limited Control over the Wage Effects of Labour Unions 
Another vital element for semi-peripheral growth involves governmental control over 
national wage levels (Wallerstein, 1974a). The raising of wages cannot be controlled 
easily by the ANC due to its tripartite alliance with COSATU and the SACP. This 
means that the government will always need to pay close attention to wage levels in 
order to be sensitive to labour union demands. South Africa experienced industrial 
action and lightning strikes throughout 2010, but the government rejected the demand 
from a coalition of unions to have an 8, 6 percent salary increase as well as a R1000 
per month housing allowance.  The coalition, which represents more than one million 
public servants, launched a country-wide strike in August that year in order to place 
additional pressure on the government (World Bank, 2011e). Wage levels are difficult 
to control as it is, without having a split in the ruling party regarding labour rights and 
the level of adequate remuneration. The government needs to reach a balance between 
attaining optimal cost levels and the livelihood of its labour force. It would go against 
South Africa’s developmental ideals if that livelihood is jeopardised.  
 
6.2.2.3. Technology and Infrastructure 
Chapter three indicated that South Africa’s level of infrastructure and technology is 
on par with other semi-peripheral states; this is not only vital for the country’s 
economy but is also relied upon by its neighbours. This achievement is misleading 
however as South Africa does not perform well on all levels. According to the World 
Bank, South Africa is far behind the upper middle income group level of internet 
users as well as high technology exports (World Bank, 2011a). Dixon believes that 
future possibilities that will be brought about through networking are still in their 
infancy. The internet will transform the lives of people in urban as well as in rural 
areas, even though the world has not begun to see its true potential as yet. The world-
system will be separated into two groups, the information haves and the information 
have-nots. Countries will be segregated internally by these two groups as well, with 
its future prosperity dependent on having a favourable proportion of haves over have-
nots (Dixon, 1999:16-23). The internet, and advances in technology will most likely 
entrench differences between the three levels in the global division of labour. If South 
Africa wants to reach the core, it will need to keep up with new and rapidly changing 
forms of technology in order to have a competitive edge during its ascent in the 
world-system.  
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6.2.2.4. Affirmative Action and Brain Drain  
The developmental benefits of affirmative action are not questioned, especially 
considering South Africa’s need to deal with high levels of poverty, unemployment, 
and inequality. The problem lies in its implementation in the midst of growing 
perceptions that this is being done in an unstructured and haphazard manner, which 
results in specialist positions being filled by inadequately qualified personnel. The 
poor service delivery that results will have a negative impact on the country’s 
productivity levels. The positive spin off has been the formation of a substantial black 
middle class; whereas on the negative side, affirmative action has led to a 
considerable brain drain in the country. South Africa is experiencing this at increasing 
levels, as a high proportion of the country’s educated citizens are emigrating in order 
to find employment. Visser (2003) believes that the brain drain of skills leaving South 
Africa is considerable but argues that it is a sign of a maturing nation. He explains that 
every country has experienced a period when many of its citizens are spread out 
across the world. Various institutions such as The Homecoming Revolution have been 
setup in order to reverse South Africa’s skills shortage.  
 
6.2.3. Political Incentives 
6.2.3.1. Democratic Consolidation  
South Africa is a multiparty parliamentary democracy in which constitutional power 
is shared between the president and the Parliament. This democratic system is 
characterised, however, by single-party dominance in the form of the ANC. South 
Africa has held four relatively peaceful elections since the country’s transition from 
apartheid to constitutional democracy in 1994, something which the World Bank calls 
“one of the most important and impressive political transitions of our time” (World 
Bank, 2011e). Jacob Zuma was sworn in as president after the ANC obtained a 65, 9 
percent majority win in the general elections in April 2009. Zuma is facing increasing 
pressure, despite being in the relative infancy of his five-year term. This is attributed 
to the difficulty involved in maintaining the cohesion of the tripartite alliance – 
between the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions – as divisions grow between its members. Zuma’s backing for 
finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, and for the continuity of the market-pleasing 
economic policy, will enhance the dissatisfaction of the left, especially COSATU 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011; World Bank, 2011e). 
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Democratic consolidation essentially entails popular support for a political regime. 
The most commonly accepted definition of the consolidation of democracy involves 
equating it with legitimation; citizens endow a regime with political legitimacy when 
they willingly support the rules that govern them. Democracy is consolidated when it 
is viewed as the ‘only game in town’, whereby leaders and citizens agree that no 
alternative form of regime has a superior claim to their allegiance (Bratton and 
Mattes, 2001:447). According to political culture theory, political instability is 
brought about by an incongruity between mass attitudes and values on one hand, and 
political institutions on the other (Almond and Verba, 1963). Mattes attributes the 
third wave of democracy that spread across the planet between 1975 and 2005 to the 
fact that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes could not supply adequate economic 
and political goods to satisfy their citizens. One of the pertinent questions for a new 
democracy like South Africa is whether the value structure that de-legitimated the 
former authoritarian regime under apartheid is sufficient to legitimate and consolidate 
the country’s new liberal democracy (Mattes, 2011:1).  
 
Mattes says that the South African population has no specific affinity for democracy 
and would be willing to accept one party rule or strong man dictatorship if these 
regimes are able to guarantee economic development. He adds that the benefits that 
were accumulated due to the political experiences of liberty, freedom and self-
government have been neutralised by clear weaknesses that cannot be ignored in the 
form of continuing poverty, unemployment and corruption. Nearly two decades on, 
the consolidation of South Africa’s democracy is as dependent on performance-based 
support as ever (Mattes, 2011:2). 
 
According to Freedom House ratings South Africa’s political rights and civil liberties 
ratings declined from 1 to 2 in 2007, as a result of the ANC’s growing monopoly on 
policy making and its increasingly technocratic nature; the constitution does however 
protect both the freedoms of expression and the press. The government is sensitive to 
media criticism nonetheless and is trying to restrict the editorial independence of the 
SABC, to the extent that its critics are not permitted on SABC airwaves. South Africa 
is a politically stable and free country in spite of this, but legitimacy appears to be 
creaking. It is clear that there is an increasing lack of confidence in the government, 
which is illustrated by the drop in voter turnout from 89, 3 percent to 76, 7 percent 
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between the 1999 and 2004 National Assembly Elections (African Elections 
Database, 2011). On a positive note the percentage of voter turnouts increased slightly 
to 77, 3 percent during the 2009 National Assembly Elections (Freedom House, 2007; 
Freedom House, 2011; The Independent Electoral Commission, 2011). 
 
Protests in South Africa had generally been peaceful and relatively low in number 
since the ANC came to power. This has changed significantly of late with service 
delivery protests increasing significantly and often turning violent over the past three 
years. According to the ‘hotspots monitor’ run by Municipal IQ – a local government 
data and intelligence service which monitors protests in all of the country’s 283 
municipalities – 75 noteworthy service delivery protests had taken place by the end of 
September 2011; in 2010 and 2009 there were 111 and 105 incidents respectively. 
These figures are worrying when compared to the average number of incidents that 
took place between 2004 and 2008, which amounts to only 21 (Municipal IQ, 2011).  
 
In order for South Africa to create a strong state it needs to appear legitimate to the 
country’s population. The ANC has performed well in maintaining the democratic 
principles that are contained in the constitution; in spite of this democratic 
consolidation requires economic development and an improvement in socioeconomic 
conditions. The party needs to increase the voter turnout for the next election; the 
reason for this is that the lower the voter turnout is the larger the proportion of 
disenfranchised citizens in the country. The ANC should not try to gain greater 
confidence by limiting the freedom of the press; this will resemble the policies of an 
autocratic state. The government should rather gain this support by promoting 
political inclusivity through the use of softer forms of power. Considering that South 
Africa is only its second decade as a democracy, one cannot blindly accept that its 
democracy is consolidated; the country’s development aspirations will depend on its 
democracy taking root even further. 
 
6.2.3.2. Foreign Policy as a Partnership-Building Tool 
South Africa’s foreign policy, according to Fairbanks (2011), has been widely 
criticised of late due to its indecisiveness. In October 2011, the South African 
government continued to delay its decision on whether to give the Dalai Lama a visa 
to attend the birthday party of Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu; this resulted in 
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the Dalai Lama cancelling his trip after allegedly being fed up with waiting for a 
response. The country’s indecisiveness also played out a few months prior to this in 
Libya, when South Africa refused to back its emerging market counterparts – Brazil, 
Russia, India and China – in support of the United Nations resolution mandating a no-
fly zone in order to assist the rebels fighting the late Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi. In 
2007 it was Burma, and South Africa’s U.N. representative voted against a resolution 
calling on Burma's military junta to free Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu 
Kyi's and other political prisoners. Suu Kyi recently remarked that the South African 
government does not always stand up for human rights in the same way that the 
country’s individuals such as Desmond Tutu do. Fairbanks critiques the Rainbow 
Nation, which she describes as a society based on freedom and human rights, for 
giving up its identity as a moral torchbearer. She believes that this mixed-signals type 
of foreign policy is due to internal pressure in response to the country’s two global 
identities: as a promoter of human rights and sound morals; and as an emerging 
regional superpower and new found member of the BRICS (Fairbanks, 2011). 
 
South Africa’s foreign policy decisions could perhaps be better understood when one 
looks at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s (DIRCO) 
‘Strategic Plan 2009-2012’.  DIRCO makes it clear that it will support the five 
priorities formulated by the South African government, namely the creation of decent 
work and sustainable livelihoods, health, education, crime and rural development. 
Furthermore, DIRCO states that the country’s foreign policy aims to forge strong 
relations with the developing countries of the South as they are important partners in 
the country’s pursuit of economic growth and development. It also aims to strengthen 
ties with the African Union as it views the organisation as an important actor in the 
attempt to bring peace, stability and economic development to the African continent. 
DIRCO has also clearly stated that it values and aims to enhance its relations with 
developed countries of the North (DIRCO, 2009). 
 
Landsberg agrees with DIRCO’s approach and believes that because South Africa is 
an African power its domestic and foreign policies should be structured in a manner 
that addresses the country’s and the continent’s considerable developmental 
challenges. The country’s domestic inequalities and instability should direct policy 
makers toward engagement with the international community, which includes the 
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industrialised North and the developing South, so that it can attend to its national and 
the African conditions. It is for this reason that South Africa needs to incorporate a 
developmental foreign policy. This foreign policy needs to be pro-engagement, not 
isolationist, as the large amount of resources that are required to address development 
issues can only be acquired through engaging the outside world (Landsberg, 
2005:723-724).  
 
Landsberg encourages Southern states to form strong South-South alliances and 
partnerships, so that development can be put back on the global agenda and the 
playing field can be levelled between North and South. The South should cooperate 
and develop strategic partnerships instead of opting out of the world-system. A 
developmental foreign policy cannot operate without developmental states, 
considering that every core power required a strong state for its development, thus 
contradicting the minimalist version that the Washington consensus promotes. He 
believes that South Africa is more than capable of moving toward a developmental 
foreign policy. The ANC had already initiated developmentalism into its foreign 
policy from 2000 in response to the Millennium Development Goals. In terms of 
South Africa’s relationship with Africa, Landsberg believes that it should promote its 
development through partnership and not through hegemony (Landsberg, 2005:726-
733). 
 
South Africa needs to make use of the African market for the exportation of its 
products; the region could be the springboard that the country needs to reach the core. 
It should try to promote the ideals of shared development in order to foster the 
partnership-building approach. The regional economic communities (RECs) on the 
continent present the country with the opportunity to focus its attention on regions of 
particular interest. This will not be done easily in regions like southern Africa, due to 
the unequal trading relationship between South Africa and SADC. It was indicated 
earlier that this skewed relationship with SADC provides the country with its greatest 
trade surplus, which allows it to finance a large proportion of its trade deficit with 
other regions. Criticism regarding this unequal trade relationship can go a long way 
toward being averted if the country adopts a developmental or partnership-building 
agenda for the continent. South Africa should continually stress the importance that 
trade and investment with the country will have for the development of African 
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countries. South Africa needs to exert greater political and cultural influence on the 
continent in order to make better use of the African market. Institutions like the 
African Union should be used to promote political stability on the continent and 
should share the vision of developing Africa through trade growth. 
 
6.2.4. Political Constraints 
6.2.4.1. Corruption, Crime and Xenophobia 
South Africa has had to grapple with high levels of corruption in both the public and 
private sectors. The country ranked poorly in Transparency International’s 2010 
Corruption Perceptions Index, placing it in 54th position out of the 178 countries 
surveyed. Recent examples of this trend include the arrest and sentencing of former 
police commissioner Jackie Selebi; the abolishment of the Scorpions; and the 
announcement that the tender process for several contracts linked with the 2010 
World Cup were suspected to be corrupt and nontransparent (Freedom House, 2011). 
 
South Africa has also gained unwanted recognition for having one of the highest 
violent crime rates in the world. Crime is prevalent throughout the country and does 
not distinguish between different levels of socioeconomic status. The use of force 
against criminals has been advocated by the Zuma administration in response to 
growing concerns, through the implementation of a ‘shoot to kill’ policy. The police 
had already been criticised because of the high degree of force it uses, after Amnesty 
International reported a rise in the number of deaths in custody in 2009. The South 
African penal system does not provide adequate security for the country’s citizens due 
to overcrowding, inadequate health care, and the abuse of inmates by staff or other 
prisoners. The legal system only exacerbates the situation whereby poor South 
Africans in particular often do not have access to a timely trial and state-funded legal 
counsel due to staff and resource shortages (Freedom House, 2011; OSAC, 2010). 
 
Terrorism is not a major factor on the South African landscape. The last major 
incident took place in the 1990s when Planet Hollywood was bombed in Cape Town. 
This occurred during PAGAD’s (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) terror 
campaign of assassinations, vigilante murders, and bombings in the Western Cape 
from 1997 to November 2001. No anti-Western attacks have taken place following the 
prosecution of PAGAD members (OSAC, 2010). There are contrasting reports 
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pertaining to the number of foreign nationals living in South Africa; general estimates 
range from two to seven million. The rise in illegal immigration, most notably from 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique, has been met with a steady increase in xenophobic 
violence by police and vigilantes. 80,000 foreigners were displaced after a wave of 
attacks in 2008; this was followed by an attack by residents in the de Doorns informal 
settlement in 2009 which resulted in some 2,500 Zimbabweans being forced to flee. 
The South African government introduced a moratorium on the deportation of 
undocumented Zimbabweans in April 2009 and the majority received 90-day visa 
waivers. Sporadic attacks continued in 2009 as well as in 2010 after the World Cup. 
(Freedom House, 2011). 
 
The ANC government needs to deal with crime and corruption efficiently in order to 
foster greater political legitimacy. Whilst terrorism may not be a major problem the 
country should place greater emphasis on the protection of its national borders in 
order to quell the high levels of illegal immigration. Illegal immigration does not only 
place greater pressure on the level of unemployment in South Africa but xenophobic 
violence creates a negative international perception of the ANC’s ability to govern 
within the country’s borders. 
 
6.2.5. Sociocultural Incentives 
6.2.5.1. Developing Brand South Africa 
Van der Westhuizen (2002) points out that an effective marketing strategy is based on 
the utilisation of cultural resources that consistently transmit the country’s culture 
globally. It is for this reason that the International Marketing Council (IMC) was 
created in August 2002, with the sole purpose of handling the marketing and branding 
of South Africa, whilst fostering a strong sense of national identity in the process. The 
IMC chose to market post-apartheid South Africa through the Brand South Africa 
campaign, with its catchy slogan ‘South Africa is alive with possibility’. Other 
memorable terms that have branded the country include Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s 
description of post-apartheid South Africa as the ‘Rainbow Nation’; as well the 
‘Proudly South Africa’ campaign which was created by the labour movement with the 
intention of stimulating domestic demand and employment. Arguably, the face that 
has given South Africa its greatest exposure is that of Nelson Mandela, who placed 
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second behind Coca-Cola in a survey listing the world’s most widely recognised 
brands (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:11,16; Brand South Africa, 2011). 
   
South Africa appears to be faring well in terms of its global cultural influence when 
compared to its counterparts in the upper middle income group of countries. Van der 
Westhuizen (2002:9) believes that the amount of international attention that post-
apartheid South Africa has received is far greater than the comparative level one 
would expect a developing country to receive. This is illustrated by South Africa 
placing 36th in Simon Anholt's Nation Brands Index in 2011. The IMC’s CEO, Miller 
Matola, states that it is the Council’s vision to break into the list of top twenty 
countries represented in the Nation Brands Index by 2020. The country’s performance 
in the region is exemplary as it was the top-ranking country in sub-Saharan Africa 
according to the 2010 Country Brand Index (Brand South Africa, 2011; Country 
Brand Index, 2010; Nation Brands Index, 2011). 
 
Even though it may already wield greater cultural influence than one would expect 
from an upper middle income country, South Africa should continue to build on the 
success that its soft power has had on the world-system. The IMC is doing well to 
create a strong brand for the country and it could potentially provide South Africa 
with a measure of cultural strength that is equivalent to that held by core powers, if it 
is able to break into the top 20 national brands. 
 
6.2.6. Sociocultural Constraints 
6.2.6.1. Unemployment, Poverty, and Inequality 
According to the World Bank (2011e), unemployment, poverty, and inequality remain 
major challenges for the South African economy. Development is marginal beyond 
the four economic centres of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, and 
Pretoria/Johannesburg. South Africa is faced with exceedingly high differences in 
income and wealth, despite the decline in income poverty that has been brought about 
by the country’s substantial economic growth in the post-apartheid period.  This 
disparity comes down the fact that between 1995 and 2008 inequality actually 
increased from 0.64 to 0.67 using the Gini coefficient.  The government is faced with 
the task of de-racialising capitalism as white South Africans still control most of the 
capital in the country (World Bank, 2011e).  
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A significant black middle class has emerged in recent years, brought about by an 
economic boom and aggressive affirmative action policies in the corporate sector. The 
UCT Unilever Institute (2007) estimates that more than 12,000 'Black Diamond' 
families (South Africa’s new black middle class) - or 50,000 people - are moving 
from the townships into the suburbs of South Africa's metro areas every month. 
Nonetheless, a substantial proportion of the country’s wealth remains concentrated in 
a small segment of the population. Unemployment is a major concern and official 
reports state that it currently stands at more than 25 percent, as the poor do not have 
access to an abundance of economic opportunities (Freedom House, 2007; World 
Bank, 2011e). 
 
The government has made steady progress in its attempt to deal with the social 
inequalities that characterise South African society. It needs to ensure that it provides 
sufficient services and opportunities for all of its citizens, if it seeks to become a core 
nation by 2025. The only way that this will be achieved on the socio-economic level 
is through the successful creation of a strong state that has attained long-term 
economic development, a requirement which is imperative for upward mobility in the 
hierarchy of core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral states. On the cultural level, 
inequality will continue to be a divisive element within society especially because 
these class differences were formed along racial lines during the apartheid era. The 
emergence of a substantial black middle class could be the saving grace that the 
government needs in its attempt to create a unified national culture. This success 
represents the positive impact that affirmative action policies have had on the country, 
and will continue to have if implemented in a balanced way. In order to build on this 
success leading up to 2025, the government should ensure that its citizens have access 
to a larger amount of economic opportunities, and should do so in a manner that is 
inclusive of all ethnic and cultural groups. 
 
6.2.6.2. Health and Education 
Around 11 percent of South Africa’s population, which accounts for about 5, 5 
million of its citizens, is infected with HIV/AIDS. The country has the highest number 
of people living with the disease in the world. Tuberculosis is rife as a result, with the 
country accounting for 24 percent of the global burden of HIV- related tuberculosis. 
Many of South Africa’s health problems can be attributed to the apartheid legacy, as 
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they are predominantly derived from social changes that were brought about by the 
migrant labour system. The situation is exacerbated by the country’s health delivery 
system which favours the elite heavily. Added to this, the scepticism that was held by 
the government under former President Thabo Mbeki about the link between HIV and 
AIDS, is believed to have claimed 330,000 lives between 2000 and 2005. The disease 
caused a significant reduction in the average life expectancy of the South African 
population as a result, falling from 62 in 1990 to 51 in 2010. Even though state-
funded access to antiretroviral drugs rose in 2008, it has been on a steady decline 
since then. This development is confirmed by the AIDS Law Project who argue that 
treatment did not reach around 40 percent of the country’s HIV- positive citizens 
during 2010 (Freedom House, 2011; World Bank, 2011e). 
 
South Africa is on par with the upper middle income group of countries with regard to 
primary enrollment but its primary completion rate and literacy rate is moderately 
lower than that achieved by the group (World Bank, 2011e). Education and skills 
development is pertinent for the expansion of the parallel economy which is an 
important component leading to real economic growth and development.  The 
government needed to intervene in order to promote training and skills development, 
so that the country could take advantage of the substantial resource base of skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour at its disposal. The then Deputy President, Phumzile 
Mlambo-Ngcuka, launched the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (AsgiSA) in 
February 2006. The national initiative aimed at producing a 6 percent economic 
growth rate accompanied by significant job creation. AsgiSA’s overall objective is to 
halve poverty and unemployment by 2014. The Joint Initiative for Priority Skills 
Acquisition (Jipsa) was launched a month later and forms one of AsgiSA’s integral 
pillars by developing much needed skills within the South African labour force 
(AsgiSA, 2009; Department of Trade and Industry, 2011). 
 
Ascent in the international division of labour will involve the provision of goods and 
services at a higher technological level than what the country currently engages in. It 
is imperative that this development is accompanied by increased education as South 
Africa’s labour force will require a greater skill set. The high level of government 
investment in education was one of the key features shared between East Asian 
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countries during their growth. In keeping with one of the key requirements of a 
developmental state, similar large-scale investment in education is being undertaken 
in China and India. The creation of a highly-skilled labour force in South Africa will 
come to naught if nothing is done about the potentially crippling effect of HIV and 
AIDS. The government needs to ensure that all of the country’s HIV- positive citizens 
have access to antiretroviral drugs. Furthermore, more should be done to educate the 
youth about how the disease can be contracted as well as its effects; this will 
contribute toward increasing South Africa’s life expectancy levels. Large differences 
in health and education levels rival the divisive role that inequality plays in the South 
African society. These visible differences need to be addressed in order for the 
country’s multicultural citizens to share commonalities that transcend the myriad of 
ethnic identities. 
 
6.3. Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this study was to propose the most optimal and inclusive 
strategies at South Africa’s disposal that would give the country the best possible 
opportunity to reach its ambition of being classified as a developed country. A fifteen-
year time scope was used with the intention of implementing strategies that would 
realize this goal by 2025. The aim of this thesis was to move away from a primarily 
economic approach that would ordinarily be used when addressing this question. A 
branch of political economy, known as the modern world-system theoretical 
perspective, was used in order to provide the necessary holistic approach for this 
undertaking. From this perspective, global power structures are determined by a 
country’s position in the division of labour within the modern world-system. This 
means either forming part of the core, semi-peripheral, or peripheral group of 
countries. National development requires ascent in this political-economic hierarchy. 
World-system theorists emphasise that the components of national development are 
all-encompassing and require an increase in state strength, long-term economic 
development, and domestic and international cultural influence.  
 
The second chapter provided a solid theoretical understanding of the approach, with 
Wallerstein explaining that three economic strategies were available to countries 
wishing to develop within the capitalist world-economy. This involved ascending by 
means of seizing the chance (import substitution); by invitation (an export-led growth 
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strategy); and through the strategy of self-reliance (closed national approach). Semi-
peripheral ascent had the additional requirements of attaining optimal cost levels as 
well as having a large enough market for its products at its disposal. It was 
emphasised throughout the study that political and sociocultural strategies were also 
important components of South Africa’s development. 
 
The aim of chapter three was to locate South Africa in the modern world-system, and 
to gain a better understanding of what its role had been within the system up until this 
point. It was discovered that the country was first incorporated into the periphery of 
the world-system during the 1840s with the exportation of wool and sugar. South 
Africa’s development was given a significant push with the discovery of diamonds 
and gold. This allowed it to develop industry and by the 1920s the country reached 
semi-peripheral status. The South African government focused predominantly on 
import substitution for its growth thereafter, until the early 1970s when it began to 
investigate the possibility of expanding the export sector. South Africa is firmly 
established as an advanced semi-peripheral state and it has continued on an upward 
curve within this group when compared to the previous assessments of its position by 
theorists such as McGowan and Andreasson. South Africa’s current position in the 
modern world-system was gained by using a broad spectrum of indicators, which 
included its GNI per capita, the composition and growth of its GDP, the nature of its 
imports and exports, its regional hegemonic attributes, its foreign policy and 
democratic characteristics, and finally its sociocultural traits. 
 
Chapter four accounted for the changing dynamics of the world-system at large. It 
looked at how countries developed traditionally and how this environment has 
changed today. It was found that countries could adopt any of the three strategies with 
varying success up until the early 1990s. China and Russia utilised self-reliance, 
Mexico and Brazil adopted import substitution, whereas South Korea and Taiwan 
favoured export-led growth. Upon closer inspection it was found that these 
approaches were not as dissimilar as they were first thought to be. In fact, import 
substitution and export-led growth were used by the latter two sets of countries 
interchangeably. Wade (2004), Chang (2003) and List (1885) discovered that this 
approach had actually been followed during the development of the majority of core 
states, as well as the previous hegemons.  
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The World Trade Organisation changed the rules of the game in 1995 by pushing the 
neoliberal developmental agenda. Trade restrictions were imposed by the WTO on 
countries wishing to adopt protectionist policies. The core states were trying to hide 
the success of their development by limiting the policy options of developing 
countries. Chang (2003) referred to the blatant refusal of core powers to allow 
developing countries the opportunity to adopt the strategies that made them successful 
as ‘Kicking away the Ladder’. The WTO made use of the TRIPS, TRIMS, and the 
GATS Agreements, to limit their policy options as core states stand to benefit the 
most from free trade. It has essentially taken away the ability to put economic growth 
at the forefront of government policy, thus preventing the formation of developmental 
states. The Organisation backs its restrictive development measures up with an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism that is heavily weighted toward protecting the 
interests of core powers. 
 
Effective developmental strategies were proposed in the fifth chapter once South 
Africa’s current position in the modern world-system had been identified. This firstly 
required an analysis of what the structure of the world-system would be in 2025. It 
was established that South Africa would most likely have to contend with a multipolar 
world-system by that time. The interesting thing is that a global shift in power from 
West to East is emerging with an increasingly strong China and India. With the 
growth of South Africa and Brazil added into the mix an opportunity will be provided 
to foster greater South-South relations, which will result in the weakening of 
traditional Western alliances.  
 
Table 12 illustrates the most optimal strategies proposed for South Africa’s 
development making use of the modern world-system theoretical perspective. It is 
recommended that the country’s long-term economic development needs to be 
approached by using both the import substitution and export-led growth strategies. A 
strong state needs to be created at the same time. It is suggested that the South African 
government continues along the path of adopting the attributes of a developmental 
state. Finally, the country needs to focus on furthering its domestic and international 
cultural strength. The ability to expand its soft power will allow South Africa to exert 
greater influence on the world-system than it already does. Drawing from chapter six 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 113 
the table also contains the internal and external constraints and incentives within the 
three factors that need to be addressed and exploited respectively.  
  
Table 12: Summary of South Africa’s Proposed Growth Strategies 
 
Final conclusion 
It is clear based on the evidence provided that South Africa faces numerous 
constraints to its development, despite the noteworthy economic, political and 
sociocultural incentives that it could potentially capitalise on over the next fifteen 
years.  These constraints point to the fact that South Africa is not in the best position 
right now to reap the benefits of the most optimal developmental strategies put 
forward by the modern world-systems approach; this holds true for all three 
Factor Objective Strategy Incentives Constraints
i)   Import Substitution i)    South-South Trade i)    Mineral-Energy   
      Complex
ii)  Export-Led Growth ii)   B-Phase of
       World-Economy ii)   Wage Levels  
       Influenced
iii)  Capture the        by Labour Unions
       African Market
iii)  Technology and   
       Infrastructure       
                                    
iv)  Affirmative Action  
      and Brain Drain
i)   Democratic 
Consolidation
i)    Corruption
ii)  Partnership-Building ii)   Crime
      Foreign Policy
iii)  Xenophobia
i)    English-Speaking i)    Unemployment
ii)   Peace-Promoting ii)   Poverty
       Foreign Policy
iii)  Inequality
iii)  Hosting Major
       Sporting Events iv)  Health
iv)  High Quality 
Academic 
v)   Education
       Institutions
v)   Strong Brand Image
Strategic Proposal for South Africa's Ascent in the Modern World-System
Economic
Long-term Economic 
Development
Political
Creation of a Strong 
State
Government Policies 
that Drive Development
Social/Cultural
Cultural Strength and 
Influence
Government to 
Strengthen  South 
Africa's Domestic and 
International Soft Power 
and Sense of Unity
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components for development. Ultimately that leaves South Africa in a position 
whereby it will be severely challenged to attain core status by 2025.  
 
6.4. Prospects for Further Research 
It has been argued that a holistic approach is needed in order to make more effective 
proposals for South Africa’s path toward development. Even though the modern 
world-systems approach is criticised in many circles, there is value in seeing how the 
country operates within the dynamics of the system. The government’s recent policy 
documents attest to the move away from a primarily export-led growth economic 
strategy, by realising the need to protect and promote the growth of certain industries. 
It appears that the government also realises the importance of having a strong state 
that is focussed on driving development. The creation of a strong South African 
brand, as well as the resources that were allocated toward the successful hosting of the 
2010 FIFA World Cup, confirms the national government’s ambition to strengthen its 
cultural influence within the world-system. 
  
The Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) unit in the Presidency 
compiled a Scenario Planning Process in 2008 entitled South Africa Scenarios 2025: 
The future we chose? The purpose of the document was to provide a reflective view of 
the three paths that South Africa may have traversed come 2025. They created the 
three possible scenarios (Table 13) that South Africa may have experienced, looking 
back as if it was already the year 2025 (Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, 
2008:3-11). 
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Table 13: South Africa Scenarios in 2025 
 
Source: Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, 2008:3-11; South African 
Government, 2009:4. 
 
It is clear that the ‘Nkalakatha’ scenario contains the attributes of a developmental 
state, whereas the other two possess a predominantly economic focus. The 
‘Muvhango’ and ‘Not yet Uhuru’ scenarios illustrate that a purely economic 
approach, whether the outcomes are positive or negative, cannot  cover all of the 
facets that are required for broad-based development. Further research should be 
conducted over the next few years pertaining to which is the likely scenario for South 
Africa come 2025; much of this will depend on whether the government has the 
capacity to adopt the development strategies that resemble the holistic approach put 
forward by world-systems theorists. This would involve a strong, legitimate state that 
directs the economy’s long-term growth, and fosters cultural strength and the 
wellbeing of its citizens. In order to measure whether South Africa’s development has 
been successful by 2025, the indicators that were used to derive the country’s current 
Scenarios Description
Scenario 1 Not yet Uhuru
This depicts a Government strongly 
committed to accelerating economic 
growth through optimising conditions for 
private investment, but which struggles to 
achieve its goals in the face of slow 
growth and minimal sharing of benefits, 
deteriorating global conditions and 
severe ecological challenges
Scenario 2 Nkalakatha
This depicts a more cohesive society as 
a result of government articulating a 
compelling national vision and fostering 
partnerships, while playing a more 
central role in the economy, prioritising 
poverty reduction and skills enhancement
Scenario 3 Muvhango
This depicts a government that battles to 
govern well despite an initial resurgence 
of the economy and positive world 
conditions, because of poor planning, 
lack of coordination, slow policy 
implementation as well as internecine 
and debilitating warfare within the party-
political arena
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position in the modern world-system should show greater similarities to the figures 
associated with the core group of states, as opposed to the semi-peripheral group. It is 
unlikely, however, that this will be the case in the given time period.  
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